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Moral injury is a relatively new area of study within military mental health care, 
as such, prevalence estimates for both moral injury and exposure to potentially morally 
injurious events (PMIE; a moral injury precursor) are unknown for many of the world’s 
militaries.  PMIE is commonly defined as the perpetrating, failing to prevent, witnessing, 
or learning about acts or events that transgress an individual’s deeply held moral 
belief(s).  The primary purpose of this study was to estimate the prevalence of PMIE in a 
population of Canadian Armed Forces (CF) members who served in support of the recent 
mission to Afghanistan.  How exposure to PMIE may affect these individuals’ self-
reported rates positive mental health served as a secondary research question.  To this 
end, a secondary data analysis was conducted using the results of the 2013 Canadian 
Forces Mental Health Survey, a cross-sectional survey of over 8,000 active-duty CF 
members conducted by Statistics Canada for the Department of National Defence and the 
CF.   
Statistical analysis revealed that over 65% of CF members reported exposure to at 
least one event that would be considered a PMIE.  The most commonly reported PMIE 
types included seeing ill or injured women and children that they were unable to help 
(48%), being unable to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (44%), and 
finding themselves in a threatening situation where they were unable to respond due to 
the rules of engagement they were required to operate under (35%).  Results of the 
second research question revealed that the positive mental health status of CF members 
overall differed slightly from the Canadian population as a whole.  However, when CF 
members’ positive mental health statuses were compared according to PMIE exposure  
iii 
 
status those exposed were found to be 37% less likely to be flourishing, and 138% more 
likely to be languishing when compared to those who were not exposed. 
These findings provide support for both the presence of exposure to PMIE in CF 
members who were deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan, and the 
detrimental effect that such exposure has on their mental health.  The implications and 
limitations of these findings and potential directions for future research into moral injury 
and PMIE are also discussed. 
 
Keywords:  moral injury, trauma, ethics, military, prevalence rate, Afghanistan, positive 
mental health, secondary data analysis 
 
 




The path to the completion of my doctoral work was a long and winding one made easier 
through the help of a number of people, both professionally and personally.  My 
supervisor, Dr. Ken Kirkwood, thank you for helping me sort the “wheat from the chaff” 
over these last four years.  Your reminding me that what’s required isn’t always 
important served to reduce my stress more than once and is a lesson I will take with me 
out into the post-academic world.  Dr. Charles Nelson, your knowledge about the real-
world of military trauma has been invaluable to me, clarifying my thoughts and ensuring 
that what was seen at the bench is applicable at the bedside and beyond as well.  Dr. 
Louis Charland, thank you for agreeing to serve on my Advisory Committee and all the 
work that entailed.  Your comments and questions over the various iterations of my 
chapters allowed me the opportunity to see my research from a different perspective and 
opened up new ways to think about research as a whole.  My doctoral work was also 
assisted greatly through the funding provided by the following sources: The St. Joseph’s 
Hospital Foundation by means of the Robert S. & Mary Gay, Donald, James and Helen 
(Taylor) Gay Endowed Research Fellowship in Veterans Care, as well as funds provided 
to the Canadian Research Data Centre Network (CRDCN) from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), the Canadian Institutes for Health Research 
(CIHR), the Canadian Foundation for Innovation (CFI), and Statistics Canada.  Although 
the research and analysis are based on data from Statistics Canada, the opinions 
expressed do not represent the views of Statistics Canada. 
I also want to thank my friends and family for all their help and support over my journey; 
knowing when to leave me be and when to pull me back into the light.  In particular, I 
want to thank Dr. Iris Gutmanis:  You started as a colleague but quickly became both a 
friend and a confidant, and for that I am more thankful than you know.  Lastly, and by far 
most importantly, Melodie Sargeant.  You have been at my side through this whole 
process, all the ups and downs, stresses and strains, sitting patiently through my long-
winded ramblings as I tried to make sense of what I wanted to say.  No words can capture 
just how much having you in my life has enriched that life, but I promise I will never stop 
looking for the words to tell you. 
 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ii 
Acknowledgements iv 
Table of Contents vi 
List of Tables ix 
List of Figures x 
List of Appendices xi 
List of Abbreviations xii 
Chapter 1.  Moral Injury in the Military: A conceptual review 1 
 Moral Injury 10 
 PTSD and Moral Injury 15 
 Assessment tools for Moral Injury and PMIE 17 
  Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) 18 
  Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M) 20 
  Moral Injury Symptom Scale – Military Version (MISS-M) 22 
  Expressions of Moral Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M) 24 
 Summary 25 
 References 29 
Chapter 2.  Canadian Forces ethics training: Applicability to moral injury 37 
 Mental health and stress management: Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) 40 
 Ethics training provided to DND employees and CF service members 46 
 Defence Ethics Program (DEP) 50 
  Values and Ethics 51 
vi 
 
  Values and Ethics in Operations 56 
  Values and Ethics training specific to the CF 56 
 DEP ethical decision-making model 59 
 Application of the DEP ethical decision-making model for PMIE 64 
  Scenario 1: Terrorist attack 64 
  Scenario 2: Child soldier 69 
  Scenario 3: Abuse of a minor 71 
 Observations relating to CF preparation for PMIE 78 
 Recommendations 89 
 References 91 
Chapter 3.  Prevalence Rate of Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE)  
         in CF members 97 
 Aims of Study 101 
 Methods 101 
  Data source and study population 101 
  Sampling and data collection 102 
  Measures 102 
  Statistical Analysis 104 
  Ethics Approval 105 
 Results 105 
 Discussion 118 
  Prevalence rate for exposure to PMIE 119 
  Characteristics associated with PMIE exposure 121 
vii 
 
 References 129 
Chapter 4.  Connection between exposure to PMIE and Self-Rated  
          Positive Mental Health 135 
 Aims of Study 139 
 Methods 139 
  Data source and study population 139 
  Sampling and data collection 140 
  Measures 140 
  Statistical Analysis 142 
  Ethics Approval 143 
 Results 144 
 Discussion 150 
  Prevalence rates for self-reported positive mental health 150 
  Characteristics associated with MHC-SF classifications 152 
  Effect of PMIE exposure on MHC-SF classification 155 
 References 159 
Chapter 5.  Overall Discussion 165 
 Prevalence estimates for exposure to PMIE 165 
 Exposure to PMIE and self-reported mental health of CF members 166 
 CF Training around mental health and resilience 167 
 CF training around ethics and ethical decision making 169 
 Potential directions for future research 171 




 Appendix A: Adult Mental Health Continuum – Short Form 181 
 Appendix B: Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category - Flourishing 182 
 Appendix C: Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category - Moderate 186 
 Appendix D: Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category - Languishing 190 
Ethics Waiver Letter 194 
Curriculum Vitae 195 
 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN 
ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1.  Fundamental rules forming the basis of the Geneva Conventions 4 
Table 1.2.  Primary belligerents in the war in Afghanistan 7 
Table 2.1.  Military Mental Health Continuum Model 42 
Table 2.2.  Values and expected behaviours 55 
Table 3.1.  Demographic, military, and deployment characteristics 106 
Table 3.2.  Common symptoms and behavioural expressions of moral injury 109  
Table 3.3.  Logistic regression for prediction of exposure to PMIE 114 
Table 4.1.  Demographic, military, and deployment characteristics 145 
Table 4.2.  Associations between sociodemographic, military, and  
        deployment factors and self-reported mental health categories 148  




MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN 
x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1.  Civilian deaths by belligerent group, 2007 to 2017 (mid-year) 9 
Figure 2.1.  Statement of Defence Ethics 52 
Figure 2.2.  Four quadrants Ethical – Moral behaviour model 88 
Figure 4.1a.  Traditional single continuum model 136 
Figure 4.1b.  Dual-continuum model 136 
 
 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN 
xi 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A.  Adult Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF)  
Appendix B.  Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category – Flourishing 
Appendix C.  Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category – Moderate 








List of Abbreviations 
AGF Anti-Government Forces 
ALP Afghan Local Police 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANP Afghan National Police 
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
AOR Adjusted Odds Ratio 
CF Canadian Armed Forces 
CFMHS Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey 
CO Commanding Officer 
COI Conflict of Interest 
CRS Chief of Review Staff 
DEP Defence Ethics Program 
DND Department of National Defence 
DNR Do Not Resuscitate 
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
EMIS-M Expressions of Moral Injury Scale - Military Version 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
LOAC Law of Armed Combat 




MHC-SF Mental Health Continuum - Short Form 
MHT Mental Health Training 
MI Moral Injury 
MIES Moral Injury Events Scale 
MIQ-M Moral Injury Questionnaire - Military Version 
MISS-M Moral Injury Symptoms Scale - Military Version 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Association 
NCM Non-Commissioned Member [Canadian Armed Forces] 
NDS National Directorate of Security [Afghanistan] 
PGF Pro-Government Forces 
PMH Positive Mental Health 
PMIE Potentially Morally Injurious Event 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
R2MR Road to Mental Readiness 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
SS Secondary School 
TCPS 2 Tri-Council Policy Statement 
UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle (“drone”) 
WHO World Health Organization 
 
 





Moral Injury in the Military: A conceptual review 
The psychological impacts of war on those involved, be they civilians or soldiers, 
have been known almost as long as there has been war.  Our understanding of these 
sequalae, however, has evolved over the years through direct observation of the 
behaviour of combatants, clinical work conducted with veterans, and focussed research in 
the area.  As a consequence of this changing knowledge, the terminology used to describe 
these impacts has also changed (for review see Ray, 2008).  In the 19th century, for 
example, field doctors observed that soldiers sometimes experienced episodes of extreme 
fatigue, tremors, shortness of breath, sweating, heart palpitations, and occasionally even 
fainting spells.  Believing the cause to be a disruption in heart function, they referred to 
the symptoms collectively as soldier’s heart, and prescribed removing the soldiers from 
the battle until the symptoms passed, after which they would return to the frontlines.  
During and after World War I, the understanding of combat stress reactions changed to 
include symptoms of hysteria (now called a “conversion disorder”) such as paralysis, 
tremors, spasms, and disordered gait, and nervous exhaustion (fatigue, headaches, 
depressed mood, and nightmares).  Following the prevailing theories of psychiatry of the 
time, professionals began referring to the syndrome as war neurosis, or more commonly, 
shell shock.  By the start of World War II, these terms had begun to fall out of use as it 
became apparent that individuals not exposed to war or shelling were experiencing 
symptoms similar to those soldiers that were exposed.  This discovery lead to a 
broadening of the area of inquiry to include investigations into the characteristics of the 
trauma(s) experienced and how these might be related to the symptoms that were 




experienced; specifically, investigations into how individuals react both physically and 
psychologically to stressful events.  Included in the newly written Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM, American Psychiatric Association, 1952) 
as stress response syndrome, the diagnosis recognized that when confronted with extreme 
physical or psychological stress, otherwise normal people could exhibit similar symptoms 
as those experienced by those exposed to combat. By the 1980s, clinical understanding of 
the syndrome had further advanced and the name was changed to post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) with formal diagnostic criteria being included in both the DSM-III 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) and the International Classification of Diseases 
and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision (ICD-10, World Health Organization, 1992). 
Refinements to the diagnostic criteria over successive versions of the DSM, including 
changes in the categorization of PTSD as an anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980, 1994, 2000) to a newly formed category of “Traumatic and stress 
related disorders” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The change in 
categorization in the DSM-5 stemmed in part from the new requirement that symptom 
onset must have been preceded by a traumatic or otherwise adverse environmental event 
(Friedman, 2017). 
Changes in understanding about causation and symptomatology are not the only 
sources for change with regards to military mental health.  Rather changes in the nature 
and style of conflict can lead to completely new forms of military trauma.  Until recently, 
wars were fought by means of “conventional warfare” between state actors of 
approximately equal size, strength, and technical ability.  Combatants wore uniforms that 
clearly identified which state they belonged to, and physical targets in battle were 




primarily opposing military forces (e.g., bases, airfields, ship yards), military-supportive 
structures (e.g., factories producing items for the war effort), critical infrastructure (e.g., 
roads, bridges, rail lines), or communications related (e.g., radio and television stations, 
telephone, and telegraph lines).  As well, the signing of the Geneva Conventions after 
World War II made hospitals, places of worship, and places of cultural importance 
protected sites under international law (de Preux, 1990).  These wars would generally 
continue until either one party capitulated, or a truce was reached by either political or 
other means.  For the most part, both parties knew, understood, and fought according to 
an agreed upon set of rules - the Geneva Conventions (de Preux, 1990), the Law of 
Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law, and Just War Theory (D.-P. Baker, 
2015), and both parties knew that the punishments could be severe (e.g., act could be 
considered a war crime) if these rules were violated.  (See Table 1.1 for fundamental 
rules underlying the Geneva Conventions.) 
This type of state-on-state warfare, however, has been on the decline (van 
Creveld, 2006) and has given way to a rise in more unconventional, asymmetric forms of 
fighting where the parties involved often differ significantly in military power.  
Asymmetric warfare (also called guerrilla warfare, insurgency/counter-insurgency, 
terrorism/counter-terrorism) has existed in some form for as long as there has been war; 
be it “resistance forces” fighting alongside traditional combatants in a conventional war, 
or civilians taking up arms against an oppressive government or invading force.  For the 
most part, this type of asymmetric fighting was more of an adjunct form of warfighting, 
done on a small scale, for the purposes of disrupting one of the parties in the larger war so 
that their opposition could gain the advantage.  





Fundamental rules forming the basis of the Geneva Conventions (adapted from de Preux, 
1990) 
1. Distinction between civilians and combatants 
Distinction must always be made between the civilian population and combatants 
so as to spare both civilian population and property.  Neither the civilian 
population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack.  Attacks shall 
be directed solely against military objectives. 
2. Perfidy is prohibited 
Intentionally deceiving an adversary into believing that the attacker is deserving 
of immunity from harm with the intent of betraying that confidence for military 
gain (ex., a combatant dressing as a civilian to get close to a checkpoint and 
detonate an IED; feigning surrender to draw adversary in closer so they can be 
killed) is prohibited. 
3. Proportionality of force/action 
The amount of force used must be proportional to the expected military gain 
achieved.  Any action that could be foreseen as having the potential to cause 
excessive incidental loss of civilian life, civilian injury, or damage to civilian 
property is prohibited if alternatives are available. 
4. Infliction of unnecessary suffering is prohibited (personal) 
No person, combatant or civilian, shall be subjected to acts that lead to 
unnecessary suffering.  This includes corporal punishment, cruel or degrading 
treatment, and physical or psychological torture. 
5. Infliction of unnecessary suffering is prohibited (means and methods) 
The use of means and methods of warfare that will cause unnecessary losses or 
physical suffering (ex., use of expanding/hollow-point bullets) is prohibited. 
6. Hors de combat are to be protected 
Combatants considered to be hors de combat [“out of the fight” due to injury or 
disability; no longer a threat] are entitled to respect for their lives and physical 
integrity, be protected and treated humanely. 
7. Injury or killing of hors de combat or those that surrender is forbidden 
The injury or killing of combatants who have surrendered or are no longer able to 
fight is forbidden. 
8. Treatment of the sick and wounded 
The sick and wounded shall be collected and cared for by the party which has 
them in its power.  This protection also covers medical personnel, establishments 
(ex., hospitals, medical facilities), transports (ex. ambulances), and equipment. 
9. Treatment of “prisoners of war” (POWs) 
Any captured combatants or civilians are to have their lives, dignity, personal 
rights, and convictions respected.  This includes protection from any acts of 
violence or reprisals from the party detaining them. 
 
 




Asymmetric warfare, almost by its very nature, is prone to violating some of the 
typical or accepted rules of engagement.  Van Creveld (2006) uses the example of an 
adult fighting against a child as an analogy for asymmetric warfare: no matter what their 
motivation or reasoning, if an adult fights a child, the adult is seen to be in the wrong and 
their behaviour is considered to be unjust (due to the difference in power between them 
and the child); it does not matter if the child started the fight, or if they were wrong by 
doing so.  By extension, because the child is a child, they need to worry less about the 
“rightness” of their actions and are entitled to more leeway in terms of how they behave 
and what techniques they use in the fight to “level the playing field” (e.g., they are 
“allowed” to bite, kick, spit, pull hair, etc., which an adult would not be allowed to do), 
since to fight according to the same rules as the adult would put them at a distinct 
disadvantage (van Creveld, 2006).  While this reasoning does not serve to justify the 
child’s behaviour (kicking, biting, and spitting are still wrong), it does make it a little 
more understandable.  When this reasoning is applied to real-world conflicts, like the 
recent war in Afghanistan, the larger problems it can create for those fighting become 
more apparent.  
In late 2001, in response to the attacks on September 11, the United States of 
America led a NATO invasion of Afghanistan that caused the overthrow of the Taliban, a 
group that held de facto political control over the majority of Afghanistan at the time.  
This NATO force would eventually grow and become the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), a force composed of trained service members predominantly 
from western countries, who, as part of their training, would have received instruction in 
the aforementioned rules of war and Just War Theory (D.-P. Baker, 2015), as well as 




been provided with specific rules of engagement (ROE) that they would be bound to 
during this deployment.  This invasion and overthrow would effectively make the Taliban 
into an insurgent group within Afghanistan who, along with the members of Al-Qaida 
believed to be hiding there, would fight against the newly established Islamic 
Government of Afghanistan and its coalition allies.  (See Table 1.2 for primary 
belligerents in the war in Afghanistan.)   
Were the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their associated off-shoot groups (“anti-
government forces”) to fight according to the same internationally agreed upon rules of 
war that bound the “pro-government forces,” they would likely have quickly lost due to 
the superior weaponry, training, strategy, and technology of their opponents, in particular, 
the ISAF.  As a result, the anti-government forces disregarded these rules and in doing so, 
effectively turned those rules against pro-government forces.  For example, anti-
government forces would routinely dress like civilians, hide amongst the civilian 
population, and use buildings as staging areas for their attacks that were considered to be 
protected sites (e.g., hospitals, schools, places of worship) (United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan, 2017a; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016); many of 
these actions would be in violation of international law.  Compounding these acts of 
perfidy, anti-government forces were known to use civilians and children, often gaining 
their cooperation by threatening them or their loved ones, to plant/detonate improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), as suicide bombers, and act as distractions believing that 
civilians would be less likely to be seen as a threat by the ISAF forces and thereby be 
fired upon (Fowler, 2016). The use of indiscriminate weapons and tactics as IEDs,  




Table 1.2   
Primary belligerents in the war in Afghanistan 
Anti-government forces 
• Taliban a  
• Al-Qaida and its offshoot groups (including the Islamic State in Syria and Levant; 
ISIS/ISIL) 
Pro-government forces 
• Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
o Afghan National Army (ANA) 
o Afghan National Police (ANP) 
o Afghan Local Police (ALP) 
o National Directorate of Security (NDS) 
• International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] (coalition force) 
o United States 
o United Kingdom 
o Canada 
o Other NATO member states to varying degrees 
• Various local militias and armed groups b 
Note: a Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001 when 
it was overthrown in the US-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan conducted in response to 
the September 11, 2001 terror attacks by Al-Qaida. 
b While these groups may not technically be “pro-government,” as they were often 
headed by various tribal warlords (Fowler, 2016), they were anti-Taliban/anti-al-Qaida as 
they opposed these groups’ role in the production of illicit drugs such as opium and 
cannabis (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007); the Taliban/al-Qaida were a 
common enemy. 
 
rockets, and mortars, as well as undirected shooting during clashes with pro-government 
forces in populated areas, also put civilians and other innocents at undue risk of harm and 
made it increasingly difficult for ISAF to engage them without also risking civilians’ 
lives.   
Unfortunately, such disregard of the rules of war was not limited to the anti-
government forces.  United Nations reports on the protection of civilians in Afghanistan 
(United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2017a) reported that members of the 
Afghan National Security Force, specifically the Afghan National Army, were 
responsible for an estimated 2,728 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) in 2016 alone.  




According to the writers of this report, just over half (53%) of the civilian causalities 
caused by pro-government forces resulted from the use of mortars, artillery, or other 
indirect or explosive ordnance during ground engagements with insurgents.  The various 
local militias and assorted other armed groups who also took part were believed to be 
responsible for an additional estimated 185 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) in 
2016, also mainly during ground engagements (United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan, 2017a).  Of particular note, the deaths attributed to these “pro-government 
armed groups” did not only occur during engagements with anti-government forces, but 
also during engagements with other pro-government armed groups, usually when either 
members of rival political parties, rival warlords, or rivals based on old tribal hatreds 
encountered each other on the battlefield (Fowler, 2016; United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan, 2017a; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016).  (See Figure 
1.1 for Civilian deaths by belligerent group, 2007-2017). 
Compounding the circumstances further, the rules of engagement (ROE) under 
which the ISAF were required to fight, could occasionally put ISAF troops into situations 
where they might need to make life or death decisions based on little or no available 
information.  For example, a soldier guarding a checkpoint sees what appears to be a 
civilian with a bundle in his arms running towards the checkpoint.  Not knowing if the 
individual has hostile intent, since insurgents have been known to use suicide bombers to 





Figure 1.1 Civilian Deaths by Belligerent Group, 2007 to 2017 (mid-year). 
AGF = Anti-Government Forces, PGF = Pro-Government Forces, “Joint AGF and PGF” 
means that the civilian deaths could not be conclusively attributed by the UN to one 
specific party (e.g., deaths in a cross-fire), Other = deaths caused by neither party (e.g., 
cross-border shelling, unexploded ordinance from current or prior conflicts).  (United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2017a, 2017b; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016) 
 
attack checkpoints, the soldier follows the ROE for the situation, giving the requisite 
verbal warnings for the individual to stop, which are ignored, and shoots and kills the 
individual, neutralizing the potential threat to himself, his unit, and the civilians nearby.  
Upon further investigation, it becomes known that the civilian was attempting to get help 
for the injured child they were carrying and had no ill intent; following the ROE led to 
the shooting of an innocent man.   
Taken together, at any given time, members of the ISAF could be both fighting 
against and alongside individuals for whom the established rules of war do not apply or 




are not enforced, while they themselves (i.e., the ISAF) have their actions and decisions 
bound by these very rules.  As well, they could be put into situations where they need to 
take actions without the benefit of having all the information available to determine what 
the correct action might be.  Events such as these can put service members into positions 
that can violate their own deeply held beliefs about the world (e.g., what is right/wrong, 
just/unjust) and their role in it.  The inner conflict that can follow these sorts of 
transgressive events can lead service members to experience what has recently been 
termed a “moral injury.” 
Moral Injury 
 Shay (Shay, 1991) first used the term moral injury to describe the internal 
conflicts he witnessed while treating Vietnam veterans.  Many of the psychological 
conflicts these veterans appeared to be experiencing did not conform to the understanding 
of post-combat stress of the time, rather they appeared to be of a more 
philosophical/existential nature, according to Shay, consistent with a shattering of 
assumptions about the self, the world, and how the two relate.  Basing his interpretations 
on a comparison between the behaviours reported by combat veterans experiencing 
severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the story of the warrior Achilles during 
the Trojan War, as told in the Iliad by Homer, Shay postulated the following seven signs 
clinicians should take note of as they may be indicative of a moral injury:  
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN  11 
 
1. Having experienced a betrayal of what is right, often by someone in power or a 
position of authority;  
2. Loss of social and moral horizon; individuals report no longer fighting for a greater 
goal or their country, but rather fighting instead for their comrades in arms; 
3. A sense of numbness after the battle replacing the usual grief and mourning following 
the loss of comrades;  
4. Feelings of failure when a comrade dies and a desire to change places with them 
(“Why couldn’t I have saved him?  It should have been me”);  
5. The desire to switch places with their fallen comrades may escalate to feeling that 
they are already dead;  
6. Similarly, in battle the feelings of grief and loss are sublimated into a rage state that 
may fuel increasingly risky behaviours, temporary loss of fear, and on occasion, 
increased cruelty (berserking);  
7. Dishonouring or dehumanizing of the enemy through either the use of derogatory 
terms or through their actions (e.g., taking of “trophies”) (Shay, 2014). 
 
Interestingly, while Shay defined moral injury as “a betrayal of what is right by someone 
who holds legitimate authority” in both in his original and later refinements of the 
concept (Shay, 1991, 2014), six of the seven behaviours he recommended clinicians 
attend to focussed on the behaviour of the individual themselves and not that of a 
powerful other such as a military leader.  
 Unlike Shay (Shay, 1991, 2014), who’s definition combined how the individual 
behaved in combat with the clinician’s subjective impression to define moral injury itself, 
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Litz (Litz et al., 2009) instead proposed a working definition, based on existing PTSD 
literature, for potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIE); that is, experiences that 
could potentially lead to a moral injury. Specifically, Litz defined a PMIE as: 
perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress 
deeply held moral beliefs and expectations (p. 700).  This transgression, he proposed, 
leads to a kind of cognitive dissonance being created between what the individual has 
done/seen/failed to prevent (i.e., the PMIE) and their own internalized beliefs about how 
things should be (e.g., how the world works, how people should behave), or what their 
own role in the situation is supposed to be (e.g., protection of the innocent and stopping 
the guilty).  Others have phrased their definitions of PMIE slightly differently and with 
varying specificity (Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015; Drescher et al., 2011), but 
at their core they all contain references to a transgressive event occurring that causes a 
disruption to the individual’s sense of morality.  Litz (2009) goes on to stipulate that it is 
not the PMIE itself that causes the moral injury, rather the moral injury is a result of a 
multi-stage thought process that occurs within the individual beginning with the 
(re)processing of the PMIE after the fact, followed by a realization that a moral 
transgression has occurred, which leads to a cognitive dissonance being created in the 
individual.  It is the failure to resolve this dissonance that leads the individual to 
sustaining the moral injury.  This injury can present as a constellation of symptoms 
including: feelings of inappropriate guilt, shame, self-directed anger (because they 
betrayed their beliefs), self-condemnation, withdrawal from others, overt self-harm or 
increases in risk taking behaviours, self-handicapping behaviours (e.g., increased 
substance use or abuse, relationship sabotage), and existential or spiritual problems (e.g., 
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a loss of religion), or a disruption in the individual’s confidence and expectations about 
one’s own and others’ motivation or capacity to behave in a just or ethical manner 
(Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015; Drescher et al., 2011).  
 In the broadest sense, transgressive acts can be divided into two broad categories 
based on the morally injured party’s involvement with the perceived transgression: direct 
(perpetration, or failure to prevent), or indirect (witnessing, or learning about after the 
fact).  A direct relationship exists if there was something the individual believes they 
could have done, or not done, that could have potentially changed the outcome of the 
situation.  Perpertrative acts in war can include, but are not limited to: the accidental 
killing of a non-combatant in a firefight or as a result of misidentifying them as a threat, 
indiscriminate killing of others while the individual was in a fit of rage (similar to Shay’s 
(1991) berserking), or the intentional torture, killing, or desecration, of either combatants 
or non-combatants (atrocities).  Failure to prevent transgressive acts could include acts 
such as failing to make sure buildings were clear of civilians prior to calling in an 
airstrike, failing to inform comrades after identifying civilians in the area, as well as 
failing to prevent any of the aforementioned perpertrative acts from being done by 
another.  In contrast, an indirect relationship exists if there was nothing that the individual 
could have done to affect the outcome of the situation, either because the transgressive 
event had already occurred (e.g., discovering a mass grave), or because they were not 
empowered to act in accordance with their moral beliefs.  An example of the latter would 
be the situation encountered during the UN Mission to Rwanda.  The UN mandate for the 
mission to Rwanda was that it be one of peacekeeping, as a result, UN forces were 
instructed to remain neutral and were prohibited from intervening in the actions of the 
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populous, only being allowed to act if they were directly threatened (Dallaire, 2003), as to 
intervene in any other way could be seen as taking sides.1  As neither party directly 
threatened the UN forces, UN troops were unable to more than merely observe and report 
on the genocide that was occurring in front of them.  
Litz (Litz et al., 2009) goes on to propose that how one views or interprets the 
transgression and their role in it, may determine what behavioural or psychological 
symptoms they experience and how these symptoms might progress.  For example, if the 
individual sees the transgression as caused by something they did (i.e., behaviour, “I did 
something bad/wrong”), this may lead to feelings of guilt about that behaviour.  At this 
point, the guilt could still be functional as it could lead the individual to seek to make 
reparations for their misdeed and change their behaviour so that they do not transgress in 
that way again.  If the individual is not able to make reparations sufficient to relieve their 
inner conflict, however, their attribution of fault may change and become internalized (“If 
the behaviour cannot be forgiven, maybe it is because I am unforgivable”).  When the 
transgression interpreted as being a result of a character flaw (i.e., something is wrong 
with them, “I am a bad person”), this may lead to a feeling of shame and fear of 
judgement by others: “If you look in my eyes, you will see the stain on my soul” (R. 
Lanius, personal communication, 8 May 2015).  This shame and fear of judgement can 
lead the individual to withdraw from others both psychologically (e.g., they are unwilling 
to discuss the transgressive event or their role in it) and socially.  This tendency to 
withdraw from others can be especially problematic for the individual’s recovery as 
                                                     
1 For example, if a UN soldier were to intervene to stop members of Group A from attacking a 
civilian of Group B, they would be seen as taking the side of Group B since they were providing 
them with protection. 
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people tend to focus on information that reinforces their existing beliefs while 
downplaying or ignoring contrary information.  While withdrawing from others does 
indeed decrease the likelihood of judgement, it will also decrease the likelihood of 
exposure to individuals and situations that can challenge their distorted perceptions of 
themselves and the transgressive event.  Without access to this contrary information, their 
distorted cognitions about themselves and the transgressive event can cause the distorted 
thinking to become more ingrained and resistant to change. 
PTSD and Moral Injury 
While aspects of moral injury symptomatology can overlap with those present in 
PTSD (e.g., the revisiting and reprocessing of the transgressive event, social withdrawal, 
and self-condemnation of moral injury may parallel the re-experiencing and rumination, 
avoidance, and emotional numbing seen in PTSD), the two stress injuries differ in 
important ways.  First, current conceptualizations of PTSD are predicated upon its being 
a fear-based adjustment disorder that requires there to have been exposure to an actual or 
threatened event in which the individual is at risk of serious injury or death (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Stein et al., 2012).  A key aspect of PTSD is that the cause 
(or agent) of this perceived life threat is external to the individual; someone or something 
threatens the individual which leads to their trauma.  With moral injury, the agent of the 
trauma comes from within the individual themselves through the conscious or 
unconscious reprocessing of the transgressive event.  Put another way, it is the 
reprocessing of the event and the conclusions the individual draws based on this 
reprocessing, that are the actual cause of the moral injury and not the event itself (Litz et 
al., 2009).  This would mean that until the event is reprocessed, be it days, months, or 
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even years after the initial act, the “injury” has yet to occur.  Second, PTSD does not 
require a transgression of one’s morality or belief system to have occurred for the 
trauma/injury to be experienced.  In contrast, a transgression of one’s morality or belief 
system must have occurred and have been recognized as having occurred by the 
individual, for there to be a moral injury.  Returning to the earlier example of the 
individual running at the checkpoint with an unidentified bundle, if it had turned out that 
they were a suicide bomber or carrying an IED, it is less likely that the soldier would 
have seen killing them as an act that transgressed their moral beliefs; the soldier would 
likely have seen it as doing their job.  There is an emerging body of research that 
indicates that killing in war in itself is associated with the development of PTSD (Fontana 
& Rosenheck, 1999; Fontana, Rosenheck, & Brett, 1992; Maguen et al., 2010; Maguen et 
al., 2011; Maguen et al., 2013), however, how killing in general might be associated with 
the development of moral injury specifically, has yet to be determined.  Finally, PTSD is 
a diagnosable mental disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and as such, has 
particular, objective criteria that must be met before the diagnosis can be conferred.  
There is no objective cut-off for the presence or absence moral injury, rather it is a 
dimensional construct in which the same individual can manifest symptoms ranging from 
none to severe at different points of time.  Further research will be required before the 
precise nature of the relationship between PTSD and moral injury can be determined.  An 
important first step to this goal is the creation of formal assessment tools for both 
exposure to PMIE and the presence of moral injury itself. 
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Assessment tools for moral injury and PMIE 
Due to its relative newness in the field of military mental health, formal 
assessment tools for both moral injury and exposure to potentially morally injurious 
events (PMIE) are similarly still in their infancy.  As part of their exploration of the 
concept of moral injury, Drescher et al. (2011) interviewed a group of researchers, policy 
makers, religious, and health care professionals working within the U.S. Department of 
Defence and the Department of Veterans Affairs about their proposed conceptualization 
of moral injury (i.e., disruptions in an individual’s confidence and expectations about 
one’s own or others’ motivation or capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner, p.9), 
and what elements of combat they felt would be most likely to lead to moral injury 
including what symptoms they would most expect to observe following exposure to a 
PMIE. Participants all agreed that the concept of moral injury was a useful one to aid in 
the understanding that the complexities of psychological issues experienced by service 
members and others can go beyond what is captured by the criteria for PTSD (Drescher et 
al., 2011).  Drescher et al. acknowledge that for research into moral injury to progress, 
including the potential for formal clinical trials, reliable and valid measures of the moral 
injury construct need to be developed and consistently applied by researchers, clinicians, 
and others in the field.  To date, only two assessment measures have been developed to 
specifically investigate PMIE exposure: The Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et 
al., 2013) and the Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier, 
Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015), while another two measures have been developed to 
measure the symptoms and expression of moral injury itself: the Moral Injury Symptom 
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Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 2017) and the Expressions of Moral 
Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 2017).  
Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES).  Developed in 2013 (Nash et al., 2013), the 
MIES is a scale to measure exposure to traumatic events that could lead to PTSD, not 
because they involved actual or threatened serious injury or death, as would be required 
by Criteria A of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), but because they caused individuals’ deeply held values and moral beliefs to be 
violated.  The MIES is a 9-item, self-report measure describing events that draw upon the 
Litz et al. (2009) definition of PMIE, namely involving the learning about, witnessing, 
failing to prevent, or perpetrating acts which violate the individual’s moral beliefs and 
expectations.  Response options are given on a six-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree) with higher scores being indicative of a greater 
intensity of event exposure.  The authors report that the even number of response options 
was selected to preclude respondents from providing a “neutral” answer.  The 
psychometric evaluation of the MIES utilized the final two cohorts of the Marine 
Resiliency Study (D. G. Baker et al., 2012), which was composed of Marines who were 
previously deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2008 and 2011, all of whom were 
male.  The first cohort (n = 533) was administered the MIES approximately 1-week post 
deployment, and again approximately 3-months post deployment, while the second 
cohort (n = 506) received the MIES at 6-months post deployment only.  Internal 
reliability of the MIEs was found to be excellent (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90) with an 
average item-total correlation of 0.65 (ranging from 0.52 to 0.75).  
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When exploratory factor analyses were conducted, two factors were revealed 
which explained 64.24% of the common variance: perceived transgressions by self or 
others, and perceived betrayal by others.  The first factor, perceived transgressions by self 
or others, as the name suggests was composed of questions relating to both the witnessing 
of acts of commission and omission that violated one’s moral beliefs and expectations, 
and the perpetration of such acts, as well as the distress caused by the same (Nash et al., 
2013).  The latter questions relating to the distress caused could be seen as paralleling 
Criterion G in the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for PTSD (i.e., disturbance causes clinically 
significant distress or impairment; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), as without 
this distress it could be argued that there is no injury.  The second factor, betrayal by 
others, was composed of questions relating to feelings of betrayal by one’s superiors, 
other service members, and individuals not in the military that they once trusted.  Nash et 
al. also found that the MIES had good temporal stability with paired t-tests comparing the 
results from 1 week and 3 months post deployment all failing to meet the cut-off for 
statistical significance.  Results of the exploratory factor analyses using the second cohort 
of Marines suggested that the two-factor model found had a good model fit based on 
standard cut-off recommendations (standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) = 
0.04, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.96).  
Bryan et al. (Bryan et al., 2015) sought to further evaluate the psychometric 
properties of the MIES in samples composed of both men and women, service members 
from other branches of the military than Marines, and those from professions other than 
combat arms.  To this end, two groups of individuals were selected: a clinical sample of 
151 active duty Air Force personnel who sought outpatient mental health treatment, and a 
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non-clinical sample of 935 U.S. military personnel (84% Army National Guard).  Using 
the sample of Air Force personnel, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test 
the two-factor model proposed by Nash et al. (Nash et al., 2013) the results of which 
indicated a poor overall fit with a SRMR of 0.125 and a CFI of 0.779; general guidelines 
for acceptable results are an SRMR < 0.08, and a CFI > 0.90 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
When the confirmatory factor analysis was redone using the second sample of Army 
National Guard personnel, the two-factor model fit improved slightly (SRMR = 0.082; 
CFI = 0.930).  The difference between the results of the two samples was postulated to be 
a result of differential exposure to PMIE as only 25% of the Air Force sample reported 
having direct combat experience compared with 75% of the Army National Guard sample 
(Bryan et al., 2015). 
Having failed to confirm the results of Nash et al. (Nash et al., 2013), Bryan et al. 
conducted an exploratory factor analyses using the sample of Air Force personnel in 
hopes of identifying the latent factor structure for the MIES in this group.  This analysis 
yielded a three-factor model that explained 75.6% of the total variance observed (SRMR 
= 0.024, CFI = 0.922): transgression by others, transgression by self, betrayal by others 
(essentially splitting the Nash et al. first factor in two).  When a confirmatory factor 
analysis was conducted using the Army National Guard sample to replicate the three-
factor solution, the model fit was found to be excellent with an SRMR of 0.056 and a CFI 
= 0.962 (Bryan et al., 2015).  
Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M).  Drawing from 
clinical evidence, military trauma theory, domains found by Drescher (Drescher et al., 
2011), as well as their own research using structural equation modelling (Currier, 
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Holland, & Malott, 2015), Currier, Holland, Drescher, and Foy (2015) developed the 
Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M) to provide a unidimensional 
assessment tool for exposure to PMIE.  The MIQ-M is a 19 item, self-report 
questionnaire with items drawing from the following six domains of potentially morally 
injurious events: acts of betrayal, acts of disproportionate violence inflicted on others, 
acts which involved death or harm to civilians, violence within military ranks, inability to 
prevent death and suffering, and ethical dilemmas or moral conflicts (Currier, Holland, 
Drescher, et al., 2015).  Each item is scored on a four-point frequency scale where 1 = 
Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = Sometimes, and 4 = Often.  The authors note that due to the 
potential for guilt/shame and potential legal ramifications of admitting that they 
participated in certain acts while on deployment, they opted to combine direct 
involvement together with the witnessing of PMIE for several items on the MIQ-M to 
increase the likelihood gaining accurate responding from participants (e.g., “I saw/was 
involved with violations of rules of engagement”).  The authors acknowledge that by 
doing so, they likely confounded the effects of the two different types of war-zone 
stressors; a conclusion reinforced by the findings of Bryan (Bryan et al., 2015).  The 
MIQ-M was administered to two groups of participants; a community sample of 131 
Iraq/Afghanistan veterans attending a community college, and a clinical sample of 82 
Iraq/Afghanistan veterans attending a residential rehabilitation program for severe PTSD.  
Based on the results of a minimum average partial test (MAP) conducted on the 
community sample, only a single factor model was tested with the results suggesting a 
good fit with the data (SRMR = 0.04, CFI = 0.90).  In the clinical sample, the MAP test 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN  22 
 
also indicated that a one-factor model would also provide the best fit, with the results 
indicating a good fit with the participants’ responses (SRMR = 0.05, CFI = 0.98). 
Overall, the results for the MIES (Nash et al., 2013) and the MIQ-M (Currier, 
Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015) provide support both for the utility of moral injury as a 
construct, as well as preliminary psychometric evidence for the respective measures to 
assess military personnel for PMIE exposure.  Further refinements to both tools as well as 
testing in other military populations will be required, however, before either can be used 
in a clinical diagnostic setting.  As both measures utilized a self-report methodology, 
there is the potential for response bias having affected their respective results, especially 
with regards to the reporting of perpertrative acts on the MIES.  Finally, the cross-
sectional sampling utilized prevents drawing any associations between exposure to PMIE 
and the eventual development of psychopathology in the future. 
Moral Injury Symptoms Scale – Military Version (MISS-M).  The MISS-M 
(Koenig et al., 2017) was developed in 2017 to serve as an outcome measure for 
intervention studies in moral injury in current and former service members diagnosed 
with PTSD.  The MISS-M is a 45-item, self-report questionnaire composed of questions 
designed to assess respondents on 10 theoretically-grounded dimensions related to moral 
injury symptomatology namely guilt, shame, moral concerns, religious struggles, loss of 
religious faith/hope, loss of meaning or purpose, difficulties with forgiving, losses of 
trust, and self-condemnation.  Each question is ranked on a 10-point Likert scale relating 
to the respondent’s amount of disagreement (1) or agreement (10) with various 
statements (e.g., “Some of the things I did during war continue to bother me”), with 
higher scores being indicative of greater moral injury.  Participants were 427 veterans and 
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active duty service members recruited from VA medical centres in five major 
metropolitan areas plus one private research university which were then split to create 
two samples on which exploratory (n = 214) and confirmatory factor analyses (n = 213) 
were conducted.  
The authors elected to conduct the respective factor analyses within each of the 10 
respective dimensions due to their perceived theoretical importance and a desire to 
maintain the 10 respective dimensions (i.e., the questions that were selected because the 
authors believed that they reflected the “guilt” dimension, for example, were factor-
analysed to verify that these questions held together as indicators of that dimension).  The 
number of questions analysed in each dimension ranged from 2 (shame, and loss of 
religious faith/hope) to 10 (self-condemnation).  All of the predicted dimensions 
successfully loaded onto single factors with the exception of “difficulty forgiving” and 
“self-condemnation” which each loaded on 2 factors corresponding to how the questions 
were worded; positively worded questions (e.g., I take a positive attitude toward myself) 
loaded on one factor while negatively worded questions (e.g., I certainly feel useless at 
times) loaded on a second factor within each dimension (Koenig et al., 2017). 
With regards to the reliability of the MISS-M, the overall Cronbach’s alpha for 
the whole measure was 0.92, with alphas for the subscales ranging from 0.56 (loss of 
religious faith/hope) to 0.91 (loss of trust) indicating that the measure as a whole has 
good internal consistency.  In terms of test-retest reliability, the MISS-M was 
administered to a group of 64 veterans on two occasions separated by an average of 10 
days.  Overall ICC for the MISS-M was 0.91, and the ICCs for the subscales ranged from 
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0.78 (moral concerns) to 0.90 (loss of religious faith/hope) indicating that the measure 
has good reliability over time (Koenig et al., 2017).  
Expressions of Moral Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M).  Developed 
in 2017, the EMIS-M (Currier et al., 2017) is a 17-item, self-report measure designed for 
use by clinicians and researchers to detect the potential warning signs of moral injury in a 
military population.  Unlike other measures of moral injury, or PMIE, the authors state 
that they made no attempt to develop a measure that would capture all possible aspects 
moral injury expression, rather they report approaching moral injury as a “non-
pathological dimensional concept” (p. 5) to which additional expression can be added as 
empirical, theoretical, and clinical knowledge increases.  Participants were recruited from 
two mid-sized research universities at the beginning of the 2015-16 and 2016-17 
academic years using lists of students who were attending university using the GI Bill 
funding.2  The final sample size for the whole study was 910 individuals with 286 
individuals being utilized for an exploratory factor analysis, and the remaining 624 being 
utilized for a confirmatory factor analysis.  
Results of the exploratory factor analysis yielded a two-factor solution which 
explained almost 63% of the variance in the selected items with the majority of the 
variance (52%) being attributable to the first factor labelled Self-directed Moral Injury; 
the second factor was labelled Other-directed Moral Injury.  Indices of reliability were 
reported to have exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.9, and six-month test-retest 
coefficients ranging from 0.74 for self-directed moral injury, to 0.80 for other-directed 
                                                     
2 The GI Bill is an educational benefit provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs to 
veterans, active duty, reserve, and National Guard members of the military to help them cover the 
costs associated with receiving continued education.  
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moral injury (Currier et al., 2017).  The results of the confirmatory factor analysis to 
verify the two-factor model were similarly favourable yielding an SRMR 0.03 and a CFI 
of 0.96 indicating a good model fit.  The authors report that indices of reliability 
calculated for the various subscales exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.9, 
however, the specific statistics were not presented (Currier et al., 2017). 
Summary 
Moral injury has become the subject of increasing amounts of research in recent 
years, however, in order to maximize the quality and generalizability of research going 
forward, consensus still needs to be reached around certain aspects of the construct.  One 
such point is the terminology used to describe the construct.  Drescher (Drescher et al., 
2011) found that over a third of the respondents in their study felt that “moral injury” 
carried with it potentially negative connotations.  In particular, the use of the term 
“moral” could be interpreted by those affected as implying that they somehow behaved 
“immorally” while deployed; a position echoed in McClosky (McCloskey, 2011).  This 
interpretation could evoke negative emotions and negative self-judgement in the 
individual and in turn, affect their responding both in clinical and research contexts.  
Some of the alternatives suggested included spiritual injury, emotional injury, personal 
values injury, and life values injury (Drescher et al., 2011).   
Another point relates to how to categorize different PMIE.  The work on the 
MIES by Nash (Nash et al., 2013) resulted in two factors being found (transgression by 
self or others, and betrayal by others), while that of Bryan (Bryan et al., 2015) found 
three factors (transgression by self, transgression by others, and betrayal by others).  
Drescher (Drescher et al., 2011) proposed that “betrayal by self” could also be a form of 
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PMIE; how this concept might be related to, or different from, “transgression by self” has 
not yet been determined and would benefit from further research.  Stein and colleagues, 
in their categorization system for traumatic military events, use the broad categories of 
“moral injury by self” and “moral injury by others” to describe the differing types of 
PMIE (Stein et al., 2012).  
It is important to note that while both moral injury and potentially morally 
injurious events have been examined predominantly within the context of the military, in 
particular in relation to combat traumas (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; 
Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009; Wisco et al., 2017; Yan, 2016), the concept itself 
is applicable to other groups as well. First responders (police, fire, and ambulance 
personnel), can encounter situations in the course of their duties over which they have no 
control and that may end badly (e.g., a suicidal individual who, despite the first 
responder’s best efforts to talk them down, still jumps off the bridge).  Another possible 
group could be individuals working in health care who may be called upon to complete, 
or assist with, procedures they do not personally agree with or run counter to their beliefs 
(e.g., do not resuscitate (DNR) orders, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID)).  Referred 
to as “moral distress” in the health care field, it has been a subject of inquiry for 
bioethicists for a number of years.  Traditional definitions posit that moral distress arises 
from situations where the individual knows what the morally correct choice is to make 
but they do not make it due to various limitations placed on them by either internal or 
external (e.g., institutional) factors (Campbell, Ulrich, & Grady, 2016).  In contrast to 
moral injury as defined by Litz and colleagues (Litz et al., 2009) where the dissonance is 
created after the event has occurred, this definition of moral distress would seem to imply 
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that the distress exists for the individual before they have made their decision to act, or 
not act.  Campbell (Campbell et al., 2016) posits that the traditional definition may not 
capture the full spectrum of possible types for moral distress and propose broadening the 
definition citing a number of potentially distressing situations or conditions that are not 
covered including “bad moral luck.” (See Campbell, et al., 2016, for complete 
discussion).  Bad moral luck can be caused by situations where individuals make the best 
(moral) choice they can based on the information that they have available at the time, but 
morally undesirable results still occur.  Williams termed the emotional outcome of these 
types of situations “agent-regret” (Williams (1982) cited in: McAninch, 2016) to identify 
the complex nature of these situations; while the individual may be able to acknowledge 
that there may have been no other choice they could have made in the situation that 
would have led to a different outcome (regret about what happened), they none the less 
still feel guilty about their role in it (regret about what they did).  This broadened 
formulation of moral distress brings its definition closer to what is currently seen as 
moral injury in the military. As is the case with the military, however, the same issues 
around terminology and categorization of PMIE apply and will need to be addressed 
before research into these groups can proceed.   
The current study will focus in the experiences of PMIEs in a military sample, 
specifically, a representative sample of Canadian Armed Forces (CF) members who were 
deployed in support of the recent mission to Afghanistan.  The CF does not currently 
collect information about exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIE) or 
moral injury within either the veteran population or those currently serving, so prevalence 
rates of either outcome within these populations are not currently known.  The primary 
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purpose of this study is to estimate the prevalence of exposure to PMIE within the 
aforementioned population of CF members (Chapter 3), with the secondary purpose 
being to determine how this exposure to PMIE affects CF members self-rated mental 
health (Chapter 4).  Prior to examining these research questions, however, the type and 
extent of training regarding ethical decision making provided by the CF and its 
applicability to PMIE will be reviewed (Chapter 2).  While the topics of these chapters 
are interrelated, they are not interdependent; each chapter is presented in such a way as to 
be self-contained.  
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Chapter 2 
Canadian Forces ethics training: Applicability to moral injury 
“While the prospect of inter-state war will not disappear, future challenges will be 
more diverse – with asymmetric attacks launched by transnational terror groups, and the 
political instability, civil war and humanitarian crises characteristic of fragile countries 
making up the lion’s share of turmoil in the early 21st century” (Department of National 
Defence, 2007, p. 4).  These changes will alter both how service members will be utilized 
in the field (e.g., moving from primarily peace-support and humanitarian aid provision 
increasingly towards war-fighting) and the conditions they will encounter while they are 
deployed, some of which will expose them to new and potentially challenging situations 
that can tax their ability to cope both physically and mentally.  Litz (Litz et al., 2009) 
describes one such situation – the potentially morally injurious event (PMIE): the 
perpetration, failure to prevent, witnessing of, or learning about acts that transgress the 
individual’s deeply held moral beliefs and expectations about the rules that govern human 
behaviour.  Exposure to these PMIE could lead the individual to develop a “moral injury” 
characterized by feelings of shame, guilt, and anxiety and collateral behaviours including 
acts of self-harm (e.g., increases in substance use and abuse, parasuicidal behaviours) and 
self-handicapping behaviours (e.g., social withdrawal, avoidance, self-isolation).  The 
actual moral injury, Litz continues, does not occur until such a time as the individual 
realizes that their moral beliefs have been violated and a sense of inner conflict or 
dissonance is created; this realization may occur immediately after the traumatic event, 
after some time has passed (days, weeks, months), or it may never occur.  According to 
this formulation, moral injury can be seen as a complex, multifaceted concept that arises 
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from a combination of law and philosophy in principle, and mental health in outcome:  A 
traumatic event occurs (PMIE) that violates an underlying philosophical (moral) belief 
held by the individual regarding who they are and how the world should be that then 
leads to the creation of a psychic conflict within the person (dissonance), which can 
manifest in psychological or behavioural symptoms (moral injury). 
It is important to keep in mind that, organizationally speaking, the military does 
not operate like other groups of professionals.  Doctors and lawyers, for example, operate 
within organizations that are more associational in nature; while members of these 
respective organizations may all work toward a shared goal (i.e., for the health and 
welfare, or legal representation of their clients, respectively), they function as 
autonomous individuals within that organization.  The military, however, is a collective 
profession in which groups of individuals must operate synergistically in order to achieve 
an identified end (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 
2003).  While they are deployed, but especially while actively engaged in mission related 
activities (e.g., combat), service members no longer act as autonomous individuals but 
rather individual parts of a larger whole (e.g., their fire team, section, platoon, etc.).  The 
role of the individual service member in relation to the military is analogous how the 
heart and lungs operate within the body; while they remain distinct organs, their ability to 
function correctly both affects and is affected by the functioning of the other organs such 
that if they all do not function together appropriately, the whole body will suffer.  
Another aspect of this collective or interdependent nature is a shared responsibility for the 
continued health and wellbeing of every service member (when one individual suffers it 
affects the functioning of their fire team, squad, platoon as well).  This responsibility is 
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carried by all levels of the military from the government agencies that oversee its 
functioning (e.g., the Department of National Defence), through the organization itself 
(e.g., the Canadian Armed Forces), and down the chain of command to the individuals 
themselves. 
Based on the extensive training that the military provides to its service members 
before deploying them to hostile environments, both generally (e.g., weapons and 
training, battle tactics) and deployment specifically (e.g., cultural sensitivity, political 
climate, rules of engagement), as well as the sorts of equipment provided to maintain 
service members’ physical safety (e.g., body armour, helmets, armoured transport), it 
seems unlikely that the military, and the governmental organizations that oversee it, 
would not have taken steps to prepare their service members for the types of potentially 
morally injurious events (PMIE) they may encounter on deployment.  As such, the 
Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) must 
believe that the training they provide to their service members is adequate preparation for 
whatever events they may encounter while deployed.3 
With this in mind, this chapter has three goals.  First, to outline the current 
training4 provided by the CF to its service members regarding the potential psychological 
tolls of a modern deployment.  Second, to summarize the training provided by the DND 
                                                     
3 This last point is proposed based on the assertion that if the opposite was true (i.e., that the 
DND/CF do not believe that this training is adequate preparation for deployment experiences), 
this would mean that the DND/CF would be knowingly sending service members into situations 
for which they are unprepared. 
4 Due to the specific details of training provided to CF members being of a classified nature, the 
source material for this section is limited to documents that are either publicly available (e.g., 
from the Department of National Defence (DND), Canadian Forces (CF), and Government of 
Canada (GC) websites), unclassified documents obtained directly from members of the DND or 
CF by the author, or reports generated by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) 
and third parties on behalf of the DND or CF. 
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and CF around ethics and ethical decision-making in general and how these may be 
applied during deployment.  Finally, to evaluate, through the use of scenarios, if the 
provided ethical decision-making training is applicable to situations that contain PMIEs, 
and by extension, if this training may decrease the likelihood of service members 
developing a moral injury as the DND/CF seem to believe it will be.   
Mental Health and Stress Management: Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) 
Deployment on combat missions or on operations other than war such as peace 
support operations (PSO; peace-making, peace building, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping), disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance have been shown to take a 
psychological toll on the service members involved (Boulos & Zamorski, 2013; Boulos 
& Zamorski, 2016; Hoge et al., 2004).  In an effort to mitigate this toll through 
prevention, management, and treatment, the Canadian Forces (CF) provides training to its 
service members through a program entitled Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR, 
Department of National Defence, 2016b).  First implemented in 1997, the R2MR 
program was designed to instruct service members about the basics of mental health and 
to provide them with resilience training with the overarching goals of improving both 
short-term performance while deployed, and long-term mental health outcomes.  R2MR 
training begins at the recruit level and continues through the members’ careers in the CF 
gradually becoming more specialized and directed as they advance in rank and 
deployment requirements change.  
The mental health portion of R2MR training is designed with a focus on 
increasing mental health literacy and reducing the stigma associated with seeking 
professional help to deal with issues arising from deployment and other difficult life 
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events (Department of National Defence, 2016b; Weeks, Zamorski, Rusu, & Colman, 
2017).  Training addresses topics including common beliefs that act as barriers to help 
seeking in service members (e.g., that they can manage their problems themselves, that 
therapy won’t help, fear that therapy won’t remain confidential due to the organizational 
structure of the military, fear of how receiving assistance may affect their relationships 
with team members and their future in the military), and the identification of signs and 
symptoms of ineffective coping through the use of the Military Mental Health Continuum 
Model.  This model was designed to inculcate, force-wide, the knowledge that mental 
health and coping are not “all or none” entities (i.e., healthy or ill, coping or not), but 
rather that mental health and coping exists on a spectrum.  The model makes use of a 
four-colour spectrum ranging from healthy adaptive coping (“healthy,” green) at one end, 
through mild yet reversable distress or functional impairment (“reacting,” yellow), more 
severe and persistent impairment (“injured,” orange), and finally to clinically significant 
impairment that affects functioning and requires medical intervention (“ill,” red) at the 
other.  For each level of the spectrum, service members are provided with common 
behavioural indicators to be aware of in six different spheres: mood, attitude and 
performance, sleep, physical symptoms, social behaviour, and alcohol use and gambling 
(Table 2.1).  By instituting the training force-wide beginning at the recruit stage service 
members learn to both attend to the identified symptoms in themselves during the stresses 
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Table 2.1   









Mood Normal mood 
fluctuations; 
calm, takes 
things in stride  
Irritable/impatient; 
nervous; feelings 










































Sleep Normal sleep 
patterns; few 
difficulties 












Can no longer 
fall asleep or 
remain asleep 


































No longer goes 








No or limited 






use or gambling 
(used as coping 
mechanism) 
Alcohol use or 
gambling now 





use or gambling 
now unable to 
control; 
consequences of 
use now severe 
Note: Table adapted from (Department of National Defence, 2016b) 
 
support, referred to as “Buddy Aid” within the curriculum, also serves to reinforce the 
synergistic nature of the military as an organization.  The R2MR training provides 
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suggestions to service members for how they might be able to assist each other should 
they notice a colleague may be slipping away from the healthy (green) end of the 
spectrum.  Some of the suggestions provided include checking in with this colleague and 
seeing if there is anything they can do for them (referred to as “being a good friend”); 
basic active listening skills (i.e., listening attentively; asking non-judgemental questions 
to help understand the situation better; reflecting back their understanding to the 
individual for clarification); validating what the other person is feeling; and reminding 
the troubled individual of the resources that are available to all service members (e.g., 
chaplains, primary health care, specialized mental health and addictions teams), both on-
base and in the community, that they can access if they need to (Department of National 
Defence, 2016b).  
Related to mental health is the concept of resilience.  While there is no single 
accepted definition for what constitutes resilience within the military context (Litz, 2014; 
Meredith et al., 2011), most definitions refer to an ability to endure some form of 
traumatic or aversive circumstance and then return to a baseline level of functioning.  
R2MR defines resilience as “the capacity of a soldier to recover quickly, resist, and 
possibly even thrive in the face of direct [or] indirect traumatic events and adverse 
situations in garrison, training, and operational environments” (Department of National 
Defence, 2016b).  The resilience training provided by the CF is multifaceted and 
designed to provide service members with the practical skills required to deal with both 
acutely stressful situations, like those encountered while on deployment, and more 
common day-to-day stressors.  This training is incorporated into their basic training 
program as recruits and is refreshed at various points in their military career, as well as 
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during the classroom portion of pre-deployment briefings.  Based in part on work done in 
sports and performance psychology, service members are taught specific skills, known as 
“the Big 4.” The Big 4 consists of instruction in goal setting; mental rehearsal or 
visualization (i.e., how to work through expected scenarios mentally and determine 
appropriate responses ahead of time; this way should these situations occur while 
deployed, or another time of high stress, the member already has a plan devised to help 
deal with the situation); techniques to replace negative self-talk with positive self-talk; 
and how to use combat tactical breathing (or “box breathing”) techniques to control 
anxiety and arousal in stressful situations (i.e., inhale for a count of 4, hold breath for 
count of 4, exhale for a count of 4). Service members are also provided with additional 
techniques and general guidance relating to stress management in general including the 
importance of maintaining a healthy lifestyle (sleep, exercise, diet), knowing one’s own 
physical and psychological limits, how to break large tasks into smaller more manageable 
goals should they begin to feel overwhelmed, the value of maintaining a strong social 
support system (both to turn to in times of stress, and for recreation and escape), and the 
importance of recognizing signs of distress and seeking help when needed (Department 
of National Defence, 2016b). 
Formal study of the R2MR program within the CF, however, has been 
predominantly related to course content and methods of delivery rather than the efficacy 
or effectiveness of the program itself.  A recent study of non-commissioned member 
(NCM) recruits and officer candidates (Fikretoglu, D'Agata, Sullivan-Kwantes, & 
Richards, 2017) found that both groups begin basic training (called basic military 
qualifications or basic military officer’s qualifications, for NCM recruits and officer 
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candidates, respectively) exhibiting  considerable variation in both understanding and 
acceptance of mental health issues such as general disease course (temporary, transitory, 
or chronic), use of terminology (many saw this as “labelling” the individual), and mental 
health service use.  With regards to the latter, while both groups acknowledged that 
making use of mental health professionals can lead to a more successful management of 
issues that arise, over half go on to indicate that doing so would still be a “last resort” 
preferring to manage the problem on their own (Fikretoglu et al., 2017).  This diversity in 
knowledge and understanding makes the implementation of a single standardized, force-
wide education program problematic.  A second longitudinal (pre-post), randomized 
controlled study of recruits who received R2MR training expressed less of a decrease in 
attitude towards mental health service use that those who did not receive R2MR training 
(i.e., R2MR lessened the decline in attitude), however, the attitudes of both groups 
decreased significantly over the course of the study.  A lesser decrease in intention to use 
mental health services was also found in the R2MR groups as compared to the control 
group who received no mental health training, but both groups were less likely to utilized 
mental health services (Fikretoglu, Liu, & Blacker, 2016).   
To date, only one longitudinal study has been conducted to investigate the 
effectiveness of the R2MR training program, and this was conducted in a municipal 
police force (Carleton et al., 2018).  The study authors found that there were no 
statistically significant changes in mental health knowledge, resilience, or stress levels 
from pre-test (i.e., before R2MR training) and at either 6- or 12-month follow-up testing.  
Attitudes regarding stigma around mental health did improve immediately following 
training, however, these improvements had dissipated at the 6- and 12-month follow-up 
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points.  As one of the stated objectives of the R2MR program is to increase mental health 
literacy and reduce stigma, these results could be seen as indicating that more work needs 
to be done to refine the R2MR process and content in order to maximize efficacy.  
Studies within the CF specifically will also need to be conducted to determine if the 
outcomes of training are replicated in a military sample as well.     
While the CF has incorporated R2MR into all stages of the service members 
training and reiterates the key concepts of Military Mental Health Continuum, Buddy 
Aid, the Big 4, and various stress management techniques at both pre- and post-
deployment training stages, they acknowledge that the possibility still exists that 
psychological/stress injuries can occur.  It is believed, however, that the repeated 
exposure to the R2MR training will inculcate the core concepts and, in turn, will decrease 
the severity of the injury and foster a more rapid recovery.  
Ethics training provided to DND employees and CF service members 
As stated earlier, current deployments bear increasingly less similarities to those 
of previous generations.  One strategy increasingly used by insurgents and other non-state 
actors is to intentionally disregard internationally recognized rules regarding the conduct 
of war such as the Geneva Conventions, Laws of Armed Combat (LOAC), and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004).  
This can create situations that soldiers may be unprepared for (e.g., insurgent who attacks 
from within a protected site like a hospital or place of worship) and as a result, may lead 
to ethical conflict for the service member.  As such, it is important to gain an 
understanding of the type and content of training currently provided by the CF with 
regards to values, ethics, and morality.   
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There are three different approaches that have generally been used to create 
unified defence ethics programmes (compliance-based, prevention-based, and values-
based), each possessing different strengths and weaknesses (Department of National 
Defence, 2002; Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2005).  Compliance-based defence ethics 
programmes are founded on a strict adherence to a predetermined set of rules that govern 
behaviour (i.e., what can/not be done), similar to how rules of engagement (ROE) govern 
a service member’s behaviour while deployed.  While this type of programme generally 
has the advantage of being easy to understand, amend, and apply (i.e., when in doubt, 
refer back to the rules), it has some shortcomings in terms of usability.  By design, 
compliance-based programmes require that there be a rule for every conceivable situation 
that a service member may encounter, and these rules will need to be constantly updated 
as situations change (similar to how ROE can be amended based on the results of after-
action reports that detail how well a given ROE functioned or was applied in the 
practice).  This can eventually create to a set of rules that is so extensive, complicated, 
and potentially self-conflicting that it ceases to be functional.  Another shortfall of a 
compliance-based approach to defence ethics relates to the fact that since it is impossible 
to foresee every possible situation a service member might encounter, there will 
inevitably be situations for which there is no rule for them to refer back too.  Finally, 
strict adherence to compliance-based ethics programmes may preclude service members 
from actively reflecting upon the larger ethical issues that underly the rules which risks 
the creation of an almost automatic, blind obedience to those rules.  Doing so can lead to 
a reductionist way of approaching ethically complex situations; if a behaviour has not 
been expressly prohibited, it must not be wrong.  This change in focus from “doing what 
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is right” to “not doing what is wrong,” will require constant monitoring and enforcement 
to prevent unethical behaviour from occurring.  
Prevention-based defence ethics programmes also make significant use of rules; 
however, they temper these rules with instruction concerning the ethical values that 
underly them.  It is believed that the inclusion of ethical values instruction will allow for 
increased understanding of the rules, and in turn, more ethical behaviour.  In order to 
avoid the issues caused by the more blanket nature of rules in compliance-based ethics, 
prevention-based ethics programmes focus the resultant rules on the areas of the 
organization and mission believed to be at greatest risk of ethical violation (e.g., 
intelligence gathering, or detention camp management).  In this way, the overall number 
of rules (and their concomitant complexity) can be decreased, while the areas felt to be 
most in need of the guidance they provide still receive it (Department of National 
Defence, 2002).  Applying this kind of focussed attention to only specific organizational 
areas, however, can limit the inculcation of ethics throughout the military; while some 
areas may need it more, all areas still need ethics education.  Much as was the case with 
compliance-based models, the risk exists that individuals from areas not the focus of 
targeted ethical rules may come to believe that ethics is not a concern for them even if 
similar issues as covered by the rules may arise (e.g., a frontline soldier who needs to 
gather information from a captured enemy combatant in the field).   
Values-based defence ethics programmes, of which the DND and CF Defence 
Ethics Program (DEP) is one, could be seen as the opposite of compliance-based ethics; 
where compliance-based models focus on the “letter of the law,” values-based programs 
focus on the “spirit of the law.” As the name suggests, this model focuses on conveying 
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an understanding of the underlying ethical principles (or values) that the organization 
wants its members to uphold.  It is believed that once individuals understand these larger 
ethical principles and why they are important, they can then apply this knowledge to any 
situation they may encounter and ultimately make the “right decision” as to how they 
should proceed (Department of National Defence, 2002; Thomson et al., 2005).  While 
there is a certain amount of prima facie truth to this belief, the depth of philosophical 
understanding required to allow for this type of generalization to occur may not always 
be obtainable or even applicable in practice due to the subtle distinctions between 
available options and viewpoints that often need to be made.  This point will be discussed 
in greater detail later when discussing the specifics of the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) 
used by DND and CF. 
It might be argued that a prevention-based ethics programme would provide the 
best of both extremes (i.e., compliance- and values-based programmes), it just needs to be 
applied to the whole of the military rather than focused on specific areas.  In this way 
service members would benefit from all the structure and guidance provided by an 
existing body of rules, while gaining a level of broader understanding through knowledge 
of the underpinned values, which will allow existing rules to be generalized to new 
situations.  In practice, however, rather than resulting in a programme that possesses “the 
best of both worlds,” this enhanced prevention-based approach could result in a 
programme that contains the worst of both extremes – all the potential convolution of a 
rule-heavy system with all the subtle complexities inherent to the philosophical 
understanding required for a system based on values. 
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Defence Ethics Program (DEP) 
First implemented in 1997, the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) has undergone 
several refinements and adaptations, in part, to address some of the perceived shortfalls 
identified in successive Defence Ethics Survey Reports (Durson, Morrow, & Beauchamp, 
2005; Fraser, 2008; Messevey, Howell, Gou, & Yelle, 2011).  The DEP was designed 
with the objective of providing both the civilian employees of the DND and military 
members of the CF (collectively referred to as the Defence Team) with a common set of 
ethical principles and obligations that can be applied to any decisions that they need to 
make both domestically and while deployed; “to give [the Defence Team] the tools to 
know what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and to consistently choose ‘right’” (Walker, 2013).  As 
the respective audiences for the DEP training are generally non-academics, the relevant 
documentation and training protocols have been designed in a way so as to be most 
applicable and relatable to these individuals (i.e., non-academics).  Consequently, some 
of the more intellectually and theoretically complex aspects of the training (e.g., the 
subtle intricacies of the different philosophical principles that can underlie ethical 
decision making) are only provided in sufficient enough detail so that the necessary 
information to understand the concept being explained is covered.  
Central to the current iteration of the DEP was the creation of the DND and CF 
Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2012), which came into 
effect in June 2012, and serves to codify the values, obligations, and behaviours expected 
from all members of the Defence Team during their respective employments.  It is 
important to note that for CF members the contents of this document are not considered 
to be guidelines, but rather orders from the Chief of Defence Staff, and as such, failure to 
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comply with them makes the member subject to formal disciplinary action (Department 
of National Defence, 2012).  Unlike employees of the DND, members of the CF are also 
expected to know and follow the customs and practices outlined in Duty with Honour: 
The profession of arms in Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces 
Leadership Institute, 2003), as such, the relevant contents of this document will also be 
discussed in turn.  
The DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 
2012) document is broken into four independent, but interrelated chapters covering the 
following topics: values and ethics; values and ethics in operations; DND and CF policy 
on conflicts of interest (COI) and post-employment; and disclosure of wrongdoing.  As 
the latter chapters detailing policies regarding COI (e.g., use of government assets, taking 
part in political activities, receiving gifts) and obligations regarding the reporting of 
wrongdoing, do not apply to the operational behaviours of CF members or the potential 
development or prevention of moral injury, these chapters will be omitted from this 
summary. 
Values and Ethics.  As was stated earlier, the DEP is a values-based ethics 
program designed to provide both civilian employees and members of the military with 
ethical guidance for their respective roles.  Summarized in a document entitled the 
Statement of Defence Ethics (Figure 2.1; Department of National Defence, 2014), this 
chapter outlines three general ethical principles rooted in the Canadian Constitution and 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and five specific values and behaviours  
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Figure 2.1.  Statement of Defence Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2014) 
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that all members of the Defence Team are expected to follow in their professional 
activities.  These principles are, in order of precedence: Respect the dignity of all 
persons; treat all people with respect and fairness, value diversity and the benefits it 
brings, help create and maintain a healthy workplace free of harassment and 
discrimination, and always work in an open, honest, and transparent fashion.  Serve 
Canada before self; make decisions and act at all times in the public interest, perform 
duties to the highest ethical standards, avoid and prevent situations that could lead to 
COI, be open, candid, and impartial in relations with decision-makers.5  This principle 
has special import for members of the CF, especially when on deployment.  Members of 
the military, as a function of their role, are required to relinquish some of the rights that 
ordinary civilians possess (ex., the right to refuse to be put into harm’s way) while 
deployed, while assuming additional responsibilities that civilians do not (ex., 
maintaining national security both at home and abroad).  As a result, the military tends to 
hold itself and its members to a more selfless standard in that the needs of the individual 
service member are frequently prioritized below the needs of the mission (which receives 
highest priority) and the group (e.g., their unit/troop; next highest priority) (Gabriel, 
2007).  This does not, however, completely negate the service members ability to 
function as an individual or their responsibilities (e.g., to their family or community) 
when not actively deployed, it only requires that these responsibilities be suspended 
                                                     
5 For example, if a member of the DND has two conferences they can attend on the same 
weekend: One conference is in their hometown, so they would be able to visit friends and family 
while they are there, but the content of the conference is of limited use to the CF.  The other 
conference’s content would of more use to the CF but is on the other side of the country away 
from the person’s family and friends.  According to this principle, they are supposed to attend the 
second conference – serve Canada before self. 
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temporarily so that they might effectively function as part of a group.6  Finally, obey and 
support lawful authority; respect the rule of law, carry out duties in accordance with 
legislation, policies, and directives in a non-partisan and objective manner.  As the five 
values (integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship, and excellence) and their associated 
behaviours are more detailed and potentially prescriptive they have been outlined in 
Table 2.2.   
Defence Team members are instructed that should upholding any of these values 
come in conflict with one or more of the aforementioned principles, the principles are to 
take priority.  This chapter also outlines the duties and obligations specific to CF 
members (i.e., all members must abide by the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics in 
their actions and behaviour, leaders must to exemplify military values of the CF, and 
create a healthy ethical environment that is free of reprisal, ensure that all subordinates 
have every opportunity to meet their legal and ethical obligations to act, and proactively 
inculcate the values of DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics), and the ramifications of 
failing to comply with the outlined principals, values, and behaviours (i.e., disciplinary 
action).  The DEP acknowledges that the document does not cover all expected situations 
that may arise, in which case, the Defence Team member is “encouraged to discuss and 
resolve these matters with their immediate supervisor.” (Department of National Defence, 
2012, p. 14) 
 
                                                     
6 This contextual basis of individual rights and responsibilities in the military could be compared 
to how the laws (rules) governing operating a motor vehicle can vary from province to province: 
When driving in Québec, one is not allowed to make a right turn on a red light, but in Ontario this 
turn is legal.  When a service member is on patrol, for example, their rights as an individual are 
suppressed in deference to the needs of the mission; once they return to base and are off duty, 
however, their rights as an individual return.  
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Table 2.2 
Values and expected behaviours a 
Value Expected Behaviours 
Integrity DND employees and CF members shall serve the public interest by: 
1. Acting at all times with integrity, and in a manner that will bear the 
closest public scrutiny; an obligation that may not be fully satisfied 
by simply acting within the law. 
2. Never use their official roles to inappropriately obtain an advantage 
for themselves or to advantage or disadvantage others. 
3. Taking all possible steps to prevent and resolve any real, apparent, 
or potential conflicts of interest between their official 
responsibilities and their private affairs in favour of the public 
interest. 
4. Acting in such a way as to maintain DND’s and the CF’s trust, as 
well as that of their peers, supervisors, and subordinates. 
5. Adhering to the highest ethical standards, communicating with 
honesty, and avoiding deception. 
6. Being dedicated to fairness and justice committed to the pursuit of 
truth regardless of personal consequences. 
Loyalty DND employees and CF members shall always demonstrate respect for 
Canada, its people, its parliamentary democracy, DND and the CF by: 
1. Loyally carrying out the lawful decisions of their leaders and 
supporting Ministers in their accountability to Parliament and 
Canadians. 
2. Appropriately safeguarding information and disclosing it only after 
proper approval and through officially authorized means. 
3. Ensuring that all personnel are treated fairly and given opportunities 
for professional and skills development. 
Courage DND employees and CF members shall demonstrate courage by: 
1. Facing challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination 
and strength of character. 
2. Making the right choice amongst difficult alternatives. 
3. Refusing to condone unethical conduct. 
4. Discussing and resolving ethical issues with the appropriate 
authorities. 
Stewardship DND employees and CF members shall responsibly use resources by: 
1. Effectively and efficiently using the public money, property, and 
resources managed by them. 
2. Considering the present and long-term effects that their actions 
have on people and the environment. 
3. Acquiring, preserving, and sharing knowledge and information as 
appropriate. 
4. Providing purpose and direction to motivate personnel both 
individually and collectively to strive for the highest standards in 
performance. 
5. Ensuring resources are in place to meet future challenges. 
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Excellence DND employees and CF members shall demonstrate professional 
excellence by: 
1. Continually improving the quality of policies, programs, and 
services they provide to Canadians and other parts of the public 
sector. 
2. Fostering or contributing to a work environment that promotes 
teamwork, learning, and innovation. 
3. Providing fair, timely, efficient, and effective services that respect 
Canada’s official languages. 
Note: Adapted from (Department of National Defence, 2012).  a Italics mine. 
 
Values and Ethics in Operations.  Due to the brevity of this particular chapter, it 
has been quoted in its entirety below.7 
This chapter is to be developed by the CRS [Chief of Review Staff] through the 
Director Defence Ethics Program in partnership with Level One stakeholders 
from the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence that are 
significantly involved in military operations at home and abroad.  (Department of 
National Defence, 2012, p. 15) 
In the absence of the guidance that would be provided by this chapter, CF members are 
directed to follow the remaining sections of DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics 
(Department of National Defence, 2012), Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in 
Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), and 
related key doctrines (S. Hare, personal communication, 10 February 2017). 
 
Values and Ethics training specific to the CF.  As stated earlier, members of the 
CF are also expected to conform to the customs and practices of the CF (collectively 
                                                     
7 The most recent correspondence with the Manager for Programme Development of the DEP 
confirms that, as of May 2018, Chapter 2 – Values and Ethics in Operations is still in 
development and has not been finalized.  No date as to when this finalization might occur was 
possible at that time. 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN  57 
 
referred to as the military ethos) outlined in Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in 
Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003) as 
part of the DEP.  This military ethos is formed of three fundamental components:  Beliefs 
and expectation inherent to military service (unlimited liability, fighting spirit, 
discipline, and teamwork).  The most unique to the military of these expectations is the 
concept of unlimited liability; the understanding that, as members of the military, they 
could be ordered into harm’s way and potentially lose their lives and that refusing such a 
deployment is not an option.  This expectation of unlimited liability can extend to the 
individual’s right to self-defence as the CF does not view this right as an absolute right, 
but rather a right that can be curtailed.  For example, service members cannot sacrifice 
someone else to save themselves, flee during a firefight, or switch sides if it seems that 
their position will be overrun.  The acceptance of this possible need to self-sacrifice 
forms the cornerstone of the edict “mission, own troops, self,” which is integral to 
military’s conception of duty.  Building on this edict, fighting spirit is what “imparts to 
individuals the moral, physical, and intellectual qualities necessary to operate in 
conditions of great danger … Fighting spirit is important to act decisively – including the 
use of lawful, lethal force against an adversary – during combat operations” (p. 26).  The 
second component, Canadian values, is reflected in the three principles outlined in the 
Statement of Defence Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2014) (i.e., Respect the 
dignity of all persons, Serve Canada before self, and Obey and support lawful authority).  
The final component, Canadian military values, outlines the personal qualities that the 
CF believe are integral to its members to ensure their success.  Some of these values 
overlap with the values outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics (loyalty, integrity, 
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courage), while others are unique (duty, honour), all however are defined within Duty 
with Honour from a distinctly military point of view.  Loyalty, as well as reflecting an 
allegiance to Canada and its people, also entails a faithfulness to one’s comrades that is 
reciprocal and based on a mutual trust in one another, regardless of rank.  Integrity 
builds on the previous definition by stipulating that members must be committed to 
meeting their professional obligations while remaining responsible and accountable for 
their actions.  While a CF member is required to follow all lawful authority, which would 
include orders given by a superior officer, if they disagree with an order because they 
believe it to be unethical, for example, they need not follow it.  Should they choose to 
disobey the order, however, they then must also bear the responsibility for their actions, 
including whatever punishments for disobedience might be applied.  Courage is 
characterized as being a personal quality that allows one to do what’s right or what needs 
to be done without regard for the personal cost of taking that action, and as such, is seen 
as a function of the individuals’ willpower and resolve.  The principles of “serve Canada 
before self” and “obey and support lawful authority” form the pillars of the military value 
embodied in the concept of duty; providing purpose and direction to CF members.  
Finally, the most central military value, honour, is likely the hardest to define as it is an 
abstract concept that can be seen as including all of the values, beliefs, and expectations 
important to the military ethos: if one does one’s duty with loyalty, integrity, and 
courage, and upholds the principles outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics, then one 
possesses honour.  Honour is what “allows warriors to hold onto their humanity while 
experiencing the horrors of war.” (Thompson, Thompson, & Adams, 2008, p. 4) 
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DEP ethical decision-making model 
While the DEP remains a predominantly a values-based programme, it also 
incorporates an ethical decision-making model adapted from the Army Ethics Program 
(Thomson, Hall, & Adams, 2010; Walker, 2013).  The model as taught by the DEP 
consists of four stages (perception, judgement, decision, action) designed to create a more 
structured decision process for members to use when confronted by a potentially ethically 
challenging situation.  Part of the training includes a set of questions to help focus 
trainees on the relevant information to be considered at each stage of the decision-making 
process.  The first stage, perception, involves the recognition that a potential ethical 
issue exists and will need to be addressed.  From a practical point of view, if no ethical 
issue is recognized, the decision-making model stops.  This step requires the individual to 
draw upon their knowledge of the military ethos, mission requirements (e.g., ROE, 
mission objectives), immediate environment, as well as individual factors (e.g., own 
beliefs, values, attitudes) to view the situation from the broadest perspective possible.  Is 
there anything ethically wrong in the situation?  Who may be harmed/benefit from this 
situation?  What are the relevant mission factors relating to this situation?  It is believed 
that the inculcation of all these factors through both training and pre-deployment 
preparation makes the perception stage almost automatic (Thomson et al., 2010).   
In the second stage, judgement, the individual refocuses their attention on the 
specific situation they are confronted with.  This multi-step process begins with an 
ordered comparison of the current situation against core ethical principles and values 
outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2014) and 
military values to check if any of these have been violated.  The next step involves the 
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generation of alternate courses of action and then evaluating these alternatives according 
to their various risks and benefits, both to the individuals involved and the CF as an 
organization, using different ethical approaches to decision making.  The objective of 
using these different ethical approaches is to determine: What is the right thing to do, and 
why?  What things might prevent a person from doing the right thing?  Who might one 
turn to if one has difficulty doing the right thing?  (Thomson et al., 2010) 
As part of a mandatory 1-day course in applied ethics conducted by the DEP 
annually, CF members are taught four different approaches to making ethical decisions: 
rules-based, consequence-based, self-interest-based, and care-based, and the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of each (Walker, 2013).  As taught, rules-based or 
deontological (Keating, 2015) approaches are based on Kantian philosophy, specifically 
the first two formulations of the categorical imperative (i.e., if the decision applies in this 
case, it must apply in all similar cases; individuals are ends in themselves and should not 
be treated as mere means to an end).  Accordingly, following a rules-based approach, the 
individual seeks to determine if there is a rule, regulation, order that would be applicable 
in this situation; these rules are treated as absolutes.  Some of the limitations of a rules-
based approach outlined include that it does not allow for decisions to be made using 
methods other than reason (e.g., compassion, love, generosity) and that no rules are 
absolute; there are exceptions to almost all rules.  A consequence-based (Baker, 2015a) 
approach is based on Utilitarianism, where it is the consequences of a given action that 
determine the action’s rightness or wrongness.  Specifically, the action that leads to the 
greatest good for the greatest number is considered to be the correct action to take; the 
needs of the many will outweigh the needs of the few.  Strict adherence to this approach, 
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however, would seem to justify the use of unethical actions providing that the resultant 
outcome is for the greatest good for the greatest number (the end justifies the means).  
This approach also fails to take into consideration any past or present obligations that an 
individual may have, instead its only concern is with future outcomes.8  In contrast, 
legitimate self-interest-based (Baker, 2015b; Walker, 2013) approaches are concerned 
with inalienable rights and freedoms of the individual and uses the maintenance of these 
rights and freedoms as the basis for making a decision (i.e., will a particular course of 
action violate someone else’s rights or freedoms).  Similar to the case with rule-based 
approaches, individual’s right must be treated as absolutes for this approach to work 
consistently.  Consequently, legitimate self-interest could allow the rights and freedoms 
of the individual to have more weight in decision-making than what may be in the best 
interest of the group; the rights of the one can outweigh the needs of the many.  Finally, 
care-based approaches focus on how a given act will affect the relationships between 
individuals and groups by altering the foundational elements of that relationship such as 
trust, honesty, and compassion.  Care-based approaches, however, provide no guidance 
for how to address situations where maintaining positive relationships with one group 
will cause conflict with relationships with other groups (e.g., to be compassionate and 
                                                     
8 For example, if intelligence reports indicate that a group of insurgents are going to invade a 
village and a platoon is deployed to defend the village and its residents [current obligation].  
However, the officer in charge of that platoon reasons that instead of actively defending the 
village (which would put his own troops at risk, as well as possibly allow some insurgents to 
escape) they could instead evacuate the villagers and then wait for the insurgents to invade and 
set up camp.  Once they had done so, he could then call in an airstrike on the village and 
eliminate that insurgent threat completely.  While this alternate course of action would require the 
sacrificing of the village proper, it would also prevent this group of insurgents from invading any 
future villages and causing harm to the inhabitants [maximize future gains at cost of current 
obligation]. 
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supportive of one individual requires that another individual be lied to; “steal from Peter 
to pay Paul” – good for Peter, bad for Paul).   
There is another method for ethical decision making available, however, the CF 
does not include this as part of its DEP program: case-based reasoning.  In case-based 
reasoning (or casuistry) the individual begins by determining the facts of the situation 
they are presented with (not a theoretical foundation as was the case in previous decision 
models) and from these extracts what they feel are the appropriate features that need to be 
considered.  They then identify prior cases that are similar to the current situation in 
terms of these important facts, then extracts from those prior cases the rules that were 
used to come to a solution.  These rules are then applied to the current situation to come 
to a decision.  This type of reasoning is often used in legal proceedings when lawyers 
refer to precedent setting cases to show a parallel to situations in their current case.  There 
are two potential problems with using this form of decision making, however.  First, it 
draws upon anecdotal evidence and, as such, requires generalizations to be made which 
may overlook important differences between situations (similar does not mean the same; 
what was the right decision then may not be the right decision now).  Second, for case-
based reasoning to work, there needs to have been at least one similar prior case to refer 
back to for guidance.  In the absence of a prior case, the individual is forced to make use 
of one the aforementioned theoretical foundations (i.e., rules-based, consequence-based, 
etc.) to determine the correct course of action.  These shortcomings may be part of the 
reason that the DND and CF do not offer case-based reasoning as part of their DEP 
program.  
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According to the DEP model, once the individual has weighed the risks and 
benefits of their alternative options they must come to a decision as to how they will 
proceed, since “not acting is not an option” (Thomson et al., 2010, p. 27), and then act on 
that decision.  Should individuals find themselves unable to come to a decision as to what 
is the correct course of action, or if they are uncertain as to the decision they have chosen, 
DEP recommends that they should discuss the situation with others who may be more 
qualified or trusted to decide to assist them. 
It is important to note that while the stated goal for the DEP training program is to 
assist Defence Team members with “making the right choice,” in practice it does not 
provide any specific direction as to which approach should be used in which situations 
(e.g., in matters of life or death, always use a consequences-based approach), as a result, 
there could potentially be multiple “right choices” depending on which approach a 
service member elected to use at the judgement stage.  Similarly, the DEP model also 
does not provide direction with regards to how to select the correct action when different 
approaches yield outcomes that conflict with each other (i.e., there is no hierarchy to the 
approaches).  Returning to the example of the officer who ordered the airstrike on the 
village, his selected action was rooted in consequences-based reasoning, however, by 
doing so he would violate the villagers right to life and freedom (legitimate-self-interest), 
it would also likely sacrifice the required relationship between the military and the 
civilian population that is required for ultimate mission success (care-based approach).  It 
seems that, in practice, rather than providing a structured process from which service 
members can more easily make ethical decisions, the decision-making model as it is 
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taught in the DEP may actually serve to make determining what the “right choice” is 
more difficult. 
Application of the DEP ethical decision-making model to PMIE 
The first 2 scenarios are not true accounts of actual situations, but they do reflect 
situations in which members of the CF may find themselves while performing their 
duties.  The final scenario is based on the findings of a DND/CF Board of Inquiry report 
relating to an actual situation experienced during a recent CF deployment overseas 
(Department of National Defence, 2016a).  After each scenario the decision-making 
process taught to CF members will be applied, and the following three questions will be 
addressed:  How well does the DEP provided training address this scenario?  Could this 
situation reflect a PMIE?  Does the provided training address the potentially morally 
injurious aspects of the scenario? 
 
Scenario 1: Terrorist attack 
A fighter pilot is patrolling the skies over Toronto in response to a recent 
terrorist attack that occurred in New York City involving commercial 
airliners that had been hijacked by terrorists.  The fighter pilot has been 
issued Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow him to engage and bring 
down any highjacked aircraft that poses a threat to a civilian target.  The 
pilot has been advised that 5 terrorists have hijacked a small commuter 
aircraft with approximately 30 passengers and crew on board and is 
currently heading towards downtown Toronto.  The pilot has just detected 
the aircraft, which is heading towards a major sports stadium where 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN  65 
 
approximately 30-thousand people are attending a baseball game.  The pilot 
attempts to contact his control station to inform them of the plane’s location 
and receive further instructions but, due to communication issues, is unable 
to do so.  The pilot then attempts to contact the hijacked aircraft but 
received no response.  It is clear to the pilot that the aircraft is heading 
towards the stadium and he must engage it immediately to prevent it 
crashing into the stadium. 
 
Perception:  Is there anything ethically wrong in the situation?  Who may be 
harmed/benefit from this situation?  What are the relevant mission factors relating to this 
situation?  Yes, there is an ethical transgression possible, specifically, his requirement to 
uphold his mission (protect civilian targets) possibly puts him at odds with the 
requirement to uphold the principle of respecting the dignity of all people in that his 
actions or inactions will directly affect, that is, the lives of both the 30 passengers and 
crew on the plane and the 30-thousand spectators in the stadium.  Judgement: What are 
the alternatives the fighter pilot has available to him?  What are the ramifications of each 
of these options?  The pilot has four options available to him: engage the plane, do not 
engage the plane, talk to his command to get more information, or talk to the plane’s pilot 
to try and negotiate a safe landing somewhere.  As mentioned earlier, not making a 
decision is not an option for a CF member, but even if it were, in this case, to not decide 
would yield the same results (i.e., plane hitting stadium) as deciding to not engage the 
plane.  The pilot has already tried the latter two options to no avail, which leaves him 
with either engaging the plane or not engaging the plane, both of which violate the first 
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ethical principle of respecting the dignity of all people.  If he elects to engage the 
commuter aircraft and shoot it down, he’d be violating the right to life of the passengers, 
crew, and terrorists; however, if he does not shoot the plane down, he is risking the lives 
of the 30-thousand people in the stadium.  The pilot could conclude that, whichever 
course of action he chooses (engage or not engage the plane), the lives of the passengers 
and crew on the commuter plane will be lost, so their lives should not be a factor in his 
decision.  However, this would imply that their lives have no value and that they are 
expendable, which would also violate the first principle (Respect the dignity of all 
people).  Since both options available to the pilot will result in the deaths of people, they 
both violate key components of the ethical decision-making models taught to CF 
members:  Rule-based/Kantian ethics would be violated in that to engage the plane would 
result in the passengers and crew being treated as if they are mere means to an end (i.e., 
saving the 30-thousand in the stadium), and doing so would then necessitate that all 
future planes be shot down (or not shot down) should similar situations be present.  
Legitimate-self-interest reasoning would be violated in that the rights of the individuals to 
live is violated, and care-based reasoning is violated in that the trust of the passengers and 
crew that they are safe is lost as well as shooting the plane down could be seen as not 
showing compassion to their plight (i.e., they are in a situation not of their choosing, yet 
they will end up paying with their lives).  
In contrast, if the pilot were to utilize a consequences-based ethical reasoning 
process, while engaging the plane would lead to the inevitable deaths of the people on 
board, to not engage the plane might lead to the deaths of a larger number of people in the 
stadium should the plane crash there (i.e., only a single individual needs to die in the 
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stadium to tip the ethical balance in favour of engaging the aircraft), so engaging the 
plane would seem to be the correct choice for the pilot to make.  As well, to engage the 
plane would also allow the pilot to fulfil his responsibilities to the second and third 
principles of Serving Canada before Self, and Obeying Lawful Authority.  Not engaging 
the plane would violate both of these principles in that it would put the lives of Canadians 
at risk and the pilot would be disobeying his orders to eliminate threats to civilian targets, 
respectfully.   
The pilot having now decided upon his potential course of action (engage the 
plane), must check to see if taking this action would violate any of the values and ethics 
outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics (integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship, and 
excellence) or the additional values of duty and honour key to the military ethos.  While 
this decision wouldn’t violate most of the held values, the military value of honour may 
be violated, in that honour in part insists that “all non-combatants be protected and 
accorded the dignity and other considerations that their situations may entitle them to” 
(Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003, p. 32).  
Upholding this value, however, would raise the same conflicts as outlined for the first 
principle (respecting the dignity of all people), as the harm caused to civilians is 
inevitable if the pilot is to fulfil his mission requirements (protection of the Canadian 
populace), which he must, or he violates the third principle (obeying lawful authority).  
Action: Engage the commuter plane before it can crash into stadium. 
How well does the DEP training address this scenario?  If the scenario was viewed as an 
abstract, thought exercise, the DEP training could be applied fairly easily; the pilot had 
all the information he would need to make his decision, and he would have received 
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sufficient training to weight the pros and cons of various choices and ultimately be able to 
come to the “right answer” that the training demands.  A major obstacle even in this 
application, however, stems from the nature of the decision being made; it will result in 
the death of innocent civilians either way.  It is an operational reality for members of the 
military that their decisions can sometimes be the difference between life and death for 
themselves and others, and as such, the first principle (respect the dignity of all persons) 
will be violated.  From a practical point of view, however, the DEP model (perceive, 
judge, decide, act) is too time consuming to actually be applied as taught to this situation.  
While the pilot is trying to generate alternative courses of action, weighing the pros and 
cons of each, then comparing of these each of these options against the set of principles 
and values prescribed in the Statement of Defence Ethics to be sure that none of these are 
violated, and trying to resolve any violations that might have arisen, the commuter plane 
is getting closer and closer to the shore and the concomitant risk to the population is ever 
increasing and his window to act with minimal casualties is closing.   
Could this situation reflect a PMIE?  The scenario described could still lead to the fighter 
pilot experiencing a moral injury, even though they did exactly what they were trained to 
do, how they were trained to do it.  This is because the potential for injury stems not from 
what they did, but what they feel they should have done and what aspects of the situation 
they ultimately choose to focus on.  By engaging the commuter plane and shooting it 
down the pilot may focus on the 30-thousand people in the stadium that were potentially 
saved, and the elimination of the associated pain and suffering their families would have 
experienced from their deaths.  Alternately, the pilot might instead focus on the lives of 
the innocent people on the plane who died as a direct result of the decision and associated 
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action he took.  Maybe if he had shot somewhere different, he would have crippled the 
plane and it would have been forced to ditch in the water.  Maybe if he had tried to 
contact the plane just one more time he might have gotten through and been able to 
negotiate with the terrorists.  Ultimately, the number of ways the pilot could reinterpret 
the situation and the choice he made is limited only by the depth and degree to which he 
wishes to re-examine it. 
Does the training provided to CF members affect the possible development of moral 
injury in this scenario?  Based on the documents available to review, there appears to be 
minimal training provided that would affect either the pilot’s resilience to moral injury 
(i.e., to increase resistance to developing it), or their ability to deal with the aftermath of 
the choice he made.  
 
Scenario 2: Child Soldier 
A unit is on foot patrol through a village where intelligence indicates that 
insurgents have set up camp.  As they enter the town square they come 
under fire from the doorways and windows of the surrounding buildings.  A 
private opens fire at one of these doorways and the shooting from that 
location stops.  The firefight continues for a while longer, but eventually 
ends, and the unit begins to sweep the buildings for remaining insurgents.  
The private is the first through the door she shot at and she immediately 
comes across the body of a boy, no more than 11 or 12 years old, who has 
been shot; an assault rifle is laying by his side.  The private realizes that she 
is likely the person who shot him.  
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Perception:  Is there anything ethically wrong in the situation?  Who may be 
harmed/benefit from this situation?  What are the relevant mission factors relating to this 
situation?  Whether or not there is anything ethically wrong with the situation depends on 
whether the child-soldier is seen to be a “child” or a “soldier.” If they are viewed as a 
child, then yes there is something ethically wrong with the killing of children; however, if 
they are viewed as a soldier, then the killing of an enemy combatant during a firefight is 
acceptable, and there is nothing ethically wrong.  At the time the decision was made (i.e., 
during the firefight), however, the child-soldier was attempting to cause grievous harm to 
members of the unit and in this role, would be considered to have been a soldier.   
How well does the DEP training address this scenario?  As the DEP program teaches a 
model designed to assist with decision making, and the decision to engage the hostile had 
already been made and acted upon during the firefight, the model as taught is not actually 
applicable to this situation.  Similar to the scenario with the hijacked plane, time for 
evaluation of possible alternative courses of action was not available as any hesitation in 
a firefight on her part could have led to the death or serious injury of unit members or 
herself at the hands of an insurgent.  Part of the reason that soldiers devote so much time 
drilling with their weapons and practicing tactics is to make their actions and reactions 
during stressful situations automatic; identify threat, eliminate threat.  The DEP is by 
design a thought-driven process, and as such, could potentially be seen as a hinderance 
rather than a help in a firefight in that it could derail the tactical training service members 
have received and slow their reactions. 
Could this situation reflect a PMIE?  This scenario contains within it the potential for a 
conflict between the private’s beliefs about appropriate actions that can be taken during a 
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firefight (identify threat, eliminate threat), what her duty is with regards to children 
(children are to be protected), and the rules of war including the Geneva conventions 
which prohibit the use of children in combat ("Geneva Conventions," 1949); so the child 
should not have been in the firefight at all.  Again, a moral injury is not caused by the 
traumatic or transgressive event itself, but rather the individual’s processing of the event.  
The insurgent that she shot during the firefight turned out to be a child, and if her 
reprocessing of the event becomes fixated on that aspect of the situation, to the exclusion 
of the other aspects (e.g., he was trying to harm her and the members of her unit), this 
scenario has the potential to become a PMIE.  If she manages to not fixate on the 
insurgent’s age, however, the likelihood of her developing a moral injury may be 
lessened.   
Does the training provided to CF members affect the possible development of moral 
injury in this scenario?  Based on the documents available to review, there appears to be 
minimal training provided that would affect either the soldier’s resilience to moral injury 
(i.e., to increase resistance to developing it), or their ability to deal with the aftermath of 
the choice she made.   
 
Scenario 3: Abuse of a minor9 
While deployed as part of a NATO contingent to [country], a group of 
soldiers witness what appears to be the sexual assault of a minor by 
members of the [Country] National Security Force.  Not sure what they are 
allowed to do in such situations under their Rules of Engagement (ROE), 
                                                     
9 Adapted from (Department of National Defence, 2016a) 
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they report what they observed to their commanding officer.  The 
commander informs them that others have told him that they too have 
witnessed actual or suspected sexual assaults by members of the [Country] 
National Security Force, but the rules currently in place were unclear as to 
how they should proceed in this situation:  While the CF Use of Force 
Manual would allow soldiers to intervene if a serious crime was being 
committed, sex with a minor didn’t meet the “serious bodily harm” criteria 
required for them to do so. This was in part due to the use in the CF Use of 
Force Manual of outdated “rape terminology” (i.e., rape only applies when 
a man subjects a woman who is not his wife to sexual intercourse against 
her will), which is not as inclusive as the term “sexual assault” which 
would apply to everyone irrespective of age, gender, or marital status.  As 
well, Canadian Forces (CF) members have no authority to enforce 
International, Canadian, or [country] laws against [country] citizens; this 
is the responsibility of the [country] government.  Finally, there was no 
procedure in place at the time regarding reporting national-on-national 
crimes to the [country] government (i.e., how to report it, and who to report 
it to, since the suspected abusers were representatives of the country’s 
government, sometimes including members of law enforcement), and even if 
there were procedures, such reporting is only required if the human rights 
abuses would fall under violations of the Law of Armed Combat (LOAC), 
which sexual assault of a minor would not, since it’s not combat related.  
The commander reminds the soldiers that in order for the larger mission to 
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be successful, the NATO forces need to be able to work alongside the 
[Country] National Security Force as they will eventually be the group 
responsible for the nation’s security once the NATO mission ends and the 
troops have withdrawn.  The soldiers leave their commanders office no 
clearer on how they should proceed should they encounter a similar 
situation again.  While there doesn’t seem to be any rules that would 
prevent them from intervening in the future, if they chose to do so, their 
intervention would carry no legal weight under the rules that did exist and, 
as a result, there would be nothing that would prevent the abuser(s) from 
doing it again when the soldiers were not around to witness it.  As well, 
intervening might put the larger mission goals in jeopardy due to the 
potential for loss of trust between the NATO forces and the [Country] 
National Security Force. 
 
Perception:  Is there anything ethically wrong in the situation?  Who may be 
harmed/benefit from this situation?  What are the relevant mission factors relating to this 
situation?  Yes, conflict exists between what CF members believe they should do 
(intervene), and what it appears they can do under the rules in place.  The child/children 
being abused by the National Security Forces are being harmed by the activity, but to 
intervene may be ineffective and possibly jeopardize the larger mission by turning the 
National Security Force against the NATO force members.  Judgement: What are the 
alternatives that these soldiers have available to them?  What are the ramifications of 
each of these options?  The soldiers have two options available to them, since not 
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intervening and not reporting the incident are not options: intervene in the situation 
directly to stop the abuse should they witness it again and report the incident to their 
commander, or not intervene but still report it to their commander (observe and report).  
If they elect to intervene, they will fulfil the first principle (respect dignity of all people) 
since they will be stopping the assault on a child, and they will be upholding Canadian 
values and be acting in the public’s interest (serve Canada before self).  However, if they 
elected to follow a rules-based approach, the rules that they are to operate under while 
deployed to [country] do not seem to support their intervention, but neither do they 
expressly prohibit it, so it is unclear if intervening would or would not violate the 
principle of obeying lawful authority; overall, a rules-based approach would likely not be 
useful in this situation.  If the soldiers elected to use a legitimate self-interest approach, 
based on the fact that children have a right to be free of abuse, this may also be of limited 
utility.  As part of their pre-deployment mission orientation, CF members receive 
information about some of the cultural differences that are present in the countries they 
will be deployed to (Department of National Defence, 2016a).  For example, the status of 
women and what constitutes culturally acceptable behaviour towards them in [country] 
differs dramatically from what is considered acceptable in most western countries who 
would have supplied NATO troops; information regarding what would constitute an 
illegal act with regards to minors was not covered, however, so it is unknown to the 
soldiers what the rights of the child are in [country].10   As well, to intervene to stop the 
behaviour could conceivably be considered to be disrespectful of the country’s culture, 
                                                     
10 According to the DND/CF Board of Inquiry report (Department of National Defence, 2016a), 
any sexual act with a minor is illegal under international, Canadian, [country], and Islamic law.  
CF members, however, still have no authority to enforce these laws against [country] citizenry, as 
this is the responsibility of the [country] government. 
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beliefs, and practices (which would also violate a prime tenet of a care-based approach) 
which could in turn lead to a possible loss of trust between the CF/NATO troops and 
civilian nationals and the National Security Force.  Using a consequences-based 
approach, while it might be possible to save the child being abused for the moment, the 
future consequences of doing so are unknown.  Since the CF members have no means to 
keep the child safe after intervening (i.e., they cannot take the child away), they will need 
to release the child again which could lead to their being subjected to even more 
extensive abuse later on when the CF members are not around in retaliation for the 
soldiers’ interference.  As the National Security Force members doing the abusing are 
unlikely to appreciate the NATO soldiers intervening, this could create animosity 
between the two forces and put NATO soldiers at risk when they are in the field together 
with National Security Forces (e.g., retaliation by National Security Force members in the 
form of slower response times, indiscriminate shooting leading to “friendly fire” 
incidents, or “fragging” – the deliberate killing of one soldier by another on the same 
side), as well as increase the potential for loss of civilian lives.  This possible loss of trust 
with the National Security Force and potential for increased risk of harm would run 
counter to the stated mission goals, which could be seen as violating lawful authority 
(principle three).   
If the soldiers elect to not intervene directly but instead only report what they 
witnessed to their commander, this may or may not fulfil the first two principles 
depending on how the commander chooses to proceed.  If the commander elects to take 
direct action, for example, by issuing orders regarding what the soldiers should do in this 
situation, it would then allow all subordinate soldiers to meet all three of the required 
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ethical principles since they would have a clear, lawful authority (i.e., order) to obey. 11  
However, the commanding officer is then putting themselves in the potentially ethically 
conflicted position; if they issue an order (be that to intervene or not intervene) that is not 
supported by the any of the established rules that the mission is to operate under, they 
may not be upholding the principle of obeying lawful authority, which could lead to the 
same aforementioned issues that may affect the mission.  If the commander elects not to 
take a direct action (e.g., just file a report with his own superiors), then their subordinates 
are in the same potentially conflicted position as outlined previously.  Action:  As the 
actions taken or not taken in this situation can have potential wide-reaching repercussions 
(e.g., for the mission, the relationships with the local citizenry and the country’s 
government), the power to select the appropriate action may be beyond the abilities of the 
front-line soldiers.  This would make deferring to their superior (until clear direction can 
be given) the ethically correct action to take.  Alternatively, since the principles taught as 
part of the DEP are listed in order of precedent, with respecting the dignity of all people 
being foremost, the soldiers could see this as indicating that they would need to intervene 
to stop the abuse should they witness it in the future (the child must be protected), even 
though doing so may carry no legal weight and cause issues with completing their 
mission, and they may be called upon to answer for their choice should it be challenged 
later on. 
                                                     
11 This was what happened in one of the situations that this case is based upon; the commanding 
officer (CO) issued an order stating that if similar events were witnessed, service members were 
to intervene and report the act up the chain of command.  Unfortunately, this CO only issued the 
orders to his troops verbally so there was no official record of the orders and they were not passed 
on to the next group of soldiers deployed to the area (Department of National Defence, 2016a).  
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How well does the DEP training address this scenario?  Unlike was the case in the 
previous two scenarios where the fighter pilot and the private were empowered to make 
the choices they did, in this scenario, even if they could utilize the DEP decision-making 
process they were taught, their ability to take the action decided upon is in question.  
After they came upon the scene initially the soldiers were unclear as to how they should 
proceed, so they elected to discuss the situation with someone who was more qualified to 
decide, their commanding officer, as they are instructed to by the DEP.  Issues arise in 
that their commanding officer was unable to provide them with direction since the 
assorted rules that should dictate appropriate behaviour are confused and vague.  In this 
way, the difficulty in implementation does not actually stem from the DEP decision-
making process itself, but a lack of useful information to draw upon to make the decision.  
If, for example, the ROE, LOAC, or CF Use of Force Manual empowered soldiers to 
intervene and lay charges against the abusers in these situations, then the soldiers would 
be able to determine what they should do using the DEP process and prevent the abuse 
from continuing.  
Could this situation reflect a PMIE?  As presented, the vagueness and confusion created 
by the ROE and other rules currently in place may directly conflict with what the soldiers 
see as their duty, that is to protect civilians from harm.  The way the rules are structured 
now, however, creates a difficult situation: if they intervene, they save the child for the 
moment but possibly risk jeopardizing the mission, which could cost lives in the future.  
If they do not intervene, the greater mission may succeed but it is done at the physical, 
mental, and emotional cost of the children who will likely continue to be abused.  This 
conflict could lead to the development of a moral injury for those involved as the soldiers 
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may view it as a betrayal of their personal and professional principles by those who wrote 
the rules (e.g., NATO or the CF) and potentially their commanding officer for reinforcing 
those rules, as the rules force the soldiers to choose between doing “what’s right” and 
fulfilling their mission.  
Does the provided training address the potentially morally injurious aspects of the 
scenario?  Based on the documents available to review, there appears to be minimal 
training provided that would affect either the soldier’s resilience to moral injury (i.e., to 
increase resistance to developing it), or their ability to deal with the aftermath of the 
choices made. 
Observations relating to CF preparation for PMIE 
The review of the obtained documents relating to the training provided by the 
DND and CF around psychological tolls that exposure to PMIE can have on service 
members during deployment and the extent to which the ethics and values training 
provided are applicable to potentially morally injurious situations has led to the following 
observations.  First, and possibly most importantly, the key reference document that 
outlines the standards against which members of the DND and CF ethical behaviour will 
be judged, the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National 
Defence, 2012), is missing the chapter that relates specifically to ethical behaviour while 
on operations; likely the most important chapter for members of the CF.  Since this 
document came into force in June 2012, members of the CF have taken part in over 50 
operations (Department of National Defence, 2018) including 11 operations to areas 
where encountering hostile resistance is possible (e.g., the UN Missions to the Republic 
of South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).  The Government of 
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Canada’s recent decisions to supply troops in support of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in 
Mali and the NATO mission to Iraq to combat Daesh (a.k.a., the Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)), would bring this total to 
13 operations.  A recent report from the Secretary-General of the UN has identified both 
these countries as locations where children have been used as combatants (United 
Nations General Assembly Security Council, 2017), which dramatically increases the 
likelihood that children will be killed by CF members in the course of their duties.  This 
same report documents that the recruitment and use of children in combat roles is not 
limited to just insurgent groups; there were 11 UN-verified cases attributed to the Afghan 
National Defence and Security Forces in 2015 alone.  As stated earlier, in the absence of 
the direction provided by the missing chapter, CF members are instructed to utilize the 
contents of the remaining sections of the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics, Duty 
with Honour: The profession of arms in Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian 
Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), and related key doctrines to guide their behaviour 
while on operations (S. Hare, personal communication, 10 February 2017).  As 
demonstrated in Scenario 3 (Abuse of a minor), following this direction is not always as 
straightforward as it should be when there are multiple sets of rules in place 
simultaneously.  This can be particularly problematic when forces are involved in 
multinational missions, like those conducted by the UN and NATO, where service 
members are governed by overarching mission rules and mandates in addition to the rules 
set out by their respective countries; rules which may conflict with each other (e.g., 
Country A views “waterboarding” as a legitimate technique to gain information from 
captured insurgents, while Country C considers the act to be torture, which makes its use 
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forbidden).  Another example of the kinds of conflicts that having multiple systems of 
rules operating at the same time might be the UN mission to Rwanda.  The UN mission 
was to be a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission (i.e., to assist parties in settling intra- and 
international disputes through the use of peaceful means such as negotiation, arbitration, 
and conciliation; (United Nations)), which would mean that the UN peacekeepers 
deployed were to remain neutral.  This need for neutrality, however, also limits 
peacekeepers use of force to personal protection and prevents them from intervening to 
prevent harm to the country’s citizenry; as doing so could be interpreted as “taking sides” 
in the conflict.  So, if Scenario 3 were to have happened on a UN Chapter VI 
peacekeeping mission where the National Security Force was abusing a child from the 
other side of the conflict, the soldiers would have been expressly prohibited from 
intervening to stop the assault, irrespective of the instruction provided by the DEP around 
respecting the dignity of all people, which could create a PMIE for those soldiers 
involved. 
Related to this first observation, what guidelines are provided to CF members 
around making ethical decisions seem to have limited utility in an operational 
environment.  Problems such as these (i.e., where models work well in theory or in the 
abstract, but not in actual application) are not unique to the military but can also be seen 
in such areas as hospital bioethics as well.  While all three types of defence ethics 
programmes discussed earlier provide guidance regarding how to make an ethical 
decision, in contrast with compliance- and prevention-based systems, the values-based 
system utilized by the DND and CF is more time intensive and knowledge dependant.  
Both compliance- and prevention-based programs provide a structure for the individual to 
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refer back to, which can focus the decision-making process on the relevant core elements 
that are key to determining what the “right decision” might be; there is only one possible 
approach to use to interpret the situation.  While these systems have their own flaws, 
those flaws have more to do with the practical issues associated with using a given 
process (e.g., the sheer number of rules required, or the specificity of who those the rules 
apply to) than the decision-making process itself.  With a values-based system, in 
contrast, it is the decision-making process itself that leads to the bottleneck.  As shown in 
Scenarios 1 and 2 (Terrorist Attack, and Child Soldier, respectively), operational 
decisions often need to be made in a near instantaneous manner as dire consequences 
may result from hesitation.  In order to properly apply the decision-making model taught 
in the DEP, the service member needs both a detailed understanding of the philosophical 
underpinnings of each approach (rules-, consequence-, legitimate self-interest-, and care-
based) so that they can attempt to select the best one, and the time to weight the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of each possible course of action according to 
each of these approaches.   
Another potential shortcoming of the DEP process is that it provides no specific 
direction to the individual.  Consequently, the decision the individual makes can be 
subjective; another individual confronted with the same situation and information could 
potentially come to a different decision, and both individuals could be equally correct, or 
incorrect, as the case may be.  This less than ideal model fit for operational environments 
may stem in part from the DEP training being designed to be applicable to both civilian 
(DND) and military (CF) members of the Defence Team, which may ignore the 
differences inherent in the roles the two groups perform (bureaucratic/governmental 
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versus combat operations) and the possible ramifications of making the wrong choice 
(DND – money is wasted, versus CF – people may die).  For non-operational ethical 
decision-making situations where time limitations do not factor in in the same way (e.g., 
should someone report a colleague for taking stationary supplies from the office for their 
own use), or for judging the appropriateness of an operational decision after the fact (e.g., 
in a court-martial setting), the model taught may have some applicability.  This criticism 
has been raised by others (e.g., Sanschagrin, 2006; Woodgate, 2004) about previous 
versions of the DEP and may partially underpin the current redevelopment of the 
program, and the associated delay in the development of the chapter specifically related 
to operational ethics, to make it more operationally applicable.   
From a practical point of view, the decision-making process has potential 
limitations when applied to situations that would constitute PMIEs.  First, the process 
requires that the individual have all the information required to make their decision 
available to them at the time they need to make the decision.  If Scenario 1 (Terrorist 
attack) were rewritten such that the fighter pilot was advised that terrorists stole the 
commuter plane but there are no passengers or crew on board, then the right decision 
becomes clearer: he should engage the plane and eliminate the threat.  If the scenario was 
rewritten such that the pilot was advised that the commuter plane posed no threat, and he 
was able to confirm this with the plane’s pilot via radio, his decision also becomes 
clearer: do not engage the plane and allow it instead to land.  What about if the pilot had 
no information about who is on the plane or what their intentions are, and he cannot raise 
them on the radio?  The plane could conceivably contain only civilians (no threat), 
civilians and terrorists (threat), or only terrorists (threat), the fighter pilot has no 
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information on which to base his decision.  In this situation, the fighter pilot would need 
to proceed as if the plane posed a threat and engage it in order to save the people in the 
stadium, since to do nothing would potentially put the stadium goers’ lives at risk.  The 
information he required to determine what the right decision is only becomes available to 
him after the fact when the wreckage is examined, and the presence or absence of 
terrorists is established.  If there turns out to have been no terrorists on board, the pilot 
now has to live with the knowledge he shot down a plane that was of no threat and he 
killed innocent civilians; a PMIE.   
A second limitation is that the DEP content is only applicable to situations in 
which the individual has the ability to affect the outcome.  As outlined by Litz (Litz et al., 
2009), in addition to situations where the morally injured individual is the perpetrator of 
the PMIE, moral injuries can also be caused by witnessing or learning about potentially 
transgressive events after the fact, when the individual has no ability to affect the 
outcome.  Based on the documents reviewed, it appears that the DND and CF believe that 
their training as it exists currently is sufficient to allow its service members to deal with 
these circumstances and make the “right choice” when called upon to do so.  The training 
provided, however, may only be useful for a narrow band of situations, operational 
requirements, often exist outside this narrow band which makes the training inapplicable 
to some of the problems encountered as was shown in applying the decision-making 
model to the situations described earlier.  In particular, the DEP provides little if any 
training regarding how service members should best react to situations in which they may 
be unable to do “the right thing” either because injurious event already happened, they 
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are not empowered to affect the outcome, or conflicting rules makes determining what 
the right decision is unclear. 
The DEP program structures its training in such a way as to teach steps required 
for individuals to make the right decision, but when it comes to being applied in an 
operational setting, it may be better viewed as teaching what steps to take in order to not 
make the wrong decision.  The difference between the two (making the “right choice” 
versus “not making the wrong choice”) is subtle but important; just because an individual 
didn’t do anything wrong does not mean what they did was right.  In the last iteration of 
the terrorist attack scenario, the pilot didn’t do anything wrong (ethically) by shooting 
down the plane but, based on the results (there were only civilians on board), he may feel 
that his decision was not the right one.  The same would be true for the private in the 
child soldier scenario; she didn’t do anything wrong (ethically) by engaging a hostile 
during the firefight, but she may still feel she did when she discovers that it was a child 
doing the shooting.  The disconnect between these two interpretations of the rightness of 
the act could be seen as a difference in how the act is framed by those involved:  the 
DND/CF would view the actions from within an ethical frame, while the pilot and private 
potentially view, and later may re-evaluate them from within their own personal, moral 
frames. 
Ethics as taught by the DEP seems to be an organizational-level ethics, an ethics 
designed to be applied the same way by everyone, in which some behaviours are 
identified as being allowed while others are identified as being prohibited.12  In this way, 
the application of ethics can be an objective and impersonal process where the opinions 
                                                     
12 Stating that behaviour “A” is not allowed (e.g., kicking puppies), by extension, the opposite 
behaviour (not A) is allowed (i.e., not kicking puppies).  
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and values of the individual regarding a given course of action need not enter into the 
decision-making process so long as all the requisite steps are applied.  In this application 
of ethics, some behaviours are deemed to be wrong because they are prohibited (i.e., they 
are against the established rules; mala prohibita).  Morality, in contrast, relates to a 
personal set of values that the individual holds for themselves and, to a limited extent, for 
others.  This does not mean, however, that moral beliefs are unique to each individual as 
some beliefs may be common to many people (e.g., the killing of children is wrong, 
kicking puppies is wrong); some actions are mala in se (wrong in themselves).  The belief 
that there are some actions that are “just wrong” contains within it a comparison against a 
standard that transcends ethics, a standard that the individuals involved may see as one 
that cannot be violated.  It is this comparison that may lay at the heart of moral 
evaluations and moral injury; some behaviours are wrong because they are prohibited 
(ethics), while others are prohibited because they are wrong (morality); believing that the 
latter prohibition has been violated is what underlies moral injury.   
In scenario 2 (child soldier), if the private had instead made the wrong ethical 
choice (e.g., she had seen that the shooter was a child, elected not to shoot, and a unit 
member died as a result) and there was an investigation, she would likely be judged 
severely by the CF (and potentially herself as well) because she failed in her duty to 
protect fellow unit members by engaging an insurgent; the child-soldier is viewed as a 
soldier from the frame of ethics.  The way the scenario was written, the private does 
shoot at the insurgent and later realizes that she is responsible for the death of a child 
causing a conflict within herself.  The source of this conflict is her belief that killing 
children is mala in se; the facts that she was in a firefight and the child was shooting at 
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her unit, while relevant at the time she made her decision, are no longer relevant to her 
upon reflection since she is now comparing her actions against this inviolable higher 
standard and using this as the standard against which to make a moral judgement about 
the rightness or wrongness of her actions, and by extension, also judging herself as a 
person.  While in areas other than the military the distinction between ethics and morality 
may be more academic, the military is an organization in which behaviour is highly 
governed by the application of rules and regulations, so the distinction between ethics and 
morality may be of greater importance.  Service members, in essence, serve two masters: 
as members of the military on deployment they operate as parts of a larger machine with 
their behaviour is governed by rules and regulations (ethics) meant to ensure mission 
success.  However, they still remain individuals in their own right and as such, are also 
governed by, and judge themselves according to, their own core beliefs (morality). 
While the DEP predominantly uses the term “ethics” and speaks of “ethical 
decision-making,” it also uses the term “morality” in some places (e.g., in their definition 
of courage: “Facing challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination and 
strength of character” (Department of National Defence, 2012, p. 10)), and at other times 
uses “ethical and moral;” yet the DEP does not define these terms in any of the reviewed 
documents so that the distinction between them is made clear.  This may partially be a 
result of the programme’s more superficial coverage of some core philosophical concepts 
to ensure maximum understanding of programme participants; they assume that the 
participants understand at a visceral level that the two concepts (ethics and morality) 
differ, even if they cannot explain precisely how they differ in words.13  This assumed 
                                                     
13 If a person as done something that is “unethical,” participants understand that this is bad (i.e., it 
is wrong because it is prohibited); the person broke an established rule.  But if a person has done 
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intuitive understanding may make their codification into specific guidelines especially 
challenging (Mileham, 2016).  By using both terms interchangeably in their instruction 
and course materials, however, the DEP risks creating the appearance that the two terms 
are synonymous and glossing over the inherent, viscerally understood, differences 
between the two concepts.  By extension, this confusing of terms might be indicative of a 
belief within the DND/CF that the ethics-focussed training they provide to their service 
members will also assist them in making morally correct decisions, and as such, pre-empt 
the development of a moral injury.  As the scenarios demonstrate, this assumption may 
not be true; individuals can make ethically correct actions (i.e., decisions resulting from 
working through the ethical decision-making process) yet still sustain a moral injury as a 
result of their choices.   
This would seem to indicate that ethics and morality may exist as separate 
entities, thereby creating a four-quadrant structure where “ethical-unethical” behaviour 
exists on one axis, and “moral-immoral” behaviour on another (Figure 2.2).  Operational 
behaviours that would be both ethical and moral (quadrant A) could include such 
behaviours as neutralizing a suicide bomber before they can detonate their vest, these 
would be the least likely to be considered a PMIE.  Ethical but potentially immoral 
behaviours (quadrant B) could include acts such as shooting an individual running at a 
checkpoint who’s intent at the time was unknown but upon post-incident investigation 
was found to not have hostile intent (i.e., an innocent); if this person was found to have 
been carrying a bomb, however, then the act would fall into quadrant A – ethical and 
moral.  Quadrant B behaviours would generally be considered to be PMIE.  Quadrant C 
                                                     
something that is “immoral,” participants understand that this is qualitatively different (i.e., it is 
prohibited because it is wrong); the person broke a rule that cannot be broken.  
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(unethical but moral) would contain acts such as shooting an enemy combatant who is 
fatally wounded but would die slowly and in immense pain (i.e., battlefield mercy killing, 
the deliberate taking of the life of another on the field of battle where the killer’s intent  
 
  Morality 





Ethical A B 
Unethical C D 
 
Figure 2.2.  Four quadrants Ethical – Moral behaviour model 
 
claims to be one of mercy towards the person killed.)14  As the service member’s intent 
was to end the individual’s suffering, it is likely that they would also consider the action 
to have been morally correct, so it is unlikely to be considered a PMIE. This having been 
said, the behaviour is likely be the subject of disciplinary or even court-martial 
proceedings due to its illegality.  Finally, behaviours that would be placed in quadrant D 
(unethical and immoral), such as the massacre at My Lai during the Vietnam War, would 
also be considered to be PMIE however, the individual involved may not realize the 
immorality of their actions until much later.    
 
 
                                                     
14 Under the Geneva Conventions, battlefield mercy killings are illegal.  Incapacitated individuals 
(by injury, or being unconsciousness), and those who have formally surrendered, are considered 
no longer to be a threat and are not to be harmed ("Geneva Conventions," 1949). The behaviour 
does still occur, however (Deakin, 2013; Friscolanti, 2010). 
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Recommendations for ways to improve DND/CF preparation for PMIE 
Based on the documents available for review, as it is designed and implemented 
currently, neither the R2MR nor the DEP seems to provide CF service members with 
sufficient preparation to deal with the kinds of potentially morally injurious situations 
they may encounter on a contemporary military deployment.  This being said, there is no 
reason this needs to continue to be the case going forward.  First and foremost, the DND 
and CF needs to complete and release the missing chapter from DND and CF Code of 
Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2012) that relates to values and 
ethics in operations.  As the situations encountered on both combat and peace-support 
operations are constantly changing, sometimes even from one encounter to the next, 
creating a guidance document that will cover all eventualities will not be an easy task.  
This being said, it can be argued that some guidance is better than no guidance at all, 
which is the current state of the document it seems; documents can always be updated or 
amended as situations change.  Second, in light of the increasing possibility for 
encountering potentially morally injurious events while on deployment, it would be 
beneficial for the DEP to provide definitions of the terms “ethics” and “morality” (and 
their derivatives) in their training programs so participants are clear on their respective 
meanings and contexts for use, as well as being able to accurately identify when a 
situation requires an ethical or a moral decision be made.  Alternately, the DND/CF could 
remove references to morality from its training and guidance documents completely so 
that it becomes clear to participants and instructors alike that the training provided is only 
designed to address ethical dilemmas.  It is important to note that not every ethical 
question is necessarily a dilemma (i.e., a situation where an individual is required to make 
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a choice between two or more equal alternatives where making the choice requires a 
compromise be made that is undesirable).  Moral questions, in contrast, generally are also 
dilemmas due to the deeply held and absolute nature inherent in these beliefs.  Third, the 
DEP could incorporate into their training scenarios situations that are more reflective of 
the types of situations service members might encounter on deployment.  These could 
include situations where multiple sets of equally valid ethical rules conflict with each 
other (an ethical dilemma) and the service member needs to determine which rules they 
will follow and be able to justify why they made that choice; situations where there is no 
possibility of achieving a positive outcome no matter what choice they make (i.e., no-win 
situation); or situations where following the ethical decision-making model they are 
taught will lead them to making a decision that would be considered to be morally 
incorrect.  By introducing these situations into training in a safe, controlled environment, 
the service members will gain exposure to the inherent conflicts (personal and 
procedural) before they encounter them in the field; similar to how they are instructed in 
mental rehearsal as part of their resilience training.  Finally, with regards to the mental 
health and resilience, include training in basic coping mechanisms (e.g., positive self-talk, 
focussing on the facts of the situation) specifically focussed on encounters with a PMIE 
while deployed so they are better prepared for dealing with the feelings of conflict should 
they arise, thus potentially blunting some of the psychic impact that can result.  
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Chapter 3 
Prevalence Rate of Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE) in CF members 
For the 50 years following the Korean War the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) have 
predominantly been deployed internationally on multinational peace support operations 
(i.e., peace-making, peace building, peace enforcement, peace keeping, and monitoring) 
and humanitarian aid missions to areas of the globe affected by disasters, both natural and 
man-made.  While peace support was to be the intended foci of these missions, this does 
not mean that CF members did not occasionally have to also engage in combat while 
deployed.  During the UN protection mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992 to 1995), for 
example, Canadian troops were deployed to supervise the removal of heavy weapons 
from major cities, protect non-combatants and maintain security of UN protected areas, 
reopen the airport in Sarajevo to allow humanitarian aid flights to come in, and to protect 
these aid convoys from hostiles (Department of National Defence, 2016; Department of 
Public Information - United Nations, 2016).  They would, however, come under fire from 
both major parties in the conflict and a variety of non-governmental paramilitary groups 
using indiscriminate shelling of the cities and UN protected areas, and snipers 
intentionally targeting civilians and UN troops, to achieve their respective ends.  As a 
result, the Canadian troops were required to respond to protect both the civilians and 
themselves.  As well as violating the internationally recognized rules of war (i.e., the 
Geneva Conventions, Laws of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law (Legal 
Information Institute, 2018)), these behaviours also exposed Canadian soldiers to 
situations they had rarely witnessed previously including mass graves, genocide, and 
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other acts that would later be classified as crimes against humanity (United Nations, 
2017).   
This predominant focus on multinational peace support missions changed in 
October 2001, however, when the CF were deployed to Afghanistan as part of operations 
focussed on the identification and neutralization of members of al-Qaeda believed to be 
hiding in the country, as well as the overthrowing of the Taliban regime that was 
supportive of international terrorism (Public Safety Canada, 2018); the CF members were 
deployed specifically in a combat role (i.e., for war).  Ultimately, the CF would remain in 
the region for the next 13 years and during this time would be engaged in a different kind 
of warfighting than they had encountered previously.  As was the case with the UN 
deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, this deployment exposed CF members to combat 
situations for which they may have been unprepared, as well as exposing them to   
situations where what the ‘morally correct’ decision was either unclear or not available to 
them.  These situations could include encountering a child pointing a rifle at them, or 
when quickly determining whether the individual who just stepped around the corner is a 
hostile combatant or an innocent civilian in the wrong place at the wrong time is 
impossible.  Circumstances such as these have been postulated to lead to some service 
members experiencing a different type of combat injury; an injury caused by a 
transgression of that service member’s core moral beliefs, beliefs about what is Right, 
Just, and Fair, about themselves, others, and the world as a whole.  
The phenomenon was first termed “moral injury” by Shay (Shay, 1991, 2009) to 
describe the internal conflicts experienced by veterans as a result of what they 
encountered, and occasionally engaged in, during their participation in the Vietnam War.  
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These experiences, alternately referred to in the literature as potentially morally injurious 
experiences (PMIE; Litz et al., 2009) or as transgressive acts (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016), 
have been defined with varying levels of specificity in recent years (e.g., Currier, 
Holland, & Malott, 2015; Drescher et al., 2011) but at their respective cores remains the 
formulation put forth by Litz and his colleagues: “the perpetration, failure to prevent, 
bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and 
expectations” (Litz et al., 2009).  These PMIEs form the precursors for what may 
eventually manifest as a moral injury.  Litz et al. goes on to stipulate that the moral injury 
itself is not caused by exposure to the PMIE, but rather a result of the individual’s 
reprocessing of the event after the fact leading to a realization that some aspect of their 
moral belief system has been compromised or transgressed.  This realization of the moral 
transgression then leads to the creation of dissonance or inner conflict for the individual 
which then manifests in the actual moral injury; in effect, it is the reprocessing and 
realization of the transgression that is the cause of the moral injury. 
Predicting which individuals will go on to develop a moral injury after exposure 
to a transgressive event is a challenging prospect as what is and is not considered 
“morally permissible behaviour” can vary across culture, time, and context.  Take for 
example the near universal belief that killing another person is an immoral act and, as 
such, should not be done.  The killing of an enemy combatant in war, however, is 
allowable and is almost an expected behaviour for combat soldiers while for medical 
personnel, such action is only permissible in self-defence, and for a military chaplain 
never permissible.  Individual differences also contribute to the complexities of defining 
morally permissible and impermissible behaviours in that what may violate one 
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individual’s moral code may not violate another’s.  Another issue relates to rates of 
reporting and the concomitant prevalence rates.  As outlined above, moral injury results 
from an internal conflict which requires the affected individual first admit to another 
person, such as a colleague, therapist, or chaplain, that they are conflicted and what the 
event was that lead to this conflict.  Depending on the nature of the transgression 
involved, such an admission may bring with it the potential for interpersonal and legal 
consequences, including loss of the trust or respect of their colleagues, courts-martial, or 
potentially even prison time.  The real or perceived risk of these outcomes may decrease 
the likelihood that individuals will report their moral conflict resulting in knowledge of 
who is affected and what occurred that led to the problem remaining unknown and 
unaddressed. 
These issues have, until the recent development of specific scales to measure 
moral injury such as the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2013), Moral 
Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 
2015), Expressions of Moral Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 
2017), and the Moral Injury Symptom Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 
2017), necessitated that researchers approach the problem of moral injury by looking 
instead at rates of its precursor PMIE. Similar to with many diseases like influenza where 
exposure to the virus does not necessarily mean that the individual will develop the 
illness, if an individual does present with the illness, they must have been exposed to the 
virus; if a service member is to develop a moral injury, they first need to have been 
exposed to a PMIE. 
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Aim of this study 
The CF does not currently collect information on either exposure to PMIE or rates 
of moral injury itself within its serving member or veteran’s populations, so the 
prevalence rates for these events are not currently known.  As such, this study set out to 
accomplish three tasks.  First, to estimate the prevalence rate of PMIE exposure within a 
representative sample of CF members who served in support of the recent mission to 
Afghanistan.  Second, validate the resulting group formations with regards to potential 
moral injury by comparing the groups on questions relating to common symptoms and 
behavioural expressions associated with having experienced a moral injury (e.g., anxiety, 
feelings of alienation, purposelessness, social withdrawal, and self-handicapping).  
Finally, using the groups created based on endorsement of questions indicative of 
potential PMIE exposure, determine if there are any sociodemographic, military, or 
deployment characteristics that may be related to said exposure. 
Methods 
Data source and study population 
The data for this study was obtained from the Canadian Forces Mental Health 
Survey (CFMHS), conducted by Statistics Canada between April and August 2013 
(Statistics Canada, 2014c).  The CFMHS is a cross-sectional survey containing a range of 
questions relating both directly and indirectly to the mental health status of Canadian 
Armed Forces (CF) members.  A subset of the population surveyed for the CFMHS (n = 
4854) serves as the target population for this study, specifically, all regular and reserve 
force members of the CF who had been deployed in support of the mission to 
Afghanistan between 2001 and time of survey completion. 
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Sampling and data collection 
For the CFMHS, Statistics Canada utilized a stratified random sampling 
framework (stratified by military rank) to ensure that the resultant sample would remain 
representative of the whole of the CF.  In order to reinforce the confidentiality of the 
survey, interviews were conducted on-base by Statistics Canada personnel using a 
computer assisted personnel interview.  These Statistics Canada personnel were neither 
affiliated with nor would they report back to the CF any responses received during survey 
administration.  
Measures 
Since the CFMHS was administered in 2013, several scales related to moral injury 
have been published (e.g., Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2015), Moral 
Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier et al., 2017), Moral Injury 
Symptoms Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 2017), Expressions of 
Moral Injury Scale (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 2017)), however, these tools were not 
available at that time.  As a result, for this study exposure to potentially morally injurious 
events (PMIE) was determined using a composite measure based on prevailing moral 
injury theory and questions from the psychometrically validated MIES and MIQ-M that 
referred specifically to PMIE as a guide.  The resultant measure was composed of 
questions drawn from the Deployment Experiences (DEX) and Post-Traumatic Stress 
(PTS) modules of the CFMHS.  The final list of questions selected was sent to a content 
expert for review and verification that they met the criteria for PMIE (B. Litz, personal 
communication, 03 August 2017).  
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The DEX questions15 selected were DEX-2 “found yourself in a threatening 
situation where you were unable to respond because of rules of engagement;” DEX-4 
“ever seen ill or injured women or children you were unable to help;” DEX-6 “ever felt 
responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel;” and DEX-8 “ever had 
difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants.”  Selected PTS 
questions included were PTS-25 “Have you ever done something that accidentally lead to 
serious injury or death of another person;” PTS-26 “Have you ever purposely injured, 
tortured, or killed another person;” and PTS-27 “Have you ever seen atrocities or 
massacres such as mutilated bodies or mass killings.”  In an effort to restrict participant 
inclusion to only those who had experienced PMIE during deployment(s), participants 
must have also endorsed one of the two following questions for the aforementioned PTS 
questions to be included in the measure: “Have you ever participated in combat, either as 
a member of the military, or as a member of an organized non-military group,” or “Have 
you ever served as a peacekeeper or relief worker in a war zone or in a place where there 
was ongoing terror of people because of political, ethnic, religious, or other conflicts?” 
(PTS questions 1 and 2, respectively).  Individuals who positively endorsed any of 
selected DEX or PTS questions were considered to have been exposed to a PMIE 
(PMIE+), the remaining participants were considered to have not been exposed to a 
PMIE (PMIE-). 
The CFMHS also contains information relating to the sociodemographic and 
military characteristics of the participants at the time the survey was completed.  This 
information includes the participants’ age, sex, marital status, educational attainment, 
                                                     
15 All DEX questions are preceded by “During any [Canadian Forces] deployment, have you …” 
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rank category (Junior Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) [Private to Master Corporal], 
Senior NCM [Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer], or Officer), component (regular force, 
reserve force), previous exposure to mental health training, and information relating to 
their Afghanistan deployment. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 23 and STATA 15, with results 
being weighted and an alpha level set to 0.05.  List-wise deletion was used to ensure all 
analyses were conducted on complete cases.  Statistics Canada provided the final sample 
weights (adjusting for initial sampling weight, removal of outliers, and participant non-
response) so that the estimates produced from the CFMHS data would be reflective of the 
entire Canadian Armed Forces population at time of survey (n = 68,866) and not just the 
sample (Statistics Canada, 2014a).  A bootstrapping technique using sampling weights 
(500 bootstrap samples also provided by Statistics Canada) was used to account for the 
complex survey design (Statistics Canada, 2014d).  Per Statistics Canada requirements 
for release of confidential data, all final cell counts were rounded to the nearest 20, so as 
to protect the identity of respondents.  Descriptive statistics were calculated for each 
variable used in the analyses (e.g., socio-demographic, military, mental-health training, 
and deployment related characteristics), and used as covariates in logistic regressions 
conducted to explore the impact they had on exposure to PMIE.  With regards to Mental 
Health Training, only the final composite question (i.e., “Any mental health training in 
the last 5 years”) was used as a covariate in the regression analysis.  Adjusted Odds 
Ratios (AOR) were calculated for the logistic regressions rather than the usual regression 
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coefficient (i.e., β) to ease the interpretation of results.  The AOR indicates the odds of a 
given outcome occurring (e.g., developing the flu) if the individual was exposed to a 
specific event or stimulus (e.g., receiving the flu shot) compared with the odds of the 
same outcome occurring without said exposure (e.g., not receiving the flu shot), when all 
other covariates (e.g., age, sex, marital status, etc.) are kept constant. 
Ethics approval 
The original data collection procedures for the survey and access to the resultant 
database containing the survey results were reviewed and approved by the relevant 
committees at Statistics Canada that serve these purposes in terms of ethical treatment of 
participants, following the principles detailed in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct of Research Involving Humans (TCPS-2).  The Research Ethics Board of 
Western University provided a waiver for this study as it constitutes a secondary data 
analysis, which does not require an ethical review under TCPS-2. 
Results 
The weighted demographic, military, and deployment characteristics of survey 
respondents are presented in Table 3.1.  Of those CF members who were deployed in 
support of the mission to Afghanistan, just over 86% were in the Regular Forces, 48% 
had ranks of Master-Corporal or below (i.e., Junior Non-Commissioned Member), and 
51% had finished post-secondary education (i.e., college or university graduate).  With 
regards to having received some form of mental health training in the five-years prior to 
survey administration, endorsement rates ranged from almost 14% (During trades 
training) to almost 64% (at the end of their deployment), with 84% indicating that they 
had received some mental health training during the stated time period.  Almost two-
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Table 3.1.   
Demographic, Military, and Deployment Characteristics (Weighted N = 33,440) 
Characteristic Weighted % 95% CI 
Sociodemographic   
Sex   
   Male 89.20 88.20 – 90.20 
   Female 10.80 9.80 – 11.80 
Age (years)   
   19-24 4.06 3.43 – 4.69 
   25-34 36.58 35.23 – 37.92 
   35-44 34.43 33.11 – 35.74 
   45-54 22.98 21.79 – 24.16 
   55 and over 2.03 1.70 – 2.35 
Marital Status   
   Married or Common-law 72.73 71.42 – 74.04 
   Widowed, Separated, or Divorced 8.41 7.54 – 9.28 
   Single (never married) 18.85 17.73 – 19.98 
Education   
   Less than secondary school graduation 4.55 3.93 – 5.17 
   Secondary school graduate 28.90 27.48 – 30.33 
   Some post-secondary 9.22 8.32 – 10.11 
   Post-secondary graduation 51.23 49.66 – 52.79 
   More than post-secondary graduation 6.10 5.49 – 6.72 
Military Factors    
Military Component    
   Regular Forces  86.69 86.61 – 86.78 
   Reserve Forces  13.37 13.28 – 13.45 
Rank Group*    
   Junior NCM  48.21 47.74 – 48.68 
   Senior NCM  31.74 31.35 – 32.14 
   Officer  20.05 19.78 – 20.31 
Mental Health Training last 5 years (endorsed)   
   In preparation for CF deployment 58.92 57.47 – 60.38 
   At the end of CF deployment 63.71 62.26 – 65.17 
   Preparation for a higher rank 33.35 31.90 – 34.81 
   During trades training 13.89 12.81 – 14.98 
   By PSP personnel/health office 20.48 19.20 – 21.76 
   Routine training/professional development 46.83 45.27 – 48.38 
   Any mental health training in the last 5 years 83.89 82.77 – 85.01 
Total number of days deployed to Afghanistan 
   < 120 days  13.67 12.60 – 14.74 
   121 – 240 days  57.25 55.74 – 58.77 
   241 – 360 days  14.15 13.04 – 15.25 
   Over 361 days  14.93 13.85 – 16.00 
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Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE) 
Exposure to any PMIE   
   Not exposed (PMIE-) 34.84 33.37 – 36.32 
   Exposed (PMIE+) 65.21 63.74 – 66.68 
Specific PMIE (endorsed experience)   
   Accidentally caused serious injury or death of  
   another person 
6.11 5.31 – 6.92 
   Purposely injured, tortured, or killed another  
   person  
15.94 14.77 – 17.11 
   Saw atrocities or massacres  29.33 27.87 – 30.79 
   Found self in threatening situation where you  
   were unable to respond due to ROE  
35.41 33.90 – 36.92 
   Seen ill or injured women or children who you  
   were unable to help  
48.37 46.68 – 50.07 
   Felt responsible for the death of Canadian or  
   allied personnel  
8.41 7.48 – 9.35 
   Had difficulty distinguishing between  
   combatants and non-combatants  
43.55 41.87 – 45.24 
Note: CF = Canadian Armed Forces, Junior NCM = Private to Master Corporal, NCM = 
non-commissioned member, PMIE = Potentially Morally Injurious Event, PSP = 
Personnel Support Program, ROE = Rules of Engagement, Senior NCM = Sargent to 
Chief Warrant Officer 
 
thirds (65.21%) of deployed personnel indicated that they had experienced at least one 
event that could be considered a PMIE.  This included 48.37% seeing ill or injured 
women and children that they were unable to help, 43.55% reported being in situations 
where they could not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and 35.41% 
reported finding themselves in threatening situations where they were unable to respond 
due to the rules of engagement (ROE) set out for the mission.  
A comparison of available survey questions related to common symptoms and 
behavioural expressions by PMIE grouping is presented in Table 3.2.  With the exception 
of a feeling of belonging to their community, the distributions of responses differed 
significantly between groups according to their PMIE exposure status (< 0.001 p ≤ 
0.003).   
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Logistic regression models for exposure to any PMIE and component PMIE sub-
questions are presented in Table 3.3.  Variables found to be associated with a statistically 
significant increase in endorsement of any PMIE exposure (i.e., endorsement of any 
single PMIE sub-question) included being in the youngest age group relative to the oldest 
group (AOR: 2.08, 95% CI: 1.16 – 3.73), being a member of the Reserve Forces 
(AOR:1.46, 95% CI: 1.27 – 1.68), being in the Senior NCM rank group compared to 
being an Officer (AOR: 1.30, 95% CI: 1.07 – 1.59), having received any mental health 
training in the previous five years (AOR: 1.92, 95% CI: 1.61 – 2.29), and having a total 
number of days deployed to Afghanistan of longer than 121 days (AOR: 1.67 – 2.56; see 
Table 3.3 for respective confidence intervals).  In comparison, being female (AOR: 0.44, 
95% CI: 0.36 – 0.55) was associated with a statistically significant lower rate of PMIE 
endorsement.  This statistically significant lower rate of PMIE endorsement for female 
service members was also found on all PMIE sub-questions with the exception of 
questions relating to seeing sick/injured women and children they were unable to help, 
and feeling responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel, which, while still a 
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Table 3.2  
Common symptoms and behavioural expressions of moral injury 
 PMIE - PMIE +  
Characteristic or Behavioural Expression 
(CFMHS Variable Name) 
Proportion 95% CI Proportion 95% CI p = 
Depression      
Feld sad/depressed in last month (DIS_10G)      
     No 57.02 54.55 – 50.49 46.98 45.19 – 48.77 < 0.001 
     Yes 42.98 40.51 – 45.45 53.11 51.32 – 54.90 
 
Felt hopeless in last month (DIS_10D) 
     
     No 84.08 82.23 – 85.92 74.20 72.52 – 75.88 < 0.001 
     Yes 15.75 13.91 – 17.60 25.71 24.03 – 27.39 
 
Felt worthless in last month (DIS_10J) 
     
     No 87.99 86.29 – 89.70 82.43 80.98 – 83.89 < 0.001 
     Yes 12.01 10.30 – 13.71 17.57 16.11 – 19.02 
 




     Yes 57.53 55.00 – 60.07 67.40 65.90 – 69.21 < 0.001 
     No 42.47 3.94 – 45.00 32.60 30.79 – 34.41 
 
      
Anxiety 
     
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Received a positive screening for ~ (SCRGAD)   
  
     Yes 42.44 39.90 – 44.98 56.04 54.21 – 57.87 < 0.001 
     No 57.73 55.19 – 60.28 43.96 42.13 – 45.79 
 
Panic Disorder; Received a positive screening for ~ (SCRPAD)  
  
     Yes 45.21 42.53 – 47.88 67.22 65.40 – 69.04 < 0.001 
     No 54.80 52.12 – 57.47 32.78 30.96 – 34.60 
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Social Withdrawal 
     
In the past month, how often did you feel …      
That you belonged to a community (PMH_05) 
     
     Every day or almost every day 59.00 56.41 – 61.61 56.99 55.23 – 58.74 0.320 
     About 1 to 3 times per week 21.27 19.16 – 23.39 21.42 19.89 – 22.95 
 
     Once or twice a month, or never 19.73 17.64 – 21.81 21.60 20.42 – 23.16 
 
When dealing with stress, how often do you … 
     
Avoid being with people (STR_6_3) 
     
     Often 7.38 6.02 – 8.73 13.28 11.95 – 14.61 < 0.001 
     Sometimes 33.62 31.18 – 36.06 35.35 33.49 – 37.21 
 
     Rarely 35.68 33.17 – 38.19 33.70 31.92 – 35.48 
 
     Never 23.16 20.96 – 25.35 17.58 16.28 – 18.92 
 
Sense of belonging to local community 
(GEN_10) 
     
     Very strong 10.65 8.96 – 12.35 10.95 9.83 – 12.06 < 0.001 
     Somewhat strong 46.74 44.07 – 49.40 41.86 39.98 – 43.74 
 
     Somewhat weak 31.44 28.98 – 33.91 31.65 29.92 – 33.37 
 
     Very weak 11.34 9.67 – 13.01 15.64 14.25 – 17.03 
 
      
Self-harm 
     
Suicidal thought – Past 12 months (DEPFSYT) 
     
     Yes 3.26 2.33 – 4.19 5.59 4.65 – 6.54 < 0.001 
     No 96.74 95.81 – 97.67 94.41 93.46 – 95.35 
 
Suicidal thoughts – lifetime (DEPFSLT) 
     
     Yes 12.18 10.46 – 13.90 18.79 17.31 – 20.27 < 0.001 
     No 87.82 86.10 – 89.54 81.21 79.73 – 82.69 
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Role or Purpose in Society 
     
In the past month, how often did you feel …     




     Every day or almost every day 67.78 66.34 – 71.22 63.73 61.96 – 65.50 0.003 
     About 1 to 3 times per week 19.55 17.45 – 21.65 22.87 21.24 – 24.49 
 
     Once or twice a month, or never 11.49 9.73 – 13.26 13.41 12.12 – 17.70 
 





     Every day or almost every day 79.55 77.41 – 81.71 74.15 72.53 – 75.77 < 0.001 
     About 1 to 3 times per week 15.71 13.85 – 17.77 17.69 16.28 – 19.10 
 
     Once or twice a month, or never 4.64 3.53 – 5.75 8.16 7.05 – 9.27 
 
      
Trust / Betrayal 
     
In the past month, how often did you feel …      
That people are basically good (PMH_07) 
     
     Every day or almost every day 68.61 66.24 – 70.98 54.23 52.36 – 56.09 < 0.001 
     About 1 to 3 times per week 24.36 22.11 – 26.60 31.07 29.26 – 32.88 
 
     Once or twice a month, or never 7.03 5.64 – 8.42 14.71 13.29 – 16.12 
 
That you had a warm, trusting relationship with others (PMH_11)  
  
     Every day or almost every day 86.45 84.69 – 88.21 80.93 79.36 – 82.51 < 0.001 
     About 1 to 3 times per week 10.81 9.23 – 12.38 14.57 13.20 – 15.95 
 
     Once or twice a month, or never 2.74 1.87 – 3.61 4.49 3.65 – 5.34 
 
      
Self-Blame or Self Handicapping 
     
When dealing with stress, how often do you … 
     
Blame yourself (STR_6_10) 
     
     Often 9.47 7.91 – 11.02 14.59 13.21 – 15.96 < 0.001 
     Sometimes 41.65 38.96 – 44.34 41.56 39.66 – 43.46 
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     Rarely 35.11 32.61 – 67.61 32.57 30.75 – 34.39 
 
     Never 13.77 12.04 – 15.50 11.28 10.02 – 12.55 
 
Alcohol abuse or dependence – lifetime (AUDDL) 
     Yes 26.12 23.84 – 28.40 37.65 35.98 – 39.32 < 0.001 
     No 73.88 71.61 – 76.16 62.38 60.68 – 64.02 
 




     Yes 2.23 1.48 – 2.99 4.59 3.80 – 5.38 < 0.001 
     No 97.94 97.18 – 98.70 95.50 94.71 – 96.29 
 
      
Satisfaction with life in general (GENGSWL) 
     
     Satisfied 94.52 93.33 – 95.71 89.09 87.91 – 90.27 < 0.001 
     Neutral 2.91 2.02 – 3.81 5.68 4.79 – 6.58 
 
     Dissatisfied 2.57 1.74 – 3.40 5.13 4.32 – 5.95 
 
Note: CFMHS = Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey; PMIE- = Not exposed to potentially morally injurious event; PMIE+ = 
Exposed to potentially morally injurious event 
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Logistic regression models to determine the associations between covariates and 
the prediction of each of the PMIE sub-questions yielded mixed results (Table 3.3).  With 
the exception of female sex, none of the sociodemographic, military, or deployment 
related covariates showed a statistically significant association with endorsement of the 
question “Have you ever done something that accidentally led to the serious injury or 
death of another person?”  In contrast, endorsement of the question “Have you ever 
purposely injured, tortured, or killed another person?” was significantly associated with 
the following covariates: being under 45 years of age compared with being over 55 years 
of age (AOR: 4.53 – 6.40, see table 3.3 for respective 95% CI), and having been deployed 
for over 361 days (AOR: 1.85, 95% CI: 1.25 - 2.74).  Reporting having witnessed 
atrocities (e.g., massacres or mass killings) was statistically associated with having 
graduated from a post-secondary educational institution (AOR: 0.66, 95% CI: 0.46 –
0.96), being a Senior NCM of the CF (AOR: 1.61, 95% CI: 1.26 – 2.07), and having been 
deployed to Afghanistan for over 241 days in total (AOR: 1.40 – 1.74, see Table 3.3 for 
95% CI).    
Having a post-secondary education was also significantly associated with being 
unable to respond in a threatening situation due to ROE (AOR: 0.62, 95% CI: 0.43 - 0.88) 
when compared with those with less than a secondary school education.  Holding a less 
than officer rank (AOR: 1.60 – 1.88), and being deployed between 121 and 240 days, or 
over 361 days (AOR: 1.34 – 1.53) were both associated with a higher rate of endorsement 
of the inability to respond due to ROE question see Table 3.3 for respective 95% CIs).  
Witnessing sick/injured women or children they were unable to help was associated with 
being a member of the Reserves, a Senior NCM, and having a total-days deployed 
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Table 3.3 
Logistic regression for prediction of exposure to PMIE 
Characteristic Any PMIE 
Accidentally caused 
serious injury or death of 
another person 
  AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.44 *** 0.36 - 0.55 0.34 * 0.13 – 0.90 
Age (years)     
   19-24 2.08 * 1.16 – 3.73 0.34 0.10 – 1.11 
   25-34 1.39 0.88 – 2.19 0.70 0.28 – 1.73 
   35-44 1.55 0.99 – 2.43 0.66 0.26 – 1.65 
   45-54 1.08 0.69 – 1.69 0.59 0.23 – 1.54 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Divorced 1.15 0.87 – 1.40 1.03 0.60 – 1.75 
   Single (never married) 1.02 0.84 – 1.23 1.15 0.77 – 1.73 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.75 0.52 – 1.10 0.77 0.39 – 1.52 
   Some post-secondary 0.90 0.57 – 1.41 1.19 0.55 – 2.58 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.70 0.49 – 1.02 0.71 0.36 – 1.39 
   More than post-secondary  
   graduation 
1.18 0.73 – 1.90 1.04 0.42 – 2.54 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.46 *** 1.27 – 1.68 1.09 0.79 – 1.49 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.95 0.78 – 1.17 0.84 0.53 – 1.37 
   Senior NCM 1.30 ** 1.07 – 1.59 1.05 0.67 – 1.66 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.92 *** 1.61 – 2.29 1.17 0.76 – 1.81 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed 
(days) 
    
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.67 *** 1.37 – 2.05 0.90 0.55 – 1.45 
   241-360 days 1.70 *** 1.32 – 2.19 1.07 0.63 – 1.83 
   Over 361 days 2.56 *** 1.95 – 3.35 1.04 0.60 – 1.80 





tortured, or killed 
someone 
Saw atrocities or 
massacres 
  AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.23 *** 0.13 – 0.42 0.47 *** 0.34 – 0.66 
Age (years)     
   19-24 6.40 *** 2.04 – 20.05 1.08 0.81 – 1.44 
   25-34 6.26 *** 2.15 – 18.24 0.76 0.46 – 1.24 
   35-44 4.53 ** 1.54 – 13.35 1.10 0.67 – 1.80 
   45-54 2.19 0.75 – 6.56 0.97 0.59 – 1.57 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or 
Divorced 
1.30 0.92 – 1.85 1.08 0.81 – 1.44 
   Single (never married) 0.96 0.74 – 1.24 0.95 0.77 – 1.18 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.10 0.68 – 1.78 0.78 0.54 – 1.13 
   Some post-secondary 1.07 0.63 – 1.83 0.74 0.49 – 1.13 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.81 0.50 – 1.31 0.66 * 0.46 – 0.96 
   More than post-secondary  
   graduation 
0.95 0.50 – 1.80 0.86 0.51 – 1.37 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.14 0.93 – 1.40 1.05 0.89 – 1.23 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.91 0.55 – 1.27 1.19 0.92 – 1.53 
   Senior NCM 0.96 0.69 – 1.35 1.61 *** 1.26 – 2.07 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.05 0.78 – 1.43 1.23 0.98 – 1.55 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed 
(days) 
    
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.23 0.86 – 1.75 1.16 0.90 – 1.49 
   241-360 days 1.05 0.66 – 1.64 1.40 * 1.04 – 1.90 
   Over 361 days 1.85 ** 1.25 – 2.74 1.74 *** 1.30 – 2.34 









  AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.41 *** 0.30 – 0.56 0.81 0.64 – 1.03 
Age (years)     
   19-24 1.61 0.91 – 2.85 1.24 0.72 – 2.14 
   25-34 1.02 0.64 – 1.62 1.07 0.70 – 1.64 
   35-44 0.98 0.63 – 1.55 1.30 0.52 – 1.97 
   45-54 0.95 0.61 – 1.51 0.95 0.63 – 1.45 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Divorced 1.00 0.77 – 1.32 1.11 0.88 – 1.41 
   Single (never married) 0.97 0.80 – 1.17 1.04 0.86 – 1.24 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.80 0.56 – 1.15 0.89 0.62 – 1.28 
   Some post-secondary 0.74 0.50 – 1.12 0.86 0.57 – 1.29 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.62 ** 0.43 – 0.88 0.82 0.57 – 1.17 
   More than post-secondary  
   graduation 
0.66 0.40 – 1.10 1.39 0.89 – 2.17 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.08 0.93 – 1.25 1.19 * 1.03 – 1.37 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 1.59 *** 1.26 – 2.02 1.12 0.92 – 1.37 
   Senior NCM 1.88 *** 1.49 – 2.38 1.46 *** 1.19 – 1.79 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.07 0.85 – 1.34 1.07 0.87 – 1.31 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed 
(days) 
    
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.34 * 1.06 – 1.70 1.27 * 1.03 – 1.56 
   241-360 days 1.22 0.92 – 1.62 1.26 0.97 – 1.63 
   Over 361 days 1.53 ** 1.15 – 2.03 1.48 ** 1.15 – 1.92 
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Characteristic 
Felt responsible for the 
death of Canadian or 
allied personnel 
Difficulty distinguishing 
between combatants and 
non-combatants 
  AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.93 0.61 – 1.43 0.33 *** 0.25 – 0.43 
Age (years)     
   19-24 1.91 0.67 – 5.49 1.55 0.85 – 2.81 
   25-34 2.22 0.90 – 5.45 1.17 0.73 – 1.88 
   35-44 1.84 0.77 – 4.39 1.20 0.75 – 1.92 
   45-54 1.52 0.63 – 3.64 1.01 0.64 – 1.61 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Divorced 0.80 0.48 – 1.31 1.00 0.78 – 1.29 
   Single (never married) 1.06 0.78 – 1.42 0.94 0.79 – 1.13 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.85 0.44 – 1.68 1.15 0.80 – 1.66 
   Some post-secondary 1.07 0.51 – 2.24 0.95 0.63 – 1.43 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.91 0.47 – 1.75 1.06 0.75 – 1.52 
   More than post-secondary  
   graduation 
1.86 0.86 – 4.04 1.07 0.68 – 1.67 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.05 0.82 – 1.35 1.33 *** 1.15 – 1.53 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.78 0.54 – 1.14 0.72 ** 0.58 – 0.89 
   Senior NCM 0.90 0.61 – 1.32 0.90 0.73 – 1.10 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.39 0.93 – 2.06 1.58 *** 1.29 – 1.93 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed 
(days) 
    
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 2.13 *** 1.35 – 3.36 1.5 ** 1.08 – 1.67 
   241-360 days 1.61 0.93 – 2.82 1.24 0.96 – 1.61 
   Over 361 days 2.05 ** 1.23 – 3.41 1.83 *** 1.42 – 2.35 
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Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, MHT = Mental Health Training, NCM = Non-Commissioned 
Member, PMIE = Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = 
Secondary School 
* .01 < p ≤ .05, **.001 < p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
 
between 121 and 240 days or over 361 days (AOR: 1.18 – 1.48).  Reporting having total 
deployment durations of between 121 and 240 days, or over 361 days was the only 
covariate that showed a statistically significant association with reporting feeling 
responsible for the death of Canadian or Allied personnel (AOR: 2.13 and 2.05, 
respectively).  Finally, having difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-
combatants was significantly associated with an increased likelihood of being in the 
Reserves (AOR: 1.33, 95% CI: 1.15 – 1.54), and having deployments between 121 and 
240 days, or over 361 days (AOR: 1.35 – 1.83), while being of the lowest rank grouping 
(i.e., Junior NCM) was associated with a decreased likelihood of endorsement (AOR: 
0.72, 95% CI: 0.58 – 0.89) when compared with being an officer. 
Discussion 
Using data collected as part of the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey 
(CFMHS), a cross-sectional survey of representative sample of all regular and reserve 
force members of the CF who were deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan, 
the prevalence rate of exposure to various potentially morally injurious events (PMIE) 
during deployment was determined.  The association between various demographic, 
military, and deployment related characteristics and endorsement of PMIE exposure was 
also established.  
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Prevalence rate for exposure to PMIE 
Almost two-thirds of the CF members who were deployed to Afghanistan 
reported having experienced at least one PMIE during their deployments.  While this 
result is significantly higher that the results of other studies investigating the prevalence 
of exposure to PMIE in military populations, it is in line with their respective findings 
regarding the pervasiveness of incident exposure.  In their study of 867 active duty U.S. 
Marines who were deployed to Afghanistan, Jordan et al. (Jordan, Eisen, Bolton, Nash, & 
Litz, 2017) found that over 37% of respondents endorsed at least one question on the 
Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) at the level of “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly 
agree.” Wisco et al. found similar results in their investigation of U.S. combat veterans 
who took part in the National Health and Resilience in Veterans Study in 2013 using 
slightly more restrictive MIES criteria; 42% endorsed at least one question at the level of 
“moderately” or “strongly agree” (Wisco et al., 2017).  Differences in typical deployment 
lengths between Canada and U.S. militaries make accurate comparisons between these 
results difficult however; the typical deployment duration for a CF member is 6-months 
(Peddie & Koundakjian, 2009), while for a member of the U.S. military it is 12-months.  
The only Canadian study reporting rates of exposure to PMIE was conducted by Nazarov, 
Fikretoglu, Liu, Thompson, and Zamorski (2018).  As one of the stated goals of that 
study was to investigate the potential association between exposure to PMIE and the 
development of post-traumatic stress disorder, the questions used therein were more 
restrictive than those used in the current study.  This difference in PMIE definition likely 
contributed to the difference in reported prevalence rates of any PMIE between their 
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study (58%; Nazarov, Fikretoglu, Liu, Thompson, & Zamorski, 2018) and the current 
study (65%).   
As was the found in Nazarov et al. (2018), the two most commonly reported 
PMIE by CF members in the current study were seeing ill or injured women and children 
that they were unable to help (48%), and having difficulty distinguishing between 
combatants and non-combatants (43%).  These results likely arose in part from the nature 
of the operational deployment undertaken (i.e., counter-insurgency operations) where 
combat often takes place in populated areas, against combatants who blended in with the 
civilian population, which in turn would increase the probability of civilians being 
unintentionally injured.  In addition, insurgent forces have been known to use civilians as 
pseudo-combatants (e.g., as suicide bombers or distractions), often against their will.  The 
complex combat environment created has been associated with increased incidents of 
operational stress injuries (i.e., and persistent psychosocial problem resulting from a 
military operation) and post-traumatic stress disorder with the highest incident rates being 
reported in service members deployed to Kandahar (17%) and Kabul (15%), the two most 
populated cities in Afghanistan (Boulos & Zamorski, 2008).  Nazarov et al. (2018) 
acknowledge that the deployment related experiences that they used to create their PMIE 
exposure variable may not have captured the range of potentially morally injurious events 
that a service member might encounter while deployed.  Using the three-factor structure 
proposed for the MIES (Bryan et al., 2015) as guide (i.e., transgression by self, 
transgression by others, and betrayal), the three questions selected by Nazarov et al. could 
all be categorized as “transgressions by self.”  The current study attempted to capture a 
wider variety of PMIE, and thereby create a more complete picture of PMIE exposure, 
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through the inclusion of additional questions drawn from both the deployment 
experiences (DEX) and post-traumatic stress (PTS) modules of the survey.  Specifically, 
the DEX question about finding themselves a threatening situation where they were 
unable to respond due to rules of engagement (ROE), endorsed by over 35% of 
respondents, could be interpreted by the service member as a “betrayal” as the ROE 
prevented the individual from responding to a situation to which they believe they should 
have been allowed to respond.  The United Nations (U.N.) peace-support and 
humanitarian aid operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda where the 
ROE outlined by the U.N. actively prevented soldiers from intervening in situations that 
were not considered to be part of the mission’s respective mandates (Dallaire, 2003; 
United Nations), would be examples of such a PMIE.  Similarly, the included PTS 
question relating to the witnessing of atrocities or massacres, endorsed by over 29% of 
respondents in this study, could be viewed as an example of “transgression by others.” 
Characteristics associated with PMIE exposure. 
The likelihood of being exposed to a PMIE was found to be associated with 
several sociodemographic, military, or deployment related covariates, though the 
direction of the association varied according to question.  The most consistent finding, 
that females were less likely to report exposure to PMIE than males, was found on the 
“any PMIE” question and across 6 of the 7 PMIE subtypes.  This sex difference in 
exposure likely results from females representing less than 15% of the total Canadian 
military with only 2.4% to 5.6% (Regular and Reserve Forces, respectively) serving in 
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combat arms roles16 (Department of National Defence, 2014); the remainder serve in 
more distal roles such as logistic support, communications, or medical personnel.  The 
only other variable that was associated with a lower prevalence for PMIE endorsement 
was education, specifically graduating from a post-secondary institution, which only 
reached statistical significance twice: once for witnessing atrocities or massacres, and 
again for inability to respond to threatening situations because of ROE (34% and 38% 
reductions relative to not finishing secondary school, respectively).  Individuals in the 
rank grouping of Senior NCM (Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer) were found to have a 
greater likelihood of endorsing exposure to a PMIE, in particular witnessing atrocities, 
being unable to respond due to ROE, and seeing injured women or children that they 
were unable to help.  This finding may be a function of the length of time they have been 
in the CF, and not their rank per se (i.e., the longer a person is in the military, the greater 
the likelihood that they would have advanced in rank).  Having served for a longer period 
of time also increases the odds that they would have been deployed on the 
aforementioned UN missions to areas such as Rwanda or Somalia, where most of the 
associated PMIEs could have been experienced.  Future studies should include a variable 
that accounts for length of time in the military in order to investigate this interpretation.  
The covariate that was most frequently associated with an increase in PMIE exposure 
endorsement was deployment duration, however, the underlying reason for this 
association potentially differs.  Individuals whose total deployment duration ranged from 
121 to 240 days were associated with between a 27% and 113% increase rate in PMIE 
                                                     
16 The term “combat arms” is used by the Canadian Forces to describe the four combat-focused 
areas of occupation that make up the Canadian Army: infantry, armour, artillery, and combat 
engineers. 
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endorsement relative to those deployed for less than 121 days.  This group, however, 
represented 57% of those surveyed and the result may be a reflection of the number of 
individuals deployed and therefore are available to be exposed to PMIEs and not duration 
per se.  In comparison, individuals deployed for over 361 days were associated with 
between a 48% and a 156% increase in PMIE endorsement compared to those deployed 
for less than 121 days and thereby may be a more accurate reflection of the effect of 
deployment duration (the longer an individual is deployed, the more opportunities they 
have to be exposed to a PMIE) than those deployed between 121 and 240 days.  Future 
researchers interested in the influence of deployment duration on PMIE exposure might 
wish to create a variable that standardizes the relationship (e.g., number of PMIE 
exposures per days deployed).  
It is important to remember that since the outcome variables of interest relates to 
exposure to PMIEs and not the development of a moral injury, these results are 
associational in nature and not causal; none of the demographic, military, or deployment 
characteristics will either cause or protect service members from exposure to a PMIE.  
Using receiving a flu shot as an analogy, there is nothing inherent in receiving a flu shot 
[demographic characteristics] that will increase or decrease an individual’s likelihood of 
coming in contact with the flu virus [exposure to a PMIE], what the flu shot does affect is 
the likelihood that the individual will go on to develop the flu should they encounter the 
virus [moral injury].   The variable that would have a causal relationship with PMIE 
exposure, and in effect may underly all of the characteristics found to have significant 
associations, was not measured as part of the CFMHS – exposure to combat situations.  
Not everyone who was deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan would be 
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engaged in combat operations, so not everyone had the opportunity to be exposed to the 
types of PMIE that were captured in this study.  Consequently, future research into both 
PMIE and moral injury might wish to incorporate some type of a “combat exposure” 
variable, be it one of frequency, intensity, or duration.  
Limitations 
There are some notable limitations to this study.  The first limitation stems from 
the necessity to use a proxy measure of PMIE composed of questions available in the 
CFMHS rather than using an established and validated measure of PMIE such as the 
MIES (Nash et al., 2013) or the MIQ-MV (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015).  As a 
result, the questions used may not reflect the complete spectrum of PMIE that a service 
member may encounter while deployed, and consequently, the results may be 
underestimates of true exposure prevalence.  While these measures were not available at 
the time of either survey creation or administration, they are currently available and 
future iterations of the CFMHS would benefit from their inclusion as well as the 
inclusion of measures specifically focussed on moral injury such as the MISS-M (Koenig 
et al., 2017) or the EMIS-M (Currier et al., 2017).  Related to the use of proxy measures 
for PMIE was the questions that were selected to use as symptom and behavioural 
comparisons between PMIE exposure groups.  As the primary goal of the study was to 
estimate the prevalence rate of PMIE exposure within the Canadian Armed Forces as a 
proxy for moral injury, it was necessary to select questions that had been administered to 
all survey respondents to maintain this representativeness.  While there existed within the 
CFMHS questions pertaining to symptoms and behaviours more typically associated with 
moral injury (e.g., feelings of shame and guilt), these questions were contained within the 
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Depression module of the survey, a module that was only administered to individuals that 
screened positive for possible depression based on earlier questions; approximately 64% 
of respondents (Statistics Canada, 2014b).  Consequently, the answers from these 
questions would not be representative of the whole CF, rather only that subgroup within 
the CF.   
A second limitation relates to the cross-sectional nature of the CFMHS.  As with 
all studies that use this design, since it only captures the participants’ responses at a 
single time point, its results cannot be used to predict future events.  As the development 
of moral injury in particular is a function of the individual’s reprocessing of the PMIE, 
which can happen at any time after the event (Litz et al., 2009), longitudinal studies will 
need to be conducted to determine precisely how exposure to PMIE may be linked to the 
development of moral injury.  Third, the CFMHS is a self-report questionnaire and, as 
such, is vulnerable to a number of recall biases most importantly, social desirability bias.  
While Statistics Canada took all appropriate steps to ensure both the anonymity of 
participants and confidentiality of their responses, some of the questions asked delve into 
areas where service members may still be hesitant to respond to truthfully.  The questions 
that formed the PMIE exposure variable in particular relate to situations that by definition 
may violate the service members deeply held moral beliefs, they may have difficulty 
admitting the truth to themselves let alone a stranger who is not part of the military.  As 
self-report measures will likely continue to be the default method for obtaining 
information of this nature, future research might wish to also include supplemental 
information sources to corroborate the individual’s responses (e.g., after-action reports), 
as well as taking formal steps to ensure that there are no legal or military repercussions 
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for service members who admit engaging in unsanctioned behaviours (e.g., formal 
waivers of culpability).  Fourth, the CFMHS at times made use of multi-barrelled 
questions (e.g., Have you ever purposely injured, tortured, or killed another person?) 
which can lead to conflicted answers, especially when answer options are limited to yes 
or no.  Using this question as an example, injuring, or killing other people is sometimes a 
necessary part of a service members role, especially when deployed on a combat mission, 
so high levels of endorsement of these actions would be expected.  Purposely torturing 
people, in contrast, is not part of their role and is expressly prohibited under international 
law, and as such, low levels of endorsement would be expected.  In addition to the 
aforementioned waivers from prosecution, future researchers need to be sure that all the 
options contained within multi-barrelled questions (when they cannot be avoided) relate 
to the same concept.  For example, “injure” and “kill” both exist as points on the same 
conceptual spectrum relating to the amount or degree of harm caused to another person 
(the injury is the result of an action).  The concept of torture, in contrast, which may 
involve causing injury to an individual, also contains the underlying purpose of causing 
that injury (e.g., to get information); injury is the method of action to achieve the 
outcome and not the outcome itself.  Another potential limitation is the absence of a 
variable in the CFMHS that specified the specific year(s) each service member was 
deployed to Afghanistan, thus precluding the analysis of potential cohort effects and how 
these related to exposure to PMIEs.  The purpose and scope of the Canadian Forces 
deployment to Afghanistan changed over the duration of their various operations; 
combating international terrorism post-9/11 (2001-2003), combating insurgents and 
securing the capital of Kabul so that a new Afghan government could take power (2003-
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2008), conducting combat operations throughout the whole of Kandahar Province (2006-
2011), and finally delivering training and professional development support to various 
Afghan National Security Forces (2011-2014) so they could assume responsibility for the 
country’s security when the Canadian Forces mission ended in 2014 (Department of 
National Defence, 2018).  Related to these changes during different operational phases 
were increases in the number of fatalities the Canadian Forces sustained which peaked 
between 2006 and 2009 averaging 33 individuals per year during this time (Veterans 
Affairs Canada, 2019). 
Finally, the CFMHS was only administered to currently serving members of the 
Canadian Armed Forces, which may have led to an incomplete picture of the prevalence 
of PMIE exposure in those service members who were deployed in support of the mission 
to Afghanistan; individuals who served in Afghanistan but have since been discharged 
from the military due to physical or psychological injury, for example, would not have 
been captured in this sample. This could mean that the prevalence rates presented in this 
study may be more representative of a “high functioning” sample of CF members – those 
who were exposed to PMIE but are still able to function adequately to continue in their 
current roles.  Future research into prevalence rates of both PMIE and moral injury itself 
would benefit from administering the updated versions of CFMHS to all CF members 
who were deployed to Afghanistan, whether they are currently members of the military or 
are now considered to be veterans.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, this investigation found that exposure to 
potentially morally injurious events was a common occurrence for those Canadian Armed 
Forces members deployed to Afghanistan.  As such, further focussed research into the 
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exposure to potential morally injurious events and the concomitant emotional, 
psychological, and behavioural ramifications of such exposure is needed.  The results of 
these studies will provide a needed foundation for developing training procedures that 
will better prepare service men and women for when they encounter this new aspect of 
the ever-changing battlespace.  
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Chapter 4 
Connection between exposure to PMIE and Self-Rated Positive Mental Health 
The World Health Organization (WHO) described mental health as “a state of 
wellbeing in which the individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the 
normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a 
contribution to his or her own community” (World Health Organization, 2004, p. 10).  
Central to this definition is the individual’s ability to function, both as an individual and 
as part of their larger community.  Notably absent from this definition however is any 
mention of mental illness, specifically, it contains no requirement for the individual to be 
free of mental illness.  According to this description, it would be possible for an 
individual who has been diagnosed with a mental illness (e.g., depression, anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder), but is functioning well in society as a result of psychotherapy 
or medications, for example, to still be considered to be mentally healthy.  By extension, 
it also allows for the opposite to be true; an individual may not be mentally healthy even 
though they have not been diagnosed with a mental illness, solely because they are not 
functioning well.  Mental health and mental illness, rather than existing as opposing poles 
on a single continuum (Figure 4.1a), are seen as existing on two separate continua 
ranging from a maximal level of mental health (or mental illness) to a complete absence 
of mental health (or mental illness) (Keyes, 2014) (Figure 4.1b).  Using a physical 
malady as an analogy, an individual with untreated diabetes can experience a variety of 
symptoms as a result of their illness including fatigue, blurred vision, and slower healing 
of injuries.  With appropriate treatment such as lifestyle change or medication, these  
 
 








Figure 4.1a.  Traditional Single Continuum Model 
Figure 4.1b.  Dual Continuum Model (adapted from Keyes, 2014)  
 
 
symptoms can be managed, and the individual can live a normal life (i.e., function in 
society).  Even though they are no longer experiencing symptoms and are functioning 
well, they are nonetheless still a diabetic.  Applying the WHO definition to this example, 
they could be considered to be both “sick” and “healthy” (i.e., functional) at the same 
time.  A similar inclusion of a functional component can be seen in the frequently used 
diagnostic criterion within the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5), requiring that the symptoms the individual experiences 
“cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
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important areas of functioning” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); if this 
criterion is not met, the individual does not receive the diagnosis.17  This 
conceptualization of mental health and mental illness as existing on two separate continua 
(dual continuum model), also reflects a change in practice focus for those treating 
individuals who are living with mental illness, moving away from what has been termed 
an illness-driven model where the goal of treatment is the reduction in symptoms, to a 
model that now includes the reinforcement of behaviours that encourage positive mental 
health. (For a detailed review of the positive mental health concept, see Hubka & 
Lakaski, 2013) 
Keyes and colleagues have operationalized this dual-continua concept through the 
creation of the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF; Keyes, 2009).  The 
MHC-SF was designed to measure well-being in three interrelated spheres: First, 
emotional well-being, is characterized by happiness and an interest in and satisfaction 
with one’s life.  Second, psychological well-being, is characterized by self-acceptance, a 
perceived mastery of one’s environment, a sense of autonomy and purpose in life, the 
ability to have personal growth, as well as having positive, trusting relationships with 
others.  Finally, social well-being, which is characterized by feelings of social 
acceptance, social growth, social coherence, and that one is contributing to society.  
Based on their responses to questions designed to measure these respective spheres, 
individuals are categorized as “flourishing,” “languishing,” or as possessing “moderate” 
mental health.  The MHC-SF has been administered and validated in non-clinical 
                                                     
17 Realistically speaking, if their symptoms were not causing some form of distress (for them or 
others), it is unlikely that the individual would be seen by a clinician for diagnosis or treatment to 
begin with. 
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populations in a number of countries including Canada (Hubka & Lakaski, 2013), the 
Netherlands (Lamers, Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, & Keyes, 2011), the United 
States of America, South Africa, France, South Korea, Poland, Italy, Portugal, Iran, and 
Argentina (cited in: Franken, Lamers, Ten Klooster, Bohlmeijer, & Westerhof, 2018; 
Keyes, 2009), as well as in a population of Dutch psychiatric out-patients (Franken et al., 
2018).  The MHC-SF has also been incorporated into the Canadian Community Health 
Survey (CCHS); an annual cross-sectional survey designed to collect information of the 
health status, health care utilization, and determinants of health for the Canadian 
population, since the 2012 iteration.  
Exposure to the traumas associated with military service and how these exposures 
are related to the prevalence of mental illness has been the focus of many researchers, in 
particular the recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g., Garber, Zamorski, & 
Jetly, 2012; Hoge et al., 2004; Visco, 2009).  These conflicts have brought with them 
exposure to a new type of warfighting not experienced by service members in previous 
wars; one where their opponents are seemingly not constrained by the international 
recognized rules of war (e.g., Geneva Conventions, International Humanitarian Law).  
This abandonment of rules by one party can create situations where service members may 
witness, be unable to prevent, or even act in ways that can conflict with their core moral 
beliefs about themselves, others, and their role in the world.  The reprocessing of these 
events, alternately called potentially morally injurious events (PMIE; Litz et al., 2009) or 
transgressive events (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016), after the fact can lead them to realize 
that a core moral belief may have been violated.  This realization may lead to a state of 
inner psychic conflict or dissonance being created that the individual cannot resolve for 
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themselves.  The affect that these types of combat experiences may have on service 
members self-perceived mental health has not yet been investigated however and forms 
one of the objectives for this study. 
Aims of this study 
Using the results of the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey (Statistics Canada, 
2014b), this study aims to answer the following questions: What are the prevalence rates 
of positive mental health (i.e., flourishing, languishing, and moderate mental health) in 
Canadian Forces members deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan?  What 
sociodemographic, military, or deployment characteristics might be associated with 
positive mental health in this population?  How are the prevalence rates of positive 
mental health affected by Canadian Forces members’ exposure to potentially morally 
injurious events (PMIE)? 
Methods 
Data source and study population 
The Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey (CFMHS, Statistics Canada, 2014b) 
was the source of the data for this study.  Conducted by Statistics Canada between April 
and August 2013, the CFMHS is a cross-sectional survey containing a variety of 
questions directly and indirectly related to the mental health status of the Canadian 
Armed Forces (CF) members surveyed.  A subset of this population, specifically all 
regular and reserve force members of the CF who had been deployed in support of the 
mission to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2013 (n = 4,854), forms the target population 
for this study. 
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Sampling and data collection 
Statistics Canada utilized a stratified random sampling framework (stratified by 
military rank) to ensure that the resultant sample would remain representative of the 
whole of the CF.  In order to reinforce the confidentiality of the survey, interviews were 
conducted on-base by Statistics Canada personnel using a computer assisted personnel 
interview.  Respondents were informed that these Statistics Canada personnel were 
neither affiliated with nor would they report back to the CF any responses received 
during survey administration.  
Measures 
Potentially Morally Injurious Experiences (PMIE) 
Several scales related to exposure to PMIEs and moral injury have been published 
since the CFMHS was administered in 2013 (e.g., Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; 
Nash et al., 2015), Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier et al., 
2017), Moral Injury Symptoms Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 2017), 
Expressions of Moral Injury Scale (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 2017)), however, these tools 
were not available at that time.  Consequently, exposure to potentially morally injurious 
events (PMIE) was determined using a composite measure based on prevailing moral 
injury theory and questions that refer specifically to PMIE from the psychometrically 
validated MIES and MIQ-M as a guide.  The resultant measure was composed of 
questions drawn from the Deployment Experiences (DEX) and Post-Traumatic Stress 
(PTS) modules of the CFMHS.  The final list of questions selected was sent to a content 
expert for review and verification that they met the criteria for PMIE (B. Litz, personal 
communication, 03 August 2017).  
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The DEX questions18 selected were DEX-2 “found yourself in a threatening 
situation where you were unable to respond because of rules of engagement;” DEX-4 
“ever seen ill or injured women or children you were unable to help;” DEX-6 “ever felt 
responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel;” and DEX-8 “ever had 
difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants.”  Selected PTS 
questions included were PTS-25 “Have you ever done something that accidentally lead to 
serious injury or death of another person;” PTS-26 “Have you ever purposely injured, 
tortured, or killed another person;” and PTS-27 “Have you ever seen atrocities or 
massacres such as mutilated bodies or mass killings.”  In an effort to restrict participant 
inclusion to only those who had experienced PMIE during deployment(s), participants 
must have also endorsed one of the two following questions for the aforementioned PTS 
questions to be included in the measure: “Have you ever participated in combat, either as 
a member of the military, or as a member of an organized non-military group,” or “Have 
you ever served as a peacekeeper or relief worker in a war zone or in a place where there 
was ongoing terror of people because of political, ethnic, religious, or other conflicts?” 
(PTS questions 1 and 2, respectively).  Individuals who positively endorsed any of 
selected DEX or PTS questions were considered to have been exposed to a PMIE 
(PMIE+), the remaining participants were considered to have not been exposed to a 
PMIE (PMIE-). 
The CFMHS also contains information relating to the sociodemographic and 
military characteristics of the participants gathered from two sources:  Department of 
National Defence and Canadian Forces administrative records and directly from the 
                                                     
18 All DEX questions are preceded by “During any [Canadian Forces] deployment, have you …” 
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respondents.  This information includes the participants’ age, sex, marital status, 
educational attainment, rank category (Junior Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) 
[Private to Master Corporal], Senior NCM [Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer], or 
Officer), component (regular force, reserve force), previous exposure to mental health 
training, and information relating to their Afghanistan deployment. 
Self-rated Mental Health 
The CFMHS module on positive mental health utilized the Mental Health 
Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF) (Keyes, 2009).  The MHC-SF is a 14-item, self-
report questionnaire in which each item is designed to measure a single dimension of 
well-being within three interrelated spheres, namely, emotional well-being, psychological 
well-being, and social well-being.  Available response options are arranged to indicate 
frequencies of experiencing within the last month ranging from “every day” through 
“never” on a 6-point Likert scale (see Appendix A).  Based on their responses to the 
questions, individuals are categorized as having “flourishing” mental health if they 
responded at a high level (i.e., “every day” or “almost every day”) on at least one of the 
emotional well-being questions and at a high level on least 6 of the remaining questions, 
“languishing” if they responded at a low level (i.e., either “never” or “once or twice”) to 
the emotional well-being questions and at a low level on at least 6 of the remaining 
questions, and “moderate” if they do not meet the criteria for either flourishing or 
languishing. 
Statistical Analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 23 and STATA 15, with results 
being weighted and an alpha level set to 0.05.  List-wise deletion was used to ensure all 
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analyses were conducted on complete cases.  Statistics Canada provided the final sample 
weights (adjusting for initial sampling weight, removal of outliers, and participant non-
response) so that the estimates produced from the CFMHS data would be reflective of the 
entire Canadian Armed Forces population at time of survey (n = 68,866) (Statistics 
Canada, 2014a).  A bootstrapping technique using sampling weights (500 bootstrap 
samples also provided by Statistics Canada) was used to account for the complex survey 
design (Statistics Canada, 2014c).  Per Statistics Canada guidelines, all final cell counts 
were rounded to the nearest 20, so as to protect the identity of respondents.  Descriptive 
statistics were calculated for each variable used in the analyses (e.g., socio-demographic, 
military, mental-health training, and deployment related characteristics), and used as 
covariates in logistic regressions to determine the effect of PMIE exposure on self-rated 
positive mental health.  With regards to Mental Health Training, only the final composite 
question (i.e., “Any mental health training in the last 5 years”) was used as a covariate in 
the regression analysis.  Adjusted Odds Ratios (AOR) were calculated for the logistic 
regressions rather than the usual regression coefficient (i.e., β) to ease the interpretation 
of results.  The AOR indicates the odds of a given outcome occurring (e.g., developing 
the flu) if the individual was exposed to a specific event or stimulus (e.g., receiving the 
flu shot) compared with the odds of the same outcome occurring without said exposure 
(e.g., not receiving the flu shot), when all other covariates (e.g., age, sex, marital status, 
etc.) are kept constant. 
Ethics approval 
The original data collection procedures for the survey and access to the resultant 
database containing the survey results were reviewed and approved by the relevant 
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committees at Statistics Canada that serve these purposes in terms of ethical treatment of 
participants, following the principles detailed in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct of Research Involving Humans TCPS-2 (Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of 
Research, 2014).  The Research Ethics Board of Western University provided a waiver 
for this study as it constitutes a secondary data analysis, which does not require an ethical 
review under TCPS-2. 
Results 
The weighted sociodemographic, mental health, military, and deployment 
characteristics for survey respondents are presented in Table 4.1.  Of those deployed in 
support of the mission to Afghanistan who were surveyed, almost 73% indicated that they 
were either married or in a common-law relationship, 41% were under the age of 35, and 
over half had completed post-secondary education (i.e., a university degree or college 
diploma).   Almost 84% of respondents indicated they had received mental health training 
from the CF in the previous five years with the periods prior to and following a CF 
deployment receiving the highest rates of endorsement (59% and 64%, respectively).  
Those CF members who felt their mental health was either very good or excellent 
accounted for 56% of respondents, and almost 73% would be classified as “flourishing” 
on the MHC-SF.   
Logistic regressions were conducted to investigate the association between 
proportion of respondents assigned to each of the three levels of positive mental health 
classification according on the MHC-SF and the selected respondent characteristics are 
presented in Table 4.2.  Variables associated with statistically significant increases in 
proportions of respondents classified as “flourishing” included being between 19 and 24 
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Table 4.1 
Demographic, military, and deployment characteristics 
Characteristic  Weighted % 95% CI 
Sociodemographic 
Sex    
   Male  89.20 88.20 – 90.20 
   Female  10.80 9.80 – 11.80 
Age (years)    
   19-24  4.06 3.43 – 4.69 
   25-34  36.58 35.23 – 37.92 
   35-44  34.43 33.11 – 35.74 
   45-54  22.97 21.79 – 24.16 
   55 and over  2.03 1.70 – 2.35 
Marital Status    
   Married or Common-law 72.73 71.42 – 74.04 
   Widowed, Separated, or Divorced 8.41 7.54 – 9.28 
   Single (never married) 18.85 17.73 – 19.98 
Education    
   Less than secondary school graduation 4.55 3.93 – 5.17 
  Secondary school graduate 28.90 27.48 – 30.33 
   Some post-secondary 9.22 8.32 – 10.11 
   Post-secondary graduation 51.23 49.66 – 52.79 
   More than post-secondary graduation 6.10 5.49 – 6.72 
Mental Health Related 
Self-rated mental health   
   Poor  3.40 2.83 – 3.97 
   Fair  12.77 11.73 – 13.81 
   Good  27.86 26.52 – 29.21 
   Very Good  39.38 37.94 – 40.81 
   Excellent  16.65 15.50 – 17.79 
Positive Mental Health (MHC-SF)   
   Flourishing  72.48 71.11 – 73.85 
   Moderate  24.96 23.64 – 26.27 
   Languishing  2.63 2.10 – 3.15 
Mental Health Training last 5 years (endorsed)   
   Preparation for a CF deployment 58.92 57.47 – 60.38 
   End of a CF deployment 63.71 62.26 – 65.17 
   Preparation for a higher rank 33.35 31.90 – 34.81 
   During trades training 13.89 12.81 – 14.98 
   By PSP personnel/health office 20.48 19.20 – 21.76 
   Routine training/professional development 46.83 45.27 – 48.38 
   Any mental health training in the last 5 years 83.89 82.77 – 85.01 
Military Factors 
Military Component   
   Regular Forces  86.69 86.61 – 86.78 
   Reserve Forces  13.37 13.28 – 13.45 
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Rank Group*    
   Junior NCM  48.21 47.74 – 48.68 
   Senior NCM  31.74 31.35 – 32.14 
   Officer  20.05 19.78 – 20.31 
Deployment Related 
Total number of days deployed (days)   
   < 120  13.67 12.60 – 14.74 
   121-240  57.25 55.74 – 58.77 
   241-360  14.15 13.04 – 15.25 
   Over 361  14.93 13.85 – 16.00 
Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE) 
   Not exposed  34.84 33.37 – 36.32 
   Exposed  65.21 63.74 – 66.68 
Specific PMIE (endorsed)   
   Accidentally caused serious injury or death of  
   another person 
6.11 5.31 – 6.92 
   Purposely injured, tortured, or killed another  
   person 
15.94 14.77 – 17.11 
   Saw atrocities or massacres 29.33 27.87 – 30.79 
   Found self in threatening situation where you were  
   unable to respond due to ROE 
35.41 33.90 – 36.92 
   Seen injured women or children who you were  
   unable to help 
48.37 46.68 – 50.07 
   Felt responsible for the death of Canadian or allied  
   personnel 
8.41 7.48 – 9.35 
   Had difficulty distinguishing between combatants  
   and non-combatants 
43.55 41.87 – 45.24 
Note: Some proportions may not total to 100% as a result of Statistics Canada rounding 
requirements. 
PSP = Personnel Support Program, MHC-SF = Mental Health Continuum – Short Form, 
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, Junior NCM = Private to Master Corporal, Senior 
NCM = Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer, ROE = Rules of Engagement 
 
relative to being 55 and over (AOR: 1.92, 95% CI: 0.04 – 1.27), having more than a post-
secondary education (AOR: 1.96, 95% CI: 1.19 – 3.22), and reporting having received 
any mental health training in the previous 5 years (AOR: 1.32, 95% CI: 1.08 – 1.61).  
Being either single or widowed, separated, or divorced were associated with decreased in 
rates of flourishing compared to those who were married or living common-law (AOR: 
0.57 – 0.65, see Table 4.2 for respective 95% CIs), as was having a non-commissioned 
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rank compared to being an officer (AOR: 0.57 – 0.80).  The proportion of respondents 
classified as possessing “moderate” mental health was significantly increased in 
respondents who were of Junior NCM rank (AOR: 1.58, 95% CI: 1.26 – 1.99) versus 
Officers, and those who were not married or living common-law (AOR: 1.40 – 4.68).  In 
contrast, having more than a post-secondary education and having received mental health 
training in the previous 5 years were associated with statistically significant decreases in 
rates of moderate mental health classification (AOR: 0.49 and 0.76, respectively).  
Finally, being single (never married) was associated with an increased prevalence of a 
languishing classification on the MHC-SF (AOR: 2.23, 95% CI: 1.25 – 3.96), as did 
being of a Junior NCM rank (AOR: 3.55, 95% CI: 1.47 – 8.53).  Deployment duration 
was not statistically significantly associated with classification in any mental health 
classification (p > 0.05). 
Logistic regression models for the association between PMIE exposure types and 
the proportion of respondents flourishing, moderate, or languishing are presented in Table 
4.3 (full regression models are presented in Appendices B, C, and D, respectively).  
Controlling for sociodemographic, military, and deployment characteristics, all of the 
possible PMIE exposure types were associated with almost equal decreases in rates of 
flourishing (AOR: 0.63 to 0.75, see Table 4.3 for full AOR and 95% CI) versus not 
flourishing, with “feeling responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel” 
having the strongest association (AOR: 0.63, 95% CI: 0.49 – 0.82).   Similarly, all 
possible types of PMIE exposure were associated with statistically significant increases in 
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Table 4.2 
Associations between sociodemographic, military, and deployment factors and self-reported mental health categories. 
Characteristic Flourishing Moderate Languishing 
  AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
Sociodemographic         
Sex         
Male Reference  Reference   Reference  
Female 0.97 0.77 - 1.22 1.07 0.85 - 1.34 0.75 0.32 - 1.79 
         
Age (years)         
19-24 1.92 * 1.03 - 3.58 0.63 0.34 - 1.17 0.23 0.04 - 1.27 
25-34 1.25 0.77 - 2.04 0.96 0.59 - 1.58 0.58 0.07 - 1.05 
35-44 0.96 0.60 - 1.52 1.22 0.76 - 1.94 0.40 0.11 - 1.42 
45-54 1.07 0.66 - 1.72 1.01 0.62 - 1.63 0.66 0.18 - 2.42 
55 and over Reference  Reference   Reference  
         
Marital Status         
Married or Common-law Reference  Reference   Reference  
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced 0.57 *** 0.44 - 0.73 1.68 *** 1.31 - 2.17 1.70 0.90 - 3.20 
Single (never married) 0.65 *** 0.43 - 0.80 1.40 ** 1.13 - 1.72 2.23 ** 1.25 - 3.96 
         
Education         
Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference   Reference  
SS graduate 0.94 0.66 - 1.35 1.16 0.80 - 1.68 0.59 0.24 - 1.45 
Some post-secondary 1.28 0.84 - 1.94 0.79 0.52 - 1.22 0.86 0.33 - 2.26 
Post-secondary graduation 1.16 0.91 - 1.66 0.92 0.63 - 1.34 0.65 0.27 - 1.54 
More than post-secondary graduation 1.96 ** 1.19 - 3.22 0.49 ** 0.30 - 0.82 1.05 0.25 - 4.36 
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Military Factors         
Component         
Regular Forces Reference  Reference   Reference  
Reserve Forces 0.95 0.81 - 1.11 1.09 0.93 - 1.27 0.85 0.54 - 1.32 
         
Rank Group         
Junior NCM 0.57 *** 0.45 - 0.71 1.58 *** 1.26 - 1.99 3.55 ** 1.47 - 8.53 
Senior NCM 0.80 * 0.63 - 1.00 1.20 0.95 - 1.51 1.96 0.83 - 4.62 
Officer Reference  Reference   Reference  
         
MHT in last 5 years          
Any Mental Health Training 1.32 ** 1.08 - 1.61 0.76 ** 0.62 - 0.93 0.88 0.52 - 1.51 
         
Deployment Related         
Total number of days deployed (days)         
< 120 days Reference  Reference   Reference  
121-240 days 0.96 0.77 - 1.20 1.08 0.86 - 1.36 0.78 0.40 - 1.51 
241-360 days 1.09 0.82 - 1.45 0.94 0.70 - 1.26 0.81 0.35 - 1.89 
Over 361 days 0.85 0.65 - 1.13 1.19 0.89 - 1.58 0.97 0.44 - 2.16 
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, MHT = Mental Health Training, NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, ROE = Rules of 
Engagement, SS = Secondary School 
* .01 < p ≤ .05, **.001 < p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ 0.001, Reference category has an AOR = 1.00 
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rates of languishing (AOR: 1.71 to 3.29, see Table 4.3 for full AOR and 95% CI) 
compared with not languishing, with “accidentally causing the serious injury or death of 
another person” having the strongest association (AOR: 3.29, 95% CI: 1.78 – 6.10). 
Discussion 
Using data collected as part of the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey 
(CFMHS), a cross-sectional survey of representative sample of all regular and reserve 
force members of the CF who were deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan, 
the prevalence rate and potential sociodemographic, military, or deployment predictors of 
self-reported positive mental health as measured by the Mental Health Continuum 
(Keyes, 2009) was determined. As well, the association between exposure to potentially 
morally injurious events (PMIE) and positive mental health was examined. 
Prevalence rates for self-reported positive mental health 
 Of the Canadian Forces members who were deployed in support of the recent 
mission to Afghanistan, almost 73% would be classified as flourishing, 3% as 
languishing, and 25% as having moderate (i.e. neither flourishing nor languishing) mental 
health according to the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (Keyes, 2009).  These 
finding differ slightly from those found on the 2012 Canadian Community Health 
Survey– Mental Health (CCHS-MH), where, using the complete sample, the respective 
percentages were 77%, 1.5%, and 22% (Gilmour, 2014).  When individuals who had 
experienced a mental disorder (i.e., mood disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
substance use or abuse disorder) in the preceding 12 months were removed from the 
CCHS-MH sample, the percentages flourishing, languishing, or possessing moderate 
mental health changed to 80.7%, 0.7%, and 18.7%, respectively (calculated from data 
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Table 4.3 
Effect of PMIE exposure on Positive Mental Health category. 
  Positive Mental Health 
PMIE Type Experienced   Flourishing Moderate Languishing 
Any PMIE AOR 0.63 *** 1.46 *** 2.38 ** 
95% CI 0.54 - 0.74 1.24 - 1.70 1.36 - 4.17 
Accidentally caused serious injury or death of 
another person 
AOR 0.66 * 1.20 3.29 *** 
95% CI 0.48 - 0.91 0.86 - 1.67 1.78 - 6.10 
Purposely injured, tortured, or killed someone AOR 0.68 *** 1.23 * 2.62 *** 
95% CI 0.56 - 0.84 1.02 - 1.56 1.49 - 4.60 
Saw atrocities or massacres AOR 0.75 ** 1.24 * 1.71 * 
95% CI 0.63 - 0.94 1.04 - 1.49 1.06 - 2.76 
Unable to respond due to ROE AOR 0.68 *** 1.34 *** 2.24 *** 
95% CI 0.58 - 0.79 1.14 - 1.58 1.42 - 3.53 
Seen injured women/children unable to help AOR 0.66 *** 1.44 *** 1.82 ** 
95% CI 0.56 - 0.77 1.22 - 1.70 1.16 - 2.86 
Felt responsible for the death of Canadian or 
allied personnel 
AOR 0.63 *** 1.34 * 2.81 *** 
95% CI 0.49 - 0.82 1.02 - 1.75 1.58 - 4.99 
Difficulty distinguishing between combatants 
and non-combatants 
AOR 0.68 *** 1.35 *** 2.10 *** 
95% CI 0.59 - 0.79 1.16 - 1.58 1.36 - 3.23 
Note: PMIE = Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement 
* = 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** = 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001 
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provided in: Gilmour, 2014).  Researchers investigating population prevalence rates of 
positive mental health in other countries have found proportions that are significantly 
different than those found herein (e.g., flourishing: 20%, languishing: 14%, and 
moderate: 66% found by (Keyes, 2002)), however, these surveys are not directly 
comparable due to differences in language and format of survey administration, 
population of interest, and age ranges.   
Characteristics associated with MHC-SF classifications 
 The most consistent characteristics associated with positive mental health 
classification were Marital Status and Rank Group.  Relative to those respondents who 
reported being either married or living in a common-law relationship, individuals who 
were widowed, separated, or divorced were 43% less likely to be classified as having 
flourishing mental health, and 68% more likely to be placed in the moderate mental 
health category; they were also 70% more likely to be classified as languishing, but this 
last difference did not reach statistical significance (p = 0.10).  Similarly, individuals who 
were single (never married) were 35% less likely to be classified as having flourishing 
mental health, 40% more likely to be classified in the moderate mental health category, 
and were 123% more likely to be classified as languishing, than those who were married 
or in a common-law relationship.  These results, in particular those regarding decreases in 
flourishing and increases in languishing, coincide with the findings of Smith et al. who 
also found that being married was associated with a more favourable health status (Smith 
et al., 2007) and may be explained using social causation theory (Lee & Kim, 2009).  
This theory asserts that marriage improves psychological well-being either directly or 
through the moderating (or buffering) of negative life events.  This buffering effect is 
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believed to occur in part as a result the increased levels of social support provided by the 
family structure and increased social network size created by marriage (e.g., combination 
of social circles of both partners, in-laws) assisting individuals to deal with stressful 
situations that could affect their mental health.  Individuals who are single (never 
married) theoretically would not have access to this type of enhanced social support 
network when they return from deployment, while service members who are no longer 
married but once were (i.e., separated, divorced, or widowed), once had access to this 
network but through their change in marital status, have lost it, potentially compounding 
the effect (Williams, Frech, & Carleson, 2010). This mediation of positive mental health 
through the social support provided by family and household characteristics was also 
found in a sample of Canadian Forces members conducted in 2016 (Therrien, Richer, 
Lee, Watkins, & Zamorski, 2016).  The definitions used in the CFMHS with regards to 
marital status, however, potentially miss another potential “relationship-type” grouping 
which both the single and widowed, separated, and divorced individuals may be a part – 
those in a romantic relationship with a non-cohabiting partner who could potentially 
provide for them the same kind of social support network as that of married individuals. 
The relationship between marital status and mental health is a potentially complex one as 
factors such as marriage quality (e.g., good versus bad), marriage length, gender of 
individuals, age of individuals, and if this is a first versus a successive marriage may all 
potentially have an effect, and would benefit from further study, especially in a military 
context. 
When compared with Officers, individuals in the Junior NCM (Private to Master 
Corporal) rank group were 43% less likely to be classified as possessing flourishing 
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mental health, 58% more likely to be classified as having moderate mental health, and 
255% more likely to be languishing.  Senior NCM (Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer) 
were found to be 20% less likely to be classified as flourishing compared to those of 
Officer rank.  The pattern of increasing likelihood of classification as possessing 
moderate or languishing mental health was also seen in the Senior NCM rank grouping, 
however, failed to reach statistical significance (p > 0.05).  This finding aligns with those 
of other researchers (e.g., Smith et al., 2007; Watkins, Lee, & Zamorski, 2017) who 
found that having an Officer rank was associated with more favourable mental health 
status.  Rank had also been found to have a significant correlation with an individual’s 
marital status with NCM being more likely to be single (never married) than Officers, and 
Officers more likely to be married (Therrien et al., 2016), so the aforementioned 
explanation regarding social causation theory may hold for rank as well.  Also related to 
the buffering effect of a solid social network, individuals at the lowest ranks (i.e., Junior 
NCM), tend to have been in the military for shorter periods of time and may not have 
rebuilt the same depth of a social network as they may have possessed before they 
enlisted.  The nature of military service often entails long periods separated from (non-
military) friends and families, people may not understand why they enlisted and in turn 
begin to distance themselves from the recruit, and the increased risk of injury and death 
itself can put stresses on relationships and can cause them to falter.  In contrast, 
individuals of higher ranks, tend to have been in the military for longer and may have 
(re)formed a social network where their being in the military is potentially less 
problematic; their friends are either in the military themselves so they know and accept 
the associated hardships that come with service, or they entered into the social circle 
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when the service member were already in the military so there is no change in the service 
members social role in terms of their relationship.  As was the case with marital status, 
rank within the military is a potentially more complex concept than it may first appear 
(e.g., rank can be related to the types of duty assignments an individual receives, roles 
they serve while deployed, branch of service, etc.)  and its association with an 
individual’s mental health will be similarly complicated  
Effect of PMIE exposure on MHC-SF classification 
 Probably the most dramatic finding of this study was the affect that exposure to 
PMIE had on positive mental health classification.  Holding all other demographic, 
military, and deployment characteristics constant, it was found that individuals who 
reported having been exposed to any PMIE were 37% less likely of being classified as 
flourishing, 138% more likely to be classified as languishing, and 46% more likely to be 
classified as possessing moderate mental health (i.e., neither flourishing or languishing) 
when compared to those did not report a PMIE exposure.  This pattern of decreased 
levels of flourishing (ranging from 25% less [saw atrocities or massacres] to 37% less 
[felt responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel]) and increased levels of 
languishing (ranging from 71% [saw atrocities or massacres] to 229% increase 
[accidentally caused serious injury or death of another person]) held for all reported sub-
types of PMIE exposure.  These findings provide strong support for both the presence of 
exposure to PMIE in CF members who were deployed in support of the mission to 
Afghanistan, and it’s associated detrimental effect on the mental health of those 
members.  This is especially true for PMIEs that involved causing the death, be it 
intentional or accidental, of another individual, which would reinforce the specific 
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relationship between of this traumatic event later development of PTSD, increased rates 
of suicidal ideation and attempts, and substance use and abuse disorders proposed by 
Maguen and others (Jensen & Simpson, 2014; Maguen et al., 2017; Maguen et al., 2010; 
Maguen et al., 2011; Tripp, McDevitt-Murphy, & Henschel, 2015).   
Limitations 
There exist some notable limitations to this study.  The first stems from the use of a proxy 
measure to capture PMIE exposure that was composed of questions available in the 
CFMHS and as a result, the complete spectrum of PMIEs a service member may 
encounter while deployed may not have been captured.  Future iterations of the CFMHS 
would benefit from the inclusion of a validated measure of PMIE such as the MIES (Nash 
et al., 2013) or the MIQ-MV (Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015) or ideally a 
measure focussed specifically on moral injury, the actual outcome of interest, such as the 
MISS-M (Koenig et al., 2017) or the EMIS-M (Currier et al., 2017).   
A second limitation relates to the cross-sectional nature of the CFMHS.  Since it 
only captures the participants’ responses at a single time point, the results found cannot 
be used to predict future events.  To determine how exposure to PMIE is linked to the 
development of moral injury, longitudinal studies will need to be conducted.  Third, the 
CFMHS is a self-report questionnaire and, as such, is vulnerable to recall bias, especially 
social desirability bias.  While test administrators took steps to ensure both the anonymity 
of participants and confidentiality of their responses were maintained, some questions 
still delve into areas where service members may be hesitant to respond to truthfully 
despite these assurances.  The questions that formed the exposure to PMIE variable in 
particular relate to situations that, by definition, may violate the service members deeply 
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held moral beliefs, they may have difficulty admitting the truth to themselves let alone 
someone who is not in the military.  As self-report measures will likely continue to be the 
default method for obtaining information of this nature, future research might benefit 
from the inclusion of supplemental information sources that can be used to corroborate 
the individual’s responses (e.g., content of after-action reports), as well as taking formal 
steps to ensure that there are no legal or military repercussions for service members who 
admit engaging in unsanctioned behaviours (e.g., formal waivers of culpability).   
The absence of a variable in the CFMHS that specified the specific year(s) each 
service member was deployed to Afghanistan, thus precluding the analysis of potential 
cohort effects and how these related to exposure to PMIE and self-rated positive mental 
health, is another potential study limitation.  In particular, the number of fatalities the 
Canadian Forces (CF) experienced fluctuated significantly over the 12-year duration of 
the Afghan deployment peaking between 2006 and 2009 when on average 33 individuals 
were killed each year (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2019).  These fluctuations in fatalities 
were associated with changes in both the purpose and scope of the various operations that 
comprised the mission as a whole.  Between 2001 and 2003, for example, the CF were 
focussed on combating international terrorist entities hiding in-country and the regime 
believed to be supporting them. This focus was modified between 2003 and 2008 when 
the security of the nation’s capital, Kabul, became paramount such that a new Afghan 
government could be established; the CF mandate was broadened further to encompass 
combating the insurgency in Kandahar Province (2006-2011).  Finally, beginning in 2011 
CF members were responsible for assisting with the training and professional 
development support of various Afghan National Security Force personnel so that they 
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would be ready to take over responsibility for the nation’s security when the CF mission 
to Afghanistan would come to an end in 2014 (Department of National Defence, 2018).   
Finally, as the CFMHS was only administered to currently serving members of 
the Canadian Armed Forces, it may present an incomplete picture of both the prevalence 
of positive mental health in the CF and the affect that exposure to a PMIE may have on 
the same.  For example, individuals who served in Afghanistan but have since been 
discharged from the military due to physical or psychological injury, would not have 
been captured in this iteration of the CFMHS.  Consequentially, the prevalence rates 
presented in this study may be more representative of a “high functioning” sample of CF 
members.  Future research regarding prevalence rates of mental health issues including 
positive mental health and moral injury would benefit from broadening the sample to 
include both current members of the CF as well as those who would not be considered 
veterans to ensure that the results are as representative of the CF membership as possible. 
These limitations aside, this investigation found that the positive mental health of 
Canadian Forces members deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan is similar to 
that of the general Canadian population as a whole, but exposure to potentially morally 
injurious events while deployed has a detrimental effect on the mental health of these 
service members.  As such, further research into how the exposure to potential morally 
injurious events and the concomitant emotional, psychological, and behavioural 
ramifications of such exposure is needed.  The results of these future studies will provide 
a foundation for developing training procedures that will better prepare service men and 
women for when they encounter this new aspect of the everchanging battlespace.  
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Chapter 5 – Overall Discussion 
Using data from the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey (CFMHS; Statistics 
Canada, 2014), the current study examined a representative sample of Canadian Armed 
Forces (CF) members who were deployed in support of the recent mission to Afghanistan 
and their experiences with and exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIE).  
As the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence (DND) do not currently 
collect information on exposure to PMIE, the primary focus of the study was to estimate 
the prevalence rate of exposure to PMIE in this population.  Next, two groups were 
created according to Canadian Forces members’ reported exposure to PMIE (i.e., exposed 
to a PMIE, not exposed to a PMIE) to determine how this exposure affects the self-rated 
mental health of these CF members.  The extent and type of ethical training currently 
provided to CF members and its applicability to situations that might represent a PMIE 
was also reviewed in order to establish context for the subsequent empirical analyses. 
Prevalence estimates for exposure to PMIE 
 Questions relating to seven different events that would meet the criteria for a 
PMIE according to the definition given by Litz (Litz et al., 2009) were asked including if 
the respondent had difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, 
ever accidentally injured or killed another person, seen injured women or children that 
they were unable to help, or witnessed atrocities or massacres while on a CF deployment 
(see Table 3.1 for complete list of questions).  Of those CF members that took part in the 
CFMHS, almost two-thirds reported having experienced an event that would meet the 
criteria for being a PMIE, with the most frequently endorsed PMIEs relating to seeing ill 
or injured women and children they were unable to help (48%) and having difficulty 
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distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants (43%).  As the CFMHS used a 
stratified random sampling framework to ensure that survey respondents would be 
representative of the whole of the CF, this would translate to approximately 45,000 
service members having potentially been exposed to some type of a PMIE, with 33,000 
reporting they were unable to help sick or injured women and children, and 30,000 
having experienced difficulty distinguishing combatants from non-combatants.  These are 
likely conservative estimates of the actual exposure rates since the CFMHS only 
surveyed currently serving Regular and Reserve Force members, meaning that 
individuals who had left or been discharged from the CF prior to survey completion 
would not have been captured.   
Exposure to PMIE and self-reported mental health of CF members 
While the number of individuals exposed to a PMIE that go on to develop a moral 
injury is not currently known, in part due to the highly personal and thereby variable 
nature of the injury itself. However, if one were to use the past-year prevalence rate of 
PTSD as a rough guideline for moral injury prevalence (i.e., 5.3%; Pearson, Zamorski, & 
Janz, 2014), this would mean that over 3,600 currently serving CF members may be 
experiencing the effects of a moral injury.  The effect that exposure had on the results of 
the MHC-SF (Keyes, 2009), a self-report measure of mental health and functioning, 
would seem to support this assumption.  When the responses of all CFMHS participants 
were analysed the rates of flourishing (i.e., positive mental health and functioning) and 
languishing (i.e., negative mental health and functioning) reported by CF members were 
similar to those of the Canadian population as reported in the 2012 Canadian Community 
Health Survey – Mental Health (CCHS-MH; Gilmour, 2014).  However, when analyses 
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were conducted comparing the mental health statuses of those CF members exposed and 
not exposed to PMIEs the rates of flourishing and languishing diverged significantly.  
Individuals who reported having been exposed to a PMIE were found to be 37% less 
likely to be classified as flourishing and 138% more likely to be classified as languishing 
than those members who did not report experiencing a PMIE exposure.19  This increased 
in rate of languishing is most dramatic for those CF members who report accidentally 
killing or seriously injuring another person with this group having a 229% greater 
likelihood of languishing than those who had not.  These results clearly indicate that 
exposure to PMIEs has a detrimental effect on the mental wellbeing of CF members, 
however it is measured. 
CF training around mental health and resilience 
The mental health and resilience training (MHT) program utilized by the CF, 
entitled the Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR), has been the subject of a variety of 
research regarding content and format of delivery (e.g., Fikretoglu, Beatty, & Liu, 2014; 
Fikretoglu, D'Agata, Sullivan-Kwantes, & Richards, 2017; Fikretoglu, Liu, & Blacker, 
2016; Gaspar, Fikretoglu, Liu, & Blacker, 2017), the analysis of CFMHS data conducted 
herein may have uncovered related issue that the CF and DND may wish to address, 
namely the ability of CF members to recognize that the training they received constitutes 
MHT.  According to the training materials reviewed, R2MR training begins at the basic 
military qualifications training levels and continues throughout the service member’s 
time in the CF becoming more specialized as they rise in rank and deployment 
                                                     
19 This means that for every 100 individuals who were not exposed to a PMIE and are flourishing, 
only 63 individuals who were exposed to a PMIE are flourishing.  For every 100 individuals who 
were not exposed to a PMIE that are languishing, 238 individuals who were exposed to a PMIE 
are languishing. 
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requirements change.  This would suggest that the R2MR training is a frequent and 
consistent part of every members’ career while in the CF and yet, a significant proportion 
of CFMHS respondents (16%) reported having received no MHT in the 5 years prior to 
survey administration.  As part of the administration of the mental health and resilience 
training section, MHT was defined for participants as any “psychologically oriented 
training done in a group setting that is meant to help you cope better with stresses or 
personal problems” (p. 207; Statistics Canada, 2014) so respondents would have 
understood the types of programs and training the questions referred to.  Based on the 
questions that made up the MHT section, this result would mean that 16%, or over 11,000 
individuals in the whole of the CF, were never deployed [even though the inclusion 
criteria required that they have been deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan], 
did not advance in rank, undertook no professional development training, and did not 
receive any routine unit, trade specific, or other work-related training in the preceding 5 
years; all areas into which the R2MR has been incorporated.  While it is possible that 
these individuals may actually not have received any MHT during the recall timeframe, 
confirmation is not possible as the CF does not currently maintain registration lists for 
these courses (Zamorski, Rusu, Guest, & Fikretoglu, 2018).  An alternative explanation 
might be that these respondents did receive R2MR training but may not have recognize it 
as MHT training and, as such, failed to report having received training.  Support for this 
interpretation could be seen in the results of the only R2MR effectiveness study 
conducted to date (Carleton et al., 2018).  This study, involving a municipal police force, 
found that there were no statistically significant differences in mental health knowledge, 
resilience, or stress levels between levels determined prior to R2MR training and those at 
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either 6- or 12-month follow-up testing points.  Attitudes around mental health stigma did 
significantly improve immediately following training, however, by 6- and 12-month 
follow-ups these improvements had dissipated.  Since the primary objectives of the 
R2MR program was to increase mental health literacy and reduce stigma, that these 
results were either not found or were not maintained could be seen as reinforcing the 
interpretation that the memory of receiving the training had waned and more work needs 
to be done to improve R2MR to maximize its efficacy.  Specific research within the CF 
itself will be required to determine if the results from a police force are also applicable to 
a military sample.  Finally, establishing an ongoing attendance record for the mental 
health and resilience training programs will also help ensure that the programs’ messages 
are successfully delivered to all members of the CF in the future.  
CF training around ethics and ethical decision making 
A review of the content of ethics instruction provided to CF members and the 
ethical decision-making model they are trained to utilize in potentially ethically 
challenging situations lead to the conclusion that neither adequately prepares service 
members for exposure to PMIE when they are deployed.  Specifically, the DND and CF 
Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2012), the central document 
that codifies the requisite values, obligations, and behaviours members of both the DND 
and CF are to conform to, is missing the chapter specifically relating to appropriate 
values and ethics during operations (i.e., when CF members are deployed).  This critical 
chapter has been absent since the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics came into 
force in June 2012, since which the CF has been engaged in numerous peace support 
operations and humanitarian aid missions, as well as the recent combat mission to 
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Afghanistan.  Without the direction that this chapter is meant to provide CF members are 
required to employ the remaining chapters of the DND and CF Code of Values and 
Ethics, as well as Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in Canada (Canadian 
Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), and related key 
doctrines to guide their behaviour while on operations.  These documents are often of 
little applicability in the complex, time limited situations that arise in deployment 
situations in general, let alone the kinds of nuanced situations that can potentially lead to 
a moral injury for those involved.   
Similarly, the ethical decision-making model that CF members are taught as part 
of the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) is also too cumbersome and time consuming to 
work in an operational environment; a conclusion arrived at by others regarding previous 
iterations of the DEP and its decision-making process as well (e.g., Sanschagrin, 2006; 
Woodgate, 2004).  The major impediments to applying the DEP decision-making process 
to operational environments are the following.  First, the model requires that all the 
relevant information about the situation be available to the CF member at the time they 
need to make their decision, so they can appropriately weigh the respective advantages 
and disadvantages of all possible option alternatives and then select the ‘right one.’  In 
operational environments such as combat operations, service members may need to make 
these kinds of decisions in seconds, if not instantaneously, to avoid serious injury or 
death, making the kind of step-by-step decision-making process taught by the DEP 
inapplicable and potentially harmful.  As well, in situations involving PMIEs, the 
required information on which they are to base their decision may not become available 
until after the decision has been made (e.g., does the bundle the person running at me 
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with contain a bomb or a baby?)  Second, the model is only applicable to situations where 
the CF member involved can affect the outcomes, so it is inapplicable to situations that 
are out of the member’s control due to either restrictive rules of engagement, or situations 
that have already occurred and, as such, cannot be changed (e.g., the child soldier or 
abuse of a minor scenarios in Chapter 2).   
That the chapter relating to values and ethics in operations is currently missing 
from the central reference document for the CF provides stakeholders with a unique 
opportunity.  Rather than having to attempt to revise and update an existing chapter to 
make it fit with the modern realities of military deployments, a completely new chapter 
can be written specifically designed to address the morally and ethically complex realities 
that service members may encounter in the field, whether they be on peace-support 
operations or are once again engaged in a combat role. 
Potential directions for future research 
Research regarding moral injury is still in its early stages thus there are several 
avenues still needing to be explored.  One of these relates to how an individual’s role in 
the military, or role during a particular deployment, might affect what an individual 
would consider a potentially morally injurious event (PMIE) as well as how they may 
present with a moral injury.  For example, a doctor who must provide medical care to a 
captured enemy combatant who is known to have been responsible for the deaths of 
members of the doctor’s team.  As a doctor, he or she is bound both by their Hippocratic 
oath to help the sick, and by the Geneva conventions as a military officer (see Table 1.1, 
point 8 relating to the treatment of the sick and injured, and point 9 relating to treatment 
of prisoners of war), irrespective of her or his own beliefs about how this individual 
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should be treated (or not treated).  According to Litz (Litz et al., 2009), a PMIE involves 
the perpetrating of, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that 
transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.  What may make the issue 
reflected in the preceding example a PMIE may not be that the doctor behaved 
unethically or immorally by treating the enemy combatant, but rather that they did not 
behave unethically or immorally and refuse to treat the enemy combatant (as their core 
beliefs regarding justice may have required they do) and now they feel guilt or shame 
about having done so, or perhaps they may even feel guilty about having considered not 
treating the individual and thereby violated their various oaths.  
Related to this question is how proximity to the outcomes of one’s potentially 
morally injurious actions may affect the experience and development of a MI; this 
proximity may be physical or psychological.  With regards to physical proximity, much 
of the recent research into moral injury has been conducted with members of the Army or 
Marines who were deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan in combat roles; roles that 
would allow these individuals to directly observe the results of their actions.  Compare 
this level of exposure to that of members of an air force who would (hypothetically) fly 
into a combat zone, drop a bomb, then exit the area again; beyond potentially seeing the 
bomb explode, they generally would not directly witness the person-level effects of their 
actions.  In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, members of the navy would likely be the 
most distally connected with the results of their actions being that these conflicts occurred 
in land-locked areas.  The topic of inquiry is not the branch of service per se, while this 
may be the easiest variable to group respondents according to, but rather their distance 
from the results of their actions (e.g., an army surgeon would be located away from the 
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actual combat, and a naval aviator may still drop bombs in a land war).  With the 
increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV; “drones”) in combat situations, the 
idea of psychological distance from one’s actions may be best exemplified in the role of a 
drone pilot.  Drone pilots can operate their UAV from hundreds if not thousands of 
kilometres away through a satellite uplink viewing the UAV’s surroundings and 
behaviour on a video screen, similar to a video game.  This allows the operator to act, 
react, and witness the results of these actions in (near) real-time, however, they are not 
physically present in the same way as a fighter pilot conducting a similar combat mission 
would be.  Questions around how this possible psychological distance from their actions 
might affect the drone pilots’ view of the moral repercussions of their actions (e.g., 
killing) and how this might relate to their development of moral injury also will require 
further research. 
One important question that underlies most future studies relating to moral injury 
relates to establishing how exposure to PMIE is connected to the eventual development of 
a moral injury (MI).  As was stated earlier, if an individual develops a moral injury, they 
must have been exposed to a PMIE, however not everyone exposed to a PMIE will 
develop a moral injury; the conversion rate is unknown.  As is the case with most 
conversion research, to determine this rate will require longitudinal studies be conducted 
that follow individuals who report having been exposed to a PMIE to see who goes on to 
later develop a MI and when.  The results of these studies would be informative to 
researchers in a number of ways.  First, they would allow researchers to determine 
potential risk and protective factors relating to MI development.  Second, knowledge of 
the natural conversion rates would allow predictions to be made regarding future mental 
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illness and treatment requirements for those currently deployed to environments where 
PMIE may be common.  The best conduct of this research would necessitate that 
standardized measures be used to determine both exposure to a PMIE (e.g., the MIES or 
MIQ-M; Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015; Nash et al., 2013) as well as a 
screening for the presence of a MI (e.g., EMIS-M, or MISS-M; Currier et al., 2017; 
Koenig et al., 2017, 2018) so that results can be compared across studies. Unlike with 
other disorders and diseases where the outcome of interest is another point on the course 
of a disease and thus is as such out of the researcher’s control (e.g., the progression from 
mild-cognitive impairment to dementia; Mitchell & Shiri-Feshki, 2009), the actual injury 
in a moral injury is caused by the individual’s realization that a moral transgression has 
occurred (Litz et al., 2009), which can be effected by the researcher’s actions through the 
Hawthorne effect (or observer) effect.  Repeated administrations of a standardized MI 
screening measure, as would be typical in a longitudinal conversion study, may cause 
participants to think about their experiences more than they might have if they had not 
been part of the study.  This increase in thoughts relating to the PMIE (e.g., ‘The 
researcher keeps asking me if I feel guilt or shame about what I did when I was deployed.  
Did I do something that I should be guilty or ashamed about?’) may lead them to realize 
that their moral beliefs may have been transgressed and, in turn, potentially alter the 
natural course of MI development for that individual invalidating the predictive aspects 
of the research study.  How a longitudinal conversion study should be designed where 
part of the conduct of the research itself may affect the study’s outcome, is a question that 
is deserving of study on its own. 
MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN  175 
 
In conclusion, the results of the examinations conducted herein lend credence to 
the belief that potentially morally injurious events are a very real threat to the continued 
good mental health and functioning of the world’s militaries, whether they are deployed 
for combat or on peace support operations.  As a result, further research into both the 
assessment and treatment of moral injury as well as best practices for pre-deployment 
training and preparation are required as it is unlikely that warfighting will revert to the 
more ordered form of the past again. 
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Adult Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF) 
Please answer the following questions about how you have been feeling during the last 
month.  Place a checkmark in the box that best represents how often you have 
experienced or felt the following: 
 
 
During the past month, how 

































 1 Happy?       
2 Interested in life?       














4 That you had something 
important to contribute to 
society? 
      
5 That you belonged to a 
community (like a social 
group, or your 
neighbourhood)? 
      
6 That our society is 
becoming a better place for 
people like you? 
      
7 That people are basically 
good? 
      
8 That the way our society 
works makes sense to 
you? 




















9 That you liked most parts 
of your personality? 
      
10 Good at managing the 
responsibilities of your 
daily life? 
      
11 That you had a warm and 
trusting relationship with 
others? 
      
12 That you had experiences 
that challenged you to 
grow and become a better 
person? 
      
13 Confident to think or 
express your own ideas 
and opinions? 
      
14 That your life has a sense 
of direction or meaning to 
it? 
      
1 Adapted from Keyes, 2009.  Used with permission 
Note: The left-most column is not included on the actual questionnaire; it is included here 
to indicate which questions relate to each of the three spheres of well-being assessed by 
the MHC-SF. 




Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category - Flourishing 
Characteristic Any PMIE 
Accidentally caused 
serious injury or death of 
another person 
PMH - Flourishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 0.63 *** 0.54 - 0.74 0.66 * 0.48 - 0.91 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.89 0.71 - 1.12 0.94 0.72 - 1.24 
Age (years)     
   19-24 2.06 1.10 - 3.83 2.14 * 1.10 - 4.16 
   25-34 1.26 0.79 - 2.12 1.32 0.79 - 2.24 
   35-44 0.99 0.62 - 1.59 1.05 0.64 - 1.73 
   45-54 1.07 0.66 - 1.74 1.06 0.64 - 1.75 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 0.57 *** 0.44 - 0.73 0.58 *** 0.43 - 0.76 
   Single (never married) 0.65 *** 0.53 - 0.80 0.68 *** 0.54 - 0.85 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.91 0.64 - 1.32 1.05 0.72 - 1.53 
   Some post-secondary 1.26 0.83 - 1.92 1.38 0.90 - 2.12 
   Post-secondary graduation 1.12 0.78 - 1.61 1.35 0.92 - 1.99 
   > Post-secondary graduation 2.00 ** 1.21 - 3.30 2.53 *** 1.47 - 4.36 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.98 0.84 - 1.14 0.94 0.79 - 1.11 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.56 *** 0.44 - 0.70 0.55 *** 0.43 - 0.72 
   Senior NCM 0.81 0.65 - 1.02 0.84 0.66 - 1.08 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.42 *** 1.16 - 1.73 1.41 ** 1.12 - 1.77 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.02 0.81 - 1.27 1.11 0.86 - 1.43 
   241-360 days 1.15 0.87 - 1.53 1.28 0.92 - 1.77 
   Over 361 days 0.93 0.70 - 1.23 0.95 0.70 - 1.29 
 
 






tortured, or killed 
someone 
Saw atrocities or 
massacres 
PMH - Flourishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 0.68 *** 0.56 - 0.84 0.75 ** 0.63 - 0.94 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.92 0.67 - 1.20 0.92 0.70 - 1.21 
Age (years)     
   19-24 2.36 * 1.21 - 4.60 2.16 * 1.11 - 4.22 
   25-34 1.44 0.85 - 2.42 1.33 0.79 - 2.25 
   35-44 1.11 0.67 - 1.84 1.07 0.65 - 1.78 
   45-54 1.09 0.66 - 1.81 1.07 0.64 - 1.79 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 0.58 *** 0.44 - 0.76 0.58 *** 0.44 - 0.76 
   Single (never married) 0.67 *** 0.54 - 0.84 0.67 *** 0.54 -00.84 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.06 0.72 - 1.56 1.04 0.70 - 1.53 
   Some post-secondary 1.38 0.89 - 2.14 1.35 0.97 - 2.08 
   Post-secondary graduation 1.35 0.92 - 2.00 1.33 0.90 - 196 
   > Post-secondary graduation 2.54 *** 1.47 - 4.37 2.50 *** 1.45 - 4.32 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.94 0.79 - 1.12 0.94 0.79 - 1.11 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.55 *** 0.43 - 0.72 0.56 *** 0.43 - 0.73 
   Senior NCM 0.84 0.66 - 1.08 0.86 0.67 - 1.11 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.44 ** 1.12 - 1.78 1.43 ** 1.13 - 1.80 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.12 0.87 - 1.44 1.12 0.87 - 1.44 
   241-360 days 1.28 0.92 - 1.76 1.30 0.94 - 1.80 













PMH - Flourishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 0.68 *** 0.58 - 0.79 0.66 *** 0.56 - 0.77 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.86 0.66 - 1.12 0.89 0.69 - 1.16 
Age (years)     
   19-24 2.27 * 1.17 - 4.39 2.21 * 1.16 - 4.22 
   25-34 1.37 0.82 - 2.30 1.14 0.82 - 2.29 
   35-44 1.04 0.63 - 1.72 1.07 0.65 - 1.74 
   45-54 1.03 0.61 - 1.72 1.02 0.62 - 1.70 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 0.56 *** 0.43 - 0.73 0.57 *** 0.43 - 0.74 
   Single (never married) 0.67 *** 0.54 - 0.83 0.68 *** 0.55 - 0.84 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.98 0.67 - 1.44 0.99 0.68 - 1.45 
   Some post-secondary 1.27 0.82 - 1.97 1.29 0.83 - 1.99 
   Post-secondary graduation 1.21 0.83 - 1.78 1.24 0.45 - 1.82 
   > Post-secondary graduation 2.16 ** 1.27 - 3.65 2.31 ** 1.36 - 3.92 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.93 0.79 - 1.10 0.94 0.80 - 1.11 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.43 *** 0.42 - 0.69 0.51 *** 0.40 - 0.67 
   Senior NCM 0.81 0.64 - 1.03 0.80 0.63 - 1.01 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.43 ** 1.14 - 1.79 1.43 ** 1.14 - 1.79 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.00 ** 0.78 - 1.28 1.00 0.78 - 1.28 
   241-360 days 1.10 0.81 - 1.51 1.10 0.82 - 1.51 
   Over 361 days 0.89 0.66 - 1.19 0.89 0.66 - 1.20 
 
 




Felt responsible for the 
death of Canadian or 
allied personnel 
Difficulty distinguishing 
between combatants and 
non-combatants 
PMH - Flourishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 0.63 *** 0.49 - 0.82 0.68 *** 0.59 - 0.79 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.92 0.71 - 1.19 0.84 0.64 - 1.09 
Age (years)     
   19-24 2.18 * 1.13 - 2.21 2.24 ** 1.14 - 4.38 
   25-34 1.39 0.83 - 2.32 1.37 0.81 - 2.33 
   35-44 1.05 0.64 - 1.72 1.05 0.63 - 1.75 
   45-54 1.03 0.62 - 1.73 1.02 0.60 - 1.73 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 0.56 *** 0.43 - 0.73 0.56 *** 0.43 - 0.73 
   Single (never married) 0.68 *** 0.55 - 0.84 0.57 *** 0.54 - 0.83 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.00 0.68 - 1.46 1.02 0.70 - 1.49 
   Some post-secondary 1.31 0.84 - 2.03 1.30 0.84 - 2.01 
   Post-secondary graduation 1.27 0.86 - 1.86 1.28 0.88 - 1.87 
   > Post-secondary graduation 2.32 ** 1.36 - 3.94 2.25 ** 1.33 - 3.80 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.93 0.79 - 1.09 0.95 0.81 - 1.12 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 0.52 *** 0.40 - 0.66 0.50 *** 0.40 - 0.64 
   Senior NCM 0.77 * 0.60 - 0.98 0.76 * 0.60 - 0.97 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 1.43 ** 1.15 - 1.79 1.48 *** 1018 - 1.85 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.00 0.78 - 1.28 1.01 0.79 - 1.29 
   241-360 days 1.09 0.80 - 1.49 1.11 0.82 - 1.51 
   Over 361 days 0.87 0.65 - 1.18 0.91 0.67 - 1.22 
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, Div. = Divorced, MHT = Mental Health Training, 
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, PMH = Positive Mental Health, PMIE = 
Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = Secondary 
School.  * 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 




Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category – Moderate 
 
Characteristic Any PMIE 
Accidentally caused 
serious injury or death of 
another person 
PMH - Moderate AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 1.46 *** 1.24 - 1.70 1.20 0.86 - 1.67 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 1.15 0.91 - 1.44 1.06 0.81 - 1.39 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.60 0.32 - 1.11 0.63 0.32 - 1.23 
   25-34 0.94 0.57 - 1.54 0.97 0.57 - 1.64 
   35-44 1.18 0.74 - 1.89 1.18 0.71 - 1.98 
   45-54 1.01 0.62 - 1.64 1.07 0.64 - 1.79 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.68 *** 1.30 - 2.16 1.64 1.25 - 2.16 
   Single (never married) 1.40 ** 1.13 - 1.72 1.34 1.07 - 1.68 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.19 0.82 - 1.72 1.05 0.71 - 1.56 
   Some post-secondary 0.80 0.52 - 1.23 0.76 0.49 - 1.19 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.95 0.65 - 1.38 0.81 0.54 - 1.20 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.48 ** 0.29 - 0.81 0.40 *** 0.23 - 0.70 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.06 0.90 - 1.24 1.10 0.92 - 1.31 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 1.59 *** 1.26 - 2.01 1.57 *** 1.21 - 2.04 
   Senior NCM 1.18 0.93 - 1.49 1.13 0.87 - 1.45 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.72 *** 1.12 - 1.77 0.72 0.57 - 0.92 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.03 0.82 - 1.30 0.95 0.73 - 1.22 
   241-360 days 0.90 0.67 - 1.20 0.82 0.59 - 1.13 
   Over 361 days 1.11 0.83 - 1.47 1.09 0.79 - 1.48 
 





tortured, or killed 
someone 
Saw atrocities or 
massacres 
PMH - Moderate AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 1.23 * 1.02 - 1.56 1.24 * 1.04 - 1.49 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 1.08 0.83 - 1.42 1.09 0.83 - 1.42 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.60 0.31 - 1.17 0.63 0.32 - 1.23 
   25-34 0.92 0.54 - 1.58 0.97 0.57 - 1.16 
   35-44 1.14 0.68 - 1.92 1.17 0.70 - 1.95 
   45-54 1.05 0.63 - 1.77 1.06 0.63 - 1.78 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.63 *** 1.24 - 2.14 1.64 *** 1.24 - 2.15 
   Single (never married) 1.34 ** 1.07 - 1.69 1.34 * 1.07 - 1.69 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.05 0.71 - 1.55 1.06 0.72 - 1.58 
   Some post-secondary 0.76 0.49 - 1.19 0.78 0.50 - 1.21 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.81 0.54 - 1.21 0.82 0.5 - 1.22 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.40 *** 0.23 - 0.70 0.41 0.23 - 0.71 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.09 0.91 - 1.30 1.09 0.92 - 1.31 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 1.57 *** 1.21 - 2.04 1.56 *** 1.20 - 20.4 
   Senior NCM 1.13 0.87 1.46 1.05 0.86 - 1.43 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.72 ** 0.57 - 0.91 0.72 ** 0.56 - 0.91 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 0.94 0.73 - 1.21 0.94 0.73 - 1.21 
   241-360 days 0.82 0.59 - 1.13 0.80 0.58 - 1.11 













PMH - Moderate AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 1.34 *** 1.14 - 1.58 1.44 *** 1.22 - 1.70 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 1.16 0.89 - 1.51 1.13 0.87 - 1.46 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.57 0.29 - 1.11 0.58 0.30 - 1.12 
   25-34 0.93 0.55 - 1.58 0.93 0.55 - 1.56 
   35-44 1.18 0.71 - 1.97 1.16 0.70 - 1.91 
   45-54 1.09 0.54 - 1.83 1.09 0.65 - 1.93 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.71 *** 1.31 - 2.24 1.69 *** 1.30 - 2.22 
   Single (never married) 1.33 * 1.07 - 1.67 1.33 * 1.07 - 1.66 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.11 0.75 - 1.64 1.10 0.75 - 1.63 
   Some post-secondary 0.79 0.51 - 1.24 0.79 0.50 - 1.23 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.88 0.59 - 1.31 0.86 0.58 - 1.29 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.46 ** 0.27 - 0.78 0.43 ** 0.25 - 0.74 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.11 0.94 - 1.31 1.10 0.93 - 1.30 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 1.66 *** 1.29 - 2.13 1.69 *** 1.32 - 2.17 
   Senior NCM 1.17 0.91 - 1.50 1.18 0.92 - 1.52 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.71 ** 0.56 - 0.90 0.71 ** 0.56 - 0.89 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.07 0.82 - 1.38 1.07 0.82 - 1.38 
   241-360 days 0.95 069 - 1.32 0.95 0.69 - 1.31 








Felt responsible for the 
death of Canadian or 
allied personnel 
Difficulty distinguishing 
between combatants and 
non-combatants 
PMH - Moderate AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 1.34 * 1.02 - 1.75 1.35 *** 1.16 - 1.58 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 1.10 0.85 - 1.43 1.19 0.92 - 1.54 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.59 0.30 - 1.15 0.58 0.30 - 1.13 
   25-34 0.92 0.55 - 1.56 0.93 0.55 - 1.58 
   35-44 1.17 0.71 - 1.96 1.17 0.70 - 1.97 
   45-54 1.08 0.54 - 1.83 1.09 0.64 - 1.86 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.72 *** 1.31 - 2.25 1.71 *** 1.31 - 2.24 
   Single (never married) 1.33 * 1.07 - 1.66 1.34 ** 1.08 - 1.67 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 1.09 0.74 - 1.62 1.08 0.73 - 1.596 
   Some post-secondary 0.78 0.50 - 1.22 0.78 0.50 - 1.22 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.85 0.57 - 1.27 0.84 0.57 - 1.26 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.44 ** 0.25 - 0.75 0.44 ** 0.26 - 0.76 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 1.11 0.94 - 1.31 1.09 0.92 - 1.29 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 1.71 *** 1.33 - 2.19 1.74 *** 1.35 - 2.23 
   Senior NCM 1.22 0.95 - 1.57 1.23 0.96 - 1.58 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.71 ** 0.56 - 0.89 0.69 ** 0.44 - 0.87 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 1.07 0.83 - 1.39 1.06 0.82 - 1.38 
   241-360 days 0.96 0.70 - 1.32 0.95 0.68 - 1.31 
   Over 361 days 1.21 0.89 - 1.64 1.17 0.86 - 1.59 
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, Div. = Divorced, MHT = Mental Health Training, 
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, PMH = Positive Mental Health, PMIE = 
Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = Secondary 
School.  * 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 




Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category – Languishing 
 
Characteristic Any PMIE 
Accidentally caused 
serious injury or death of 
another person 
PMH - Languishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 2.38 ** 1.36 - 4.17 3.29 *** 1.78 - 6.10 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.88 0.37 - 2.12 0.99 0.39 - 2.54 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.21 0.04 - 1.18 0.14 * 0.20 - 0.91 
   25-34 0.26 0.07 - 1.01 0.23 * 0.06 - 0.91 
   35-44 0.37 0.10 - 1.35 0.32 0.09 - 1.17 
   45-54 0.66 0.18 - 2.44 0.59 0.16 - 2.17 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.66 0.87 - 3.15 1.75 0.89 - 3.43 
   Single (never married) 2.21 ** 1.23 - 3.96 2.16 * 1.15 - 4.07 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.62 0.25 - 1.54 0.58 0.24 - 1.41 
   Some post-secondary 0.88 0.33 - 2.30 0.67 0.26 - 1.75 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.69 0.29 - 1.63 0.55 0.23 - 1.29 
   > Post-secondary graduation 1.02 0.24 - 4.22 0.68 0.14 - 3.34 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.81 0.52 - 1.27 0.89 0.55 - 1.43 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 3.57 ** 1.49 - 8.59 4.02 ** 1.46 - 11.08 
   Senior NCM 1.89 0.81 - 4.39 1.88 0.69 - 5.14 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.77 0.46 - 1.32 0.80 0.44 - 1.47 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 0.71 0.36 - 1.39 0.69 0.33 - 1.47 
   241-360 days 0.73 0.31 - 1.71 0.69 0.23 - 1.80 
   Over 361 days 0.84 0.73 - 1.88 0.85 0.36 - 2.03 
 





tortured, or killed 
someone 
Saw atrocities or 
massacres 
PMH - Languishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 2.62 *** 1.49 - 4.60 1.71 * 1.06 - 2.76 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 1.06 0.41 - 2.75 1.00 0.39 - 2.56 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.10 * 0.02 - 0.63 0.13 * 0.02 - 0.85 
   25-34 0.18 * 0.05 - 0.69 0.22 * 0.05 - 0.89 
   35-44 0.26 * 0.70 - 0.96 0.29 0.08 - 1.09 
   45-54 0.53 0.14 - 1.92 0.53 0.14 - 2.04 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.69 0.86 - 3.33 1.75 0.89 - 3.46 
   Single (never married) 2.18 ** 1.15 - 4.13 2.15 * 1.14 - 4.05 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.55 0.22 - 1.38 0.59 0.23 - 1.51 
   Some post-secondary 0.67 0.25 - 1.83 0.73 0.27 - 1.99 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.53 0.22 - 1.31 0.56 0.22 - 1.40 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.66 0.14 - 3.24 0.70 0.14 - 3.42 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.89 0.55 - 1.42 0.88 0.55 - 1.43 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 3.95 ** 1.45 - 10.70 3.89 ** 1.42 - 10.62 
   Senior NCM 1.88 0.70 - 5.02 1.83 0.69 - 4.91 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.80 0.44 - 1.44 0.79 0.43 - 1.43 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 0.66 0.32 - 1.39 0.67 0.32 1.40 
   241-360 days 0.68 0.26 - 1.76 0.65 0.25 - 1.73 













PMH - Languishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 2.24 *** 1.42 - 3.53 1.82 ** 1.16 - 2.86 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 1.05 0.43 - 2.56 0.95 0.40 - 2.30 
Age (years)     
   19-24 0.17 * 0.03 - 0.95 0.18 0.03 - 1.04 
   25-34 .23 * 0.06 - 0.89 0.23 * 0.06 - 0.90 
   35-44 0.32 0.09 - 1.17 0.31 0.08 - 1.15 
   45-54 0.61 0.16 - 2.29 0.61 0.16 - 2.31 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.63 0.83 - 3.20 1.59 0.81 - 3.11 
   Single (never married) 2.31 ** 1.26 - 4.23 2.27 ** 1.25 - 4.13 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.61 0.25 - 1.53 0.61 0.24 - 1.51 
   Some post-secondary 0.91 0.34 - 2.40 0.88 0.33 - 2.34 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.66 0.28 - 1.59 0.60 0.26 - 1.51 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.90 0.21 - 3.88 0.82 0.19 - 3.52 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.83 0.53 - 1.32 0.83 0.53 - 1.32 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 3.73 ** 1.47 - 9.51 4.00 ** 1.56 - 10.25 
   Senior NCM 1.96 0.79 - 4.84 2.10 0.84 - 5.24 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.91 0.45 - 1.46 0.81 0.45 - 1.46 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 0.65 0.33 - 1.30 0.67 0.34 - 1.32 
   241-360 days 0.68 0.29 - 1.61 0.70 0.30 - 1.65 








Felt responsible for the 
death of Canadian or 
allied personnel 
Difficulty distinguishing 
between combatants and 
non-combatants 
PMH - Languishing AOR 95% CI AOR 95% CI 
PMIE Exposure     
   Not exposed Reference  Reference  
   Exposed 2.81 *** 1.58 - 4.99 2.10 *** 1.36 - 3.23 
Sociodemographic     
Sex     
   Male Reference  Reference  
   Female 0.91 0.38 - 2.20 1.11 0.46 - 2.70 
Age (years)     
   19-24 1.18 * 0.03 - 0.99 0.17 0.03 - 1.01 
   25-34 0.22 * 0.06 - 0.83 0.23 * 0.06 - 0.91 
   35-44 0.30 0.08 - 1.10 0.31 0.08 - 1.18 
   45-54 0.57 0.15 - 2.14 0.59 0.15 - 2.31 
   55 and over Reference  Reference  
Marital Status     
   Married or Common-law Reference  Reference  
   Widowed, Separated, or Div. 1.62 0.83 - 3.19 1.60 0.81 - 3.17 
   Single (never married) 2.27 ** 1.25 - 4.12 2.29 ** 1.26 - 4.19 
Education     
   Less than SS graduation Reference  Reference  
   SS graduate 0.61 0.24 - 1.54 0.58 0.23 - 1.45 
   Some post-secondary 0.87 0.33 - 2.30 0.87 0.33 - 2.28 
   Post-secondary graduation 0.62 0.25 - 1.50 0.60 0.25 - 1.46 
   > Post-secondary graduation 0.78 0.18 - 3.46 0.85 0.20 - 3.68 
Military Factors     
Component     
   Regular Forces Reference  Reference  
   Reserve Forces 0.83 0.52 - 1.33 0.81 0.51 - 1.28 
Rank Group     
   Junior NCM 4.12 ** 1.59 - 10.67 4.29 ** 1.67 - 11.03 
   Senior NCM 2.22 ** 0.88 - 5.61 2.28 0.91 - 5.69 
   Officer Reference  Reference  
MHT in last 5 years      
   Any Mental Health Training 0.89 0.43 - 1.42 0.76 0.42 - 1.37 
Deployment Related     
Total number of days deployed (days) 
   < 120 days Reference  Reference  
   121-240 days 0.65 0.33 - 1.29 0.65 0.33 - 1.29 
   241-360 days 0.71 0.30 - 1.65 0.68 0.29 - 1.60 
   Over 361 days 0.76 0.34 - 1.72 0.73 0.32 - 1.65 
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, Div. = Divorced, MHT = Mental Health Training, 
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, PMH = Positive Mental Health, PMIE = 
Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = Secondary 
School.  * 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001  
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lobes: A quantitative review.  The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 13, 221. 
 
 
Conferences and 6 International 
Presentations:  8 National 
   9 Provincial 
International 
1. Montero-Odasso, M, Hall, M., Hansen, K. T., Kloseck, M, & Speechley, M. (2009, July).  
Gait variability may assist in the identification of frailty.  19th IAGG World Congress of 
Gerontology and Geriatrics, International Association of Gerontology and Geriatrics (IAGG), 
Paris, France.  
2. Hall, M., Hansen, K. T., Kloseck, M., Speechley, M., & Montero-Odasso, M. (2009, May).  
Gait variability is associated with frailty.  2009 American Geriatric Society Annual Scientific 
Meeting, American Geriatrics Society.  Chicago, IL. 
3. Diachun, L, VanBussel, L, Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M. J. (2008, March).  
Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship:  Effect on geriatric knowledge, attitude and clinical skills.  
American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry Annual Meeting.  Orlando, FL. 
4. Montero-Odasso, M., Casas, A., Hansen, K. T., Gutmanis I., Wells, J., & Borrie, M.J. (2008, 
February).  Increasing gait variability with dual tasks in people with MCI: Complexity of the 
task does matter, The 2nd International Congress on Gait & Mental Function, Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands. 
5. Diachun, L.L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A.C., & Rieder, M.J. (2007, 
September).  Evaluation of the Eldercare Clerkship: Year 1 results, Association of Academic 
Psychiatry Annual Meeting, Boston, MA. 
6. Poulin, P., Hansen, K.T., Jolic, D., & Zakzanis, K.K. (1999, August).  Schizophrenia and the 




1. Diachun, L., Klages, K., Hansen, K. T., Blake, K., & Gordon, J. (2011, April).  
Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment Guide (CGAG): Can elders and their caregivers give 
content feedback to medical students?  Canadian Geriatrics Society 31st Annual Scientific 
Meeting, Vancouver, BC. 
2. Montero-Odasso, M., Casas, A., Hansen, K. T., Gutmanis I., Wells, J., & Borrie, M. J. 
(2008, May).  Increasing gait variability with dual tasks in people with MCI: Complexity of 
the task does matter, 2008 American Geriatric Society Annual Scientific Meeting, 
Washington, DC. 
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3. Montero-Odasso, M, Casas, A, Hansen, K. T., Gutmanis, I, Wells, J, & Borrie, M. J. (2008, 
May).  Test-retest reliability of quantitative gait analysis in people with Mild Cognitive 
Impairment, 2008 American Geriatric Society Annual Scientific Meeting, Washington, DC. 
4. Diachun, L. L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M. J. (2008, 
May).  Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship: Effect on geriatric knowledge, attitude, and 
clinical skills, 2008 Canadian Conference on Medical Education, Canadian Association for 
Medical Education (CAME), Montreal, QC. 
5. Diachun, L. L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M. J. (2008, 
April).  Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship: Effect on geriatric knowledge, attitude, and 
clinical skills, 28th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Geriatrics Society, Montreal, QC. 
6. Diachun, L. L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M.J.  (2007, 
November).  Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship: Effect on geriatric knowledge, attitude, and 
clinical skills, Canadian Association of Gerontology Conference, Calgary, AB. 
7. Montero-Odasso, M., Casas, A., Hansen, K. T., Gutmanis, I., Wells, J., & Borrie, M. J. 
(2007, October).  Test-retest reliability of quantitative gait analysis in people with Mild 
Cognitive Impairment, 4th Canadian Colloquium on Dementia, Vancouver, BC. 
8. Smith, K. K., Hansen, K. T., & Dasgupta, M. (2007, April).  A preliminary look at the use of 
Observational Care in an Acute Care setting.  27th Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Geriatrics Society, Banff, AB.  
 
Provincial 
1. Diachun, L., Klages, K., Hansen, K. T., Blake, K., & Gordon, J. (2011, May).  
Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment Guide (CGAG): Can elders and their caregivers give 
content feedback to medical students?  Canadian Conference on Medical Education, Toronto, 
ON. 
2. Uniac, T., Hansen, K. T., VanBussel, L., & Diachun, L. (2010, April).  The mismatch: We’re 
not teaching what they're seeing.  Canadian Geriatrics Society 30th Annual Scientific 
Meeting, Canadian Geriatric Society, Toronto, ON. 
3. Montero-Odasso, M., Hall, M., Hansen, K. T., Kloseck, M., & Speechley, M. (2009, May).  
Does gait variability contribute to the identification of frailty?  Department of Medicine, 
University of Western Ontario, Research Day, London, ON. 
4. Montero-Odasso, M., Hall, M., Hansen, K. T., Wells, J., & Borrie, M. (2009, May).  Can 
cognitive enhancers reduce the risk of falls in older adults with dementia?  An open-label 
study with controls.  Department of Medicine, University of Western Ontario, Research Day, 
London, ON. 
5. Hall, M., Hansen, K. T., Kloseck, M., Speechley, M., & Montero-Odasso, M. (2009, April).  
Is gait variability associated with frailty?  29th Annual Scientific Meeting of the Canadian 
Geriatrics Society.  Toronto, ON 
6. Diachun, L. L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M. J. (2007, 
November).  Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship: Effect on geriatric knowledge, attitude, and 
clinical skills, Aging, Rehabilitation & Geriatric Care Annual Research Day, London, ON. 
7. Diachun, L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M. J. (2007, June).  
Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship: Year 1 Results.  Regional Mental Health Care – 
London/St. Thomas Research Half-Day, St. Thomas, ON. 
8. Diachun, L., VanBussel, L., Hansen, K. T., Dumbrell, A. C., & Rieder, M. J. (2007, May).  
Evaluating an Eldercare Clerkship: Year 1 Results.  Department of Medicine, Western 
University, Research Day, London, ON. 
9. Hansen, K.T. (2002, April).  The effect of age, activity level, and peripheral vision on 
attention to moving objects.  Brain, Behaviour, and Cognitive Sciences Annual In-house 
Conference, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
 




Journal Reviewer (ad hoc): 
 Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, & Trauma    2018 – Present 
 Military Behavioral Health       2018 – Present 
 Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy  2018 – Present 
Disability and Rehabilitation       2011 – Present 




 Society for Military Psychology (APA Div. 19), Student Affiliate 2016-pres. 
 Trauma Psychology (APA Div. 56), Student Affiliate 2016-pres. 
 American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41), Student Affiliate 2004-2017 
 Canadian Geriatrics Society, Associate 2006-2010 
 Clinical Neuropsychology (APA Div. 40), Student Affiliate 2001-2007 
 
 
Professional Development and Additional Training: 
Operational Stress Injury/Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (OSI/PTSD) 
• Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-5 (CAPS-5) Clinician Training, on-line CME, 
Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (July 25, 2017) 
• Impact of Deployment-Related Risk and Resilience Factors on Post-Deployment Mental 
Health, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs 
[USA] (June 28, 2017). 
• Ethics and Professionalism – Moral Distress Series Part II: The Role of Courage and 
Culture, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs 
[USA] (June 23, 2017). 
• Resilience to Trauma and PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department 
of Veterans Affairs [USA] (December 8, 2014). 
• Pharmacological Treatment of PTSD and Comorbid Disorders (Updated), on-line CME, 
Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (July 8, 2014). 
• Cognitive Behavioral Psychotherapies for PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health 
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (June 10, 2014). 
• Overcoming barriers to PTSD treatment engagement, on-line CME, Veterans Health 
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (March 27, 2014). 
• Couples and PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans 
Affairs [USA] (March 4, 2014). 
• Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault during military service, on-line CME, Veterans 
Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (February 14, 2014). 
• Working together to address Domestic Violence among Veterans, on-line CME, CME 
Institute of Physicians Postgraduate Press, Inc. (January 24, 2014). 
• Aging and PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans 
Affairs [USA] (January 22, 2014). 
• Anger, Aggression, and PTSD (2010 VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline for PTSD), on-line 
CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (January 15, 
2014). 
• Combat Stress Injuries, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of 
Veterans Affairs [USA] (December 5, 2013). 
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• Cognitive Processing Therapy (2010 VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline for PTSD), on-line 
CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (December 3, 
2013). 
• Understanding military culture when treating PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health 
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (November 29, 2013). 
• What is PTSD?, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans 
Affairs [USA] (November 29, 2013). 
• Substance Abuse, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and Violence, on-line CME, Medscape, 
LLC (May 28, 2008). 
• Traumatic Brain Injury: Diagnosis, Outcome, and Rehabilitation, Rotman Research Institute 
Conference. Toronto, Ontario (1999). 
 
Clinical Research 
• Test construction, University of Western Ontario, London, ON (Winter 2016) 
• Investigator Training Program (ITP), 1-day Workshop, Pfizer, St. Joseph’s Health Care 
London, London, Ontario (October 3, 2008). 
• The Art and Science of Questionnaire Design, University of Western Ontario – Schulich 
School of Medicine and Dentistry, London, Ontario (February 11, 2008). 
• Power Analysis, University of Western Ontario – Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, 
London, Ontario (October 15, 2007). 
• Budgeting for Research Proposals, University of Western Ontario – Schulich School of 
Medicine and Dentistry, London, Ontario (April 30, 2007). 
 
Mental Health/General Medicine  
• Transforming Clinical Challenges in Mental Health., Executive LinksInc. (June 4, 2013) 
• Crucial Conversations Training, VitalSmarts L.C. (Nov – Dec 2009) 
• Highlights of the American Geriatrics Society 2006 Annual Scientific Meeting, on-line CME, 
Medscape, LLC (April 17, 2007). 
• Treatment Resistant Depression: A guide for effective psychopharmacology, on-line CME, 
Medical Education Collaborative [MEC] (September 24, 2001). 
• Recurrent Depression: Current Perspectives, on-line CME, Medical Education Collaborative 
[MEC] (September 30, 2000). 
 
Forensic Psychology 
• Bipolar Disorder and Aggression, on-line CME, Medscape, LLC (July 9, 2009). 
• Violence in Schizophrenia rare in the absence of substance abuse, on-line CME, Medscape, 
LLC (June 16, 2009). 
• Terrorism and trauma… The new reality, 9th Annual Forensic Conference, Forensic 
Psychiatry Program, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, London, Ontario (October 
12, 2007). 
• Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), 2-day Workshop, Darkstone Research Group, 
Whitby Mental Health Centre, and Multi-Health Systems, Whitby, Ontario, (February 22 - 
23, 2007). 
• Static-99 Pilot Online Course, Justice Institute of British Columbia (Jan. 17 - Feb.18, 2005) 
• Research, Applications, Public Policy, and Law, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health – 








• Communication of science concepts outside the bubble, University of Western Ontario, 
London, ON (June 9, 2017) 
• Developing your own course – Aligning outcomes and assessments, University of Western 
Ontario, London, ON (June 9, 2017) 
• Introduction to the scholarship of teaching and learning, University of Western Ontario, 
London, ON (March 27, 2017) 
• Successful graduate student-supervisor relationship, University of Western Ontario, London, 
ON (March 27, 2017) 
• Teaching Assistant Training program, University of Western Ontario, London, ON (January 
13, 2017) 
• Wrapping up the term – marking and proctoring strategies, University of Western Ontario, 
London, ON (November 25, 2016) 
• Threshold concepts: Teaching troublesome knowledge in the disciplines, University of 
Western Ontario, London, ON (November 25, 2016) 
• Navigating the sea of e-learning tools, University of Western Ontario, London, ON 
(November 25, 2016) 
• Negotiating office hours, University of Western Ontario, London, ON (October 17, 2016) 
• Teaching dossiers: What to include and why, University of Western Ontario, London, ON 
(July 6, 2015) 
• Professionalism: Networking at academic conferences, University of Western Ontario, 
London, ON (July 6, 2015) 
• Using social media effectively in the university classroom, University of Western Ontario, 
London, ON (July 6, 2015) 
• Designing your own course: Components of a great syllabus, University of Western Ontario, 
London, ON (July 6, 2015) 
 
